Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 18 of 18
Full-Text Articles in Law
Should Automakers Be Responsible For Accidents?, Kyle D. Logue
Should Automakers Be Responsible For Accidents?, Kyle D. Logue
Articles
Motor vehicles are among the most dangerous products sold anywhere. Automobiles pose a larger risk of accidental death than any other product, except perhaps opioids. Annual autocrash deaths in the United States have not been below 30,000 since the 1940s, reaching a recent peak of roughly 40,000 in 2016. And the social cost of auto crashes goes beyond deaths. Auto-accident victims who survive often incur extraordinary medical expenses. Those crash victims whose injuries render them unable to work experience lost income. Auto accidents also cause nontrivial amounts of property damage—mostly to the automobiles themselves, but also to highways, bridges, or …
Coordinating Sanctions In Torts, Kyle D. Logue
Coordinating Sanctions In Torts, Kyle D. Logue
Articles
This Article begins with the standard Law and Economics account of tort law as a regulatory tool or system of deterrence, that is, as a means of giving regulated parties the optimal ex ante incentives to minimize the costs of accidents. Building on this fairly standard (albeit not universally accepted) picture of tort law, the Article asks the question how tort law should adjust, if at all, to coordinate with already existing non-tort systems of regulation. Thus, if a particular activity is already subject to extensive agency-based regulation (whether in the form of command-and-control requirements or in the form of …
Letting Good Deeds Go Unpunished: Volunteer Immunity Laws And Tort Deterrence, Jill R. Horwitz, Joseph Mead
Letting Good Deeds Go Unpunished: Volunteer Immunity Laws And Tort Deterrence, Jill R. Horwitz, Joseph Mead
Articles
Does tort law deter risky behavior in individuals? We explore this question by examining the relationship between tort immunity and volunteering. During the 1980s and 1990s, nearly every state provided some degree of volunteer immunity. Congress followed with the 1997 Volunteer Protection Act. This article analyzes these acts, identifying three motivations for them: the chilling effects of tort liability, limits on liability insurance, and moral concerns. Using data from the Independent Survey’s Giving and Volunteering surveys, we then identify a large and positive correlation between immunity and volunteering. We next consider the implications of the findings for tort theory and …
Cafa's Impact On Litigation As A Public Good, Elizabeth Chamblee Burch
Cafa's Impact On Litigation As A Public Good, Elizabeth Chamblee Burch
Scholarly Works
Class actions regulate when government fails. Perhaps this use as an ex post remedy when ex ante regulation founders explains the fervor and rhetoric surrounding Rule 23's political life. In truth, the class action does more than aggregate; it augments government policing and generates external societal benefits. These societal benefits - externalities - are the spillover effects from facilitating small claims litigation. In federalizing class actions through the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), Congress, in some ways, impeded class action practice, thereby negating its positive externalities and inhibiting backdoor regulation. This Article critically considers those effects on the common good. …
Operationalizing Deterrence Claims Management (In Hopsitals, A Large Retailer, And Jails And Prisons), Margo Schlanger
Operationalizing Deterrence Claims Management (In Hopsitals, A Large Retailer, And Jails And Prisons), Margo Schlanger
Articles
The theory that the prospect of liability for damages deters risky behavior has been developed in countless articles and books. The literature is far sparser, however, on how deterrence is operationalized. And prior work slights an equally important effect of damage actions, to incentivize claims management in addition to harm-reduction responses that are cost- rather than liabilityminimizing. This article works in the intersection of these two understudied areas, focusing on claims management steps taken by frequently sued organizations, and opening a window into the black box of deterrence to see how those steps may end up serving harm-reduction purposes as …
Optimal Tax Compliance And Penalties When The Law Is Uncertain, Kyle D. Logue
Optimal Tax Compliance And Penalties When The Law Is Uncertain, Kyle D. Logue
Articles
This article examines the optimal level of tax compliance and the optimal penalty for noncompliance in circumstances in which the substance of the tax law is uncertain - that is, when the precise application of the Internal Revenue Code to a particular situation is not clear. In such situations, a number of interesting questions arise. This article will consider two of them. First, as a normative matter, how certain should taxpayers be before they rely on a particular interpretation of a substantively uncertain tax rule? If a particular position is not clearly prohibited but neither is it clearly allowed, what …
Second Best Damage Action Deterrence, Margo Schlanger
Second Best Damage Action Deterrence, Margo Schlanger
Articles
Potential defendants faced with the prospect of tort or tort-like damage actions can reduce their liability exposure in a number of ways. Prior scholarship has dwelled primarily on the possibility that they may respond to the threat of liability by augmenting the amount of care they take.1 Defendants (I limit myself to defendants for simplicity) will increase their expenditures on care, so the theory goes, when those expenditures yield sufficient liability-reducing dividends; more care decreases liability exposure by simultaneously making it less likely that the actors will be found to have behaved tortiously in the event of an accident and …
The Peculiar Challenges Posed By Latent Diseases Resulting From Mass Products, Donald G. Gifford
The Peculiar Challenges Posed By Latent Diseases Resulting From Mass Products, Donald G. Gifford
Faculty Scholarship
Legal actions against manufacturers of products that cause latent diseases, such as asbestos products, cigarettes, lead-pigment, and Agent Orange, are the signature torts of our time. Yet within this rather important subset of tort liability, it is unlikely that the imposition of liability actually results in loss prevention. Three factors, present in varying combinations in the context of latent diseases resulting from product exposure, frustrate the deterrent impact of liability. First, an extended period of time—sometimes decades—passes between the time of the manufacturer’s distribution of the product and the imposition of liability. Second, the accident compensation system frequently is unable …
The Genie And The Bottle: Collateral Sources Under The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, Kenneth S. Abraham, Kyle D. Logue
The Genie And The Bottle: Collateral Sources Under The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, Kenneth S. Abraham, Kyle D. Logue
Articles
The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 (the Fund) was part of legislation enacted just eleven days after the terrorist attacks of September 11th in the wake of extraordinary national loss. It is possible, therefore, that the Fund will always be considered an urgent and unique response to the unprecedented events of September 11th. On that view, the character of the Fund will have little longterm policy significance. It is equally possible, however, that the enactment of the Fund will prove to be a seminal moment in the history of tort and compensation law. The Fund adopts a new …
Legal Transitions, Rational Expectations, And Legal Progress, Kyle D. Logue
Legal Transitions, Rational Expectations, And Legal Progress, Kyle D. Logue
Articles
In the literature on legal transitions, the term "transition policy" is generally understood to mean a rule or norm that influences policymakers' decisions concerning the extent to which legal change should be accompanied by transition relief, whether in the form of grandfathering or phase-ins or direct compensation. Legal change within this literature is defined broadly, and somewhat counter-intuitively, to include any resolution of the uncertainty regarding what the law will be in the future or how the law will be applied to future circumstances. Thus, a legal change would obviously include an unexpected repeal of a tax provision, such as …
Inmate Litigation, Margo Schlanger
Inmate Litigation, Margo Schlanger
Articles
In 1995, prison and jail inmates brought about 40,000 new lawsuits in federal court nearly a fifth of the federal civil docket. Court records evidence a success rate for inmate plaintiffs under fifteen percent. These statistics highlight two qualities long associated with the inmate docket: its volume and the low rate of plaintiffs' success. Then, in 1996, Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which dramatically altered the litigation landscape, restricting inmates' access to federal court in a variety of ways. This Article examines inmate litigation before and after the PLRA. Looking first at the litigation process itself, it …
Utility And Community: Musings On The Tort/Crime Distinction, Stephen G. Marks
Utility And Community: Musings On The Tort/Crime Distinction, Stephen G. Marks
Faculty Scholarship
In this Paper, I propose the following two step procedure to explain both the inclusion and exclusion of criminal utility. As a first step, I posit a full compliance utility function. This utility function includes all utilities for all activities and incorporates an assumption that all members of society will forego prohibited activities. Aa s preliminary matter, I will also presuppose common information and shared values within the community. I suggest that maximization of full compliance social utility determines what society prohibits. As a second step, I strip the social utility function of the utility from prohibited activities and drop …
Solving The Judgment-Proof Problem, Kyle D. Logue
Solving The Judgment-Proof Problem, Kyle D. Logue
Articles
A tortfeasor who cannot fully pay for the harms that it causes is said to be "judgment proof." Commentators have long recognized that the existence of judgment-proof tortfeasors seriously undermines the deterrence and insurance goals of tort law. The deterrence goal is undermined because, irrespective of the liability rule, judgment-proof tortfeasors will not fully internalize the costs of the accidents they cause. The insurance goal will be undermined to the extent that the judgment-proof tortfeasor will not be able to compensate fully its victims and that first-party insurance markets do not provide an adequate response. Liability insurance can ameliorate these …
Proportional Liability: Statistical Evidence And The Probability Paradox, David A. Fischer
Proportional Liability: Statistical Evidence And The Probability Paradox, David A. Fischer
Faculty Publications
Three major policies underlie tort liability: deterrence, compensation, and corrective justice. A primary justification for proportional liability is its alleged superiority in advancing the tort policy of deterrence. This Article demonstrates a significant flaw in this claim by showing that the use of tort liability in multiple cause cases involving statistical evidence in fact serves the policy of deterrence quite poorly.
The First-Party Insurance Externality: An Economic Justification For Enterprise Liability, Jon D. Hanson, Kyle D. Logue
The First-Party Insurance Externality: An Economic Justification For Enterprise Liability, Jon D. Hanson, Kyle D. Logue
Articles
This Article explores the insurance and deterrence implications of important and long overlooked facts. Consumers are insured through first-party mechanisms against most of the risks of product accidents. However, first-party insurers rarely and imperfectly adjust premiums according to an individual consumer's decisions concerning exactly what products she will purchase, how many of those products she will purchase, and how carefully she will consume them. Such consumer decisions we refer to as "consumption choices. " This failure by first-party insurers to adjust premiums according to consumption choices gives rise to a first-party insurance externality. Based on this insight, this Article offers …
Deterrence And Desert In Tort: A Comment, David G. Owen
Deterrence And Desert In Tort: A Comment, David G. Owen
Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
Retribution And Deterrence: The Role Of Punitive Damages In Products Liability Litigation, Richard C. Ausness
Retribution And Deterrence: The Role Of Punitive Damages In Products Liability Litigation, Richard C. Ausness
Law Faculty Scholarly Articles
Punitive damages constitute an award to an injured party above what is necessary to compensate for actual loss. This Article considers whether punitive damages are an effective means of promoting the goals of products liability law. Section I traces the use of punitive damages in products liability litigation from the early 1960's to the present time. Section II examines the traditional rationales for punitive damages and considers whether they are appropriate in the products liability context. Finally, Section III evaluates some of the measures that commentators have proposed to adapt more fully the concept of punitive damages to products liability …
Driver Behavior And Legal Sanctions: A Study Of Deterrence, Roger C. Cramton
Driver Behavior And Legal Sanctions: A Study Of Deterrence, Roger C. Cramton
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
What are the consequences of the application of legal sanctions? How can these consequences be determined? This Article attempts to explore these questions in the limited field of highway safety, examining the available evidence and indicating areas where further investigation is essential. Although conclusions with respect to the general deterrent effect of traffic laws do not emerge, the parameters of the problem are defined and plausible hypotheses suggested.