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Full-Text Articles in Law

Jewish Identity And Judging: Seymour Simon Of Illinois, Jack M. Beermann Sep 2012

Jewish Identity And Judging: Seymour Simon Of Illinois, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

Illinois Supreme Court Justice Seymour F. Simon (1915-2006) would have filled the stereotype of the righteous man in Jewish lore. He was a man of principle, communicated those principles in an insistent tone to anyone who would listen, worked hard to further the cause of justice and earned a reputation as a committed public servant. Justice Simon served as Justice of the Illinois Supreme Court from 1980-1988 after having served on the Illinois Appellate Court from 1974-1980. Before winning election to the courts, Justice Simon was a politician, serving, inter alia, as an alderman in the City of Chicago and …


Pain As Fact And Heuristic: How Pain Neuroimaging Illuminates Moral Dimensions Of Law, Amanda C. Pustilnik Jan 2012

Pain As Fact And Heuristic: How Pain Neuroimaging Illuminates Moral Dimensions Of Law, Amanda C. Pustilnik

Faculty Scholarship

Legal statuses, prohibitions, and protections often turn on the presence and degree of physical pain. In legal domains ranging from tort to torture, pain and its degree do important definitional work by delimiting boundaries of lawfulness and of entitlements. The omnipresence of pain in law suggests that the law embodies an intuition about the ontological primacy of pain. Yet, for all the work done by pain as a term in legal texts and practice, it has had a confounding lack of external verifiability. As with other subjective states, we have been able to impute pain’s presence but have not been …


Aedpa Mea Culpa, Larry Yackle Jan 2012

Aedpa Mea Culpa, Larry Yackle

Faculty Scholarship

In this essay, the author contends that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 [AEDPA] has frustrated both the enforcement of federal rights and legitimate state interests. He lays most of the blame on the Supreme Court's methodology for construing AEDPA's provisions. The Court insists that poorly conceived and drafted provisions must be taken literally, whatever the consequences, and that every provision must be read to change habeas corpus law in some way. This approach has produced unfair, wasteful, and even bizarre results that might have been avoided if the Court had assessed AEDPA more realistically.