Law Commons^™

The Identification Of Customary International Law And Other Topics: The Sixty-Seventh Session Of The International Law Commission, Sean D. Murphy

GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works

The International Law Commission held its sixty-seventh session in Geneva from May 4 to June 5, and from July 6 to August 7, 2015, under the chairmanship of Narinder Singh (India). Notably, the Commission’s drafting committee completed a full set of sixteen draft conclusions on the topic of “identification of customary international law,” paving the way for those conclusions with commentaries to be approved by the Commission on first reading in 2016.

Additionally, the Commission provisionally adopted with commentaries initial draft guidelines on “protection of the atmosphere” and initial draft articles on “crimes against humanity,” as well as one further …

General Law In Federal Court, Bradford R. Clark, Anthony J. Bellia Jr.

GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works

Conventional wisdom maintains that the Supreme Court banished general law from federal courts in 1938 in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins when the Court overruled Swift v. Tyson. The narrative asserts that Swift viewed the common law as a “brooding omnipresence,” and authorized federal courts to disregard state common law in favor of general common law of their own choosing. The narrative continues that Erie constrained such judicial lawmaking by banishing general law from federal courts. Contrary to this account, Swift and Erie represent compatible conceptions of federal judicial power when each decision is understood in historical context. At the …

Kiobel, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, And The Alien Tort Statute, Bradford R. Clark

GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works

The Supreme Court is currently reviewing the Second Circuit’s decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, a case holding that federal courts lack jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) over claims against corporations. Although the parties have focused on issues of corporate liability under the ATS, there is a logically antecedent question of subject matter jurisdiction that the Court should decide before considering corporate liability. All of the parties in Kiobel — whether corporate or individual — are aliens. Understood in its full legal and historical context, the ATS was a jurisdictional statute that did not apply to suits …

The Law Of Nations As Constitutional Law, Bradford R. Clark, Anthony J. Bellia Jr.

GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works

Courts and scholars continue to debate the status of customary international law in U.S. courts, but have paid insufficient attention to the role that such law plays in interpreting and upholding several specific provisions of the Constitution. The modern position argues that courts should treat customary international law as federal common law. The revisionist position contends that customary international law applies only to the extent that positive federal or state law has adopted it. Neither approach adequately takes account of the Constitution’s allocation of powers to the federal political branches in Articles I and II or the effect of these …

The Alien Tort Statute And The Law Of Nations, Bradford R. Clark, Anthony J. Bellia Jr.

GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works

Courts and scholars have struggled to identify the original meaning of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). As enacted in 1789, the ATS provided "[t]hat the district courts... shall... have cognizance... of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." The statute was rarely invoked for almost two centuries until, in the 1980s, lower federal courts began reading the statute expansively to allow foreign citizens to sue other foreign citizens for violations of modern customary international law that occurred outside the United States. In 2004 …

Bespoke Custom, Edward T. Swaine

GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works

Curtis Bradley and Mitu Gulati’s stimulating article, “Withdrawing from International Custom,” argues for a view of customary international law (CIL) in which unilateral exit rights may be revitalized. This response suggests that Bradley and Gulati’s understanding of the intellectual history of CIL is contestable and that, they tend both to understate the novelty of their approach and overstate the rigidity of the views to which they react. Their tentativeness in endorsing exit options makes it difficult to assess the normative implications of their position, but their argument notably lacks a comprehensive consideration of alternative lawmaking forms.

The Political Branches And The Law Of Nations, Bradford R. Clark

GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works

In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the U.S. Supreme Court went out of its way to follow background rules of the law of nations, particularly the law of state-state relations. As we have recently argued, the Court followed the law of nations because adherence to such law preserved the constitutional prerogatives of the political branches to conduct foreign relations and decide momentous questions of war and peace. Although we focused primarily on the extent to which the Constitution obligated courts to follow the law of nations in the early republic, the explanation we offered rested on an important, …

The Federal Common Law Of Nations, Bradford R. Clark

GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works

Courts and scholars have vigorously debated the proper role of customary international law in American courts: To what extent should it be considered federal common law, state law, or general law? The debate has reached something of an impasse, in part because various positions rely on, but also are in tension with, historical practice and constitutional structure. This Article describes the role that the law of nations actually has played throughout American history. In keeping with the original constitutional design, federal courts for much of that history enforced certain rules respecting other nations' "perfect rights" (or close analogues) under the …

Restoring (And Risking) Interest In International Law, Edward T. Swaine

GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works

Jack Goldsmith of Harvard Law School and Eric Posner of the University of Chicago Law School articulate a comprehensive and engaging theory of state behaviors in their new book, “The Limits of International Law,” but with several internal flaws. Their book uses rational choice theory to explain how states act rationally to maximize their interests, and how, in doing so, states align themselves (sometimes) with international law. This book review argues that while Limits is a skilled and pioneering work that deserves to be taken seriously, it also suffers from tensions and over-generalizations that undermine its claims. As a result, …

Rational Custom, Edward T. Swaine

GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works

This article agrees with recent papers that rational choice analysis may be a useful heuristic for customary international law, which is plagued by an incoherent approach to state interests. The theory's initial application, however, has been flawed and unduly truncated, and I provide additional illustrations from game theory and of customary rules to illustrate the point. Rational choice analysis not only explains why certain customary international law may legitimately be regarded as obligatory, thus redeeming an important legal institution, but also indicates important directions for reform.