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Full-Text Articles in Law
We Don’T Want To Hear It: Psychology, Literature And The Narrative Model Of Judging, Kenworthey Bilz
We Don’T Want To Hear It: Psychology, Literature And The Narrative Model Of Judging, Kenworthey Bilz
Kenworthey Bilz
The “narrative” model of legal judging argues that legal decision makers both do and should render judgments by assembling sensible sto-ries out of evidence (as opposed to using Bayesian-type, linear models). This model is usually understood to demand that before one may judge a situation, one must give the parties the opportunity to tell their story in a manner that invites, or at least allows, empathy from the judger. This Article refers to this as the “inclusionary approach” to the narrative model of judging. Using psychological research in emotions and perspective-taking and the more intuitive techniques of literary criticism, this …
Self-Incrimination Doctrine Is Dead; Long Live Self-Incrimination Doctrine: Confessions, Scientific Evidence, And The Anxieties Of The Liberal State, Kenworthey Bilz
Self-Incrimination Doctrine Is Dead; Long Live Self-Incrimination Doctrine: Confessions, Scientific Evidence, And The Anxieties Of The Liberal State, Kenworthey Bilz
Kenworthey Bilz
Confessions have historically been the most compelling evidence the state could offer at a criminal trial. However, improvements in forensic technologies have led to increased use of scientific evidence, such as DNA typing, pattern-recognition software, location tracking devices, and the like, with very impressive rates of reliability. The reliability of these methods has become so impressive, in fact, that it should lead to a reduced reliance on confessions (and other nonscientific evidence, such as eyewitness identifications) in criminal prosecutions. However, this does not mean that the doctrine of self-incrimination, which regulates the acquisition and use of confessions, will no longer …
The Puzzle Of Delegated Revenge, Kenworthey Bilz
The Puzzle Of Delegated Revenge, Kenworthey Bilz
Kenworthey Bilz
Why should people ever be satisfied when a third party punishes in their name, as opposed to having the opportunity to exact revenge personally? When theories of delegated revenge are offered at all, they explain why a well-ordered society needs centralized punishment as a matter of practicality. But this doesn’t adequately explain why they actually the public actually prefers it, and why they accept some forms of delegated agents more than others. Moreover, these theories do not have a good explanation for why or when delegated revenge will fail to satisfy victims, nor when the state will indulge this preference, …
The Fall Of The Confession Era, Kenworthey Bilz
The Fall Of The Confession Era, Kenworthey Bilz
Kenworthey Bilz
This book review-essay of Solan & Tiersma’s SPEAKING OF CRIME argues that with the advent of new technologies such as improvements in DNA identification, fMRI ‘lie detector’ tests, and the like, courts will rely less and less on confessions altogether, rendering obsolete much of the doctrine that currently surrounds linguistic interpretation (and other markers) of consent and coercion.
What's Wrong With Harmless Theories Of Punishment, Kenworthey Bilz, John M. Darley
What's Wrong With Harmless Theories Of Punishment, Kenworthey Bilz, John M. Darley
Kenworthey Bilz
This paper argues that both consequentialist and retributivist punishment philosophies rest on similar analyses of the social value of punishable behavior; that is, they both rest on definitions of what counts as a “harm” of crime. The different outcomes the different philosophies produce stem from competing conclusions about which of those harms are empirically valid or morally legitimate. Once we have spelled out what counts as the harms of crime, however, retributivist and consequentialist philosophies add little to the equation. Alternative punishment regimes at their best are up front about offering a distinctive account of the harms of crime. When …