Law Commons^™

Reconsidering Spousal Privileges After Crawford, R. Michael Cassidy

R. Michael Cassidy

In this article the author explores how domestic violence prevention efforts have been adversely impacted by the Supreme Court’s new “testimonial” approach to the confrontation clause. Examining the Court’s trilogy of cases from Crawford to Davis and Hammon, the author argues that the introduction of certain forms of hearsay in criminal cases has been drastically limited by the court’s new originalist approach to the Sixth Amendment. The author explains how state spousal privilege statutes often present a significant barrier to obtaining live testimony from victims of domestic violence. The author then argues that state legislatures should reconsider their spousal privilege …

A Defense Attorney’S Guide To Confrontation After Michigan V. Bryant, Kathryn K. Polonsky

Kathryn K Polonsky

In 1603, the Crown charged Sir Walter Raleigh with high treason in part for plotting to murder King James I. In preparing for trial, Lord Cobham, Raleigh’s alleged co-conspirator, was interrogated and signed a sworn confession. During trial, the King used the Crown-procured ex parte testimony of Cobham against Raleigh. Raleigh demanded Cobham be brought before the court so Raleigh might interrogate him “face to face.” Raleigh was sure Cobham would prove his innocence. After all, Cobham had written a letter stating his charges against Raleigh contained no truth.

The Judges refused to allow Raleigh the use of Cobham’s exonerating …

Minimizing Confrontation: The Eighth Circuit Uses Crawford Avoid Bruton For Non-Testimonial Statements, Samuel Buffaloe

Missouri Law Review

Outside of the Bruton context, this Note also examines the implications of defining "testimonial" statements entirely from the point of view of the speaker as the Eighth Circuit did in Dale. This Note will argue that to ignore the motives of the examiner encourages the police to use unethical and deceptive interrogation techniques. This Note additionally argues that applying Bruton only to testimonial statements ignores Bruton's Due Process concerns in that it allows juries to do what the Supreme Court considers to be an "impossible" task. Finally, this Note questions whether, after Crawford, any remaining constitutional limits remain on the …

Death To Dying Declarations! The Case For Killing A Hearsay Exception, Samuel T. Bernier

Samuel T Bernier

No abstract provided.

Avoiding A Confrontation?: How Courts Have Erred In Finding That Nontestimonial Hearsay Is Beyond The Scope Of The Bruton Doctrine, Colin Miller

Colin Miller

The Bruton doctrine holds that the Confrontation Clause is violated by the admission at a joint jury trial of a nontestifying co-defendant’s confession that facially incriminates other defendants but is inadmissible against them under the rules of evidence. Under this doctrine, Co-Defendant’s confession to Police Officer that “Defendant and I killed Victim” could not be admitted unless Co-Defendant testified at trial. But what if Co-Defendant made his confession to his mother, his brother, his lover, or his friend? While the vast majority of courts before 2004 would have held that such “noncustodial” confessions violated the Bruton doctrine, the tables have …

A Defense Attorney’S Guide To Confrontation After Michigan V. Bryant, Kathryn K. Polonsky

Kathryn K Polonsky

In 1603, the Crown charged Sir Walter Raleigh with high treason in part for plotting to murder King James I. In preparing for trial, Lord Cobham, Raleigh’s alleged co-conspirator, was interrogated and signed a sworn confession. During trial, the King used the Crown-procured ex parte testimony of Cobham against Raleigh. Raleigh demanded Cobham be brought before the court so Raleigh might interrogate him “face to face.” Raleigh was sure Cobham would prove his innocence. After all, Cobham had written a letter stating his charges against Raleigh contained no truth.

The Judges refused to allow Raleigh the use of Cobham’s exonerating …

Employment Retaliation And The Accident Of Text, Alex B. Long

Scholarly Works

This Article explores the current and future landscape of employment retaliation law following the Supreme Court’s decisions in Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP and Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp. As the law currently exists, statutory retaliation plaintiffs win or lose largely due to the accident of statutory text rather than the fact that the law is operating as Congress envisioned or as part of a coherent scheme of regulation. In short, the federal approach to workplace retaliation is inefficient, unnecessarily complex, and in need of major reform. Contrary to popular thinking, the article concludes that the text of …