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Full-Text Articles in Law

Substitutes For Insider Trading, Ian Ayres, Joseph Bankman Nov 2007

Substitutes For Insider Trading, Ian Ayres, Joseph Bankman

Ian Ayres

When insider trading prohibitions limit the ability of insiders (or of a corporation itself) to use material non-public information to trade a particular firm’s stock, there may be incentive to use the information to trade instead on the stock of that firm’s rivals, suppliers, customers, or the manufacturers of complementary products. We refer to this form of trading as trading in stock substitutes. Stock substitute trading by a firm is legal. In many circumstance, substitute trading by employees is also legal. Trading in stock substitutes may be quite profitable, and there is anecdotal evidence that employees often engage in such …


The Fortunes & Foibles Of Exchange-Traded Funds, William A. Birdthistle Aug 2007

The Fortunes & Foibles Of Exchange-Traded Funds, William A. Birdthistle

William Birdthistle

One of the most dynamic and complex new investment vehicles on the market today is the exchange-traded fund, a security that provides the diversification of a mutual fund but trades on an exchange like a stock. In just over a decade, the number of ETFs has proliferated to well over 500, attracting almost half a trillion dollars in investment. Most of that growth has occurred in just the past two years, and ETFs are projected to continue growing at a pace far faster than hedge funds and mutual funds in the coming years. Yet for all this extraordinary growth, legal …


Guests At The Table?: Independent Directors In Family-Influenced Public Companies, Deborah A. Demott Aug 2007

Guests At The Table?: Independent Directors In Family-Influenced Public Companies, Deborah A. Demott

Deborah A DeMott

By some measures, family-controlled companies account for about a third of public companies in the United States. Public companies that retain characteristics of family companies pose a series of intriguing questions about corporate governance that center in particular on the roles and duties of directors. These are surprisingly unexplored in legal scholarship. Although concentrated ownership is more extensive in many capital markets outside the United States, numerous recent examples raise questions about governance within publicly-held family companies. In such companies, shareholders who are members of the founding family often have perspectives and interests that diverge from those of non-family public …


The One Minute Manager Prepares For Mediation: A Multidisciplinary Approach To Negotiation Preparation, Donald R. Philbin, Jr. Mar 2007

The One Minute Manager Prepares For Mediation: A Multidisciplinary Approach To Negotiation Preparation, Donald R. Philbin, Jr.

Donald R. Philbin Jr.

No abstract provided.


The Limits Of Hedge Fund Activism, Robert Thompson Feb 2007

The Limits Of Hedge Fund Activism, Robert Thompson

Robert Thompson

Abstract Hedge funds have burst on to the corporate governance scene. Not just as one player among many, but one with the potential to be the long-sought shareholder champion who can effectively discipline management in a world where ownership is separated from control. The argument has been made, with some justification, that these investors face different economic incentives than do traditional institutional investors such as mutual funds or public or private pension funds. The business plan of a typical hedge fund is more compatible with shareholder activism and they lack some of the conflicts of interests that have deterred traditional …


To Make Or To Buy: In-House Lawyering And Value Creation, Steven L. Schwarcz Feb 2007

To Make Or To Buy: In-House Lawyering And Value Creation, Steven L. Schwarcz

Steven L Schwarcz

In recent years, companies have been shifting much of their transactional legal work from outside law firms to in-house lawyers, and some large companies now staff transactions almost exclusively in-house. Although this transformation redefines the very nature of the business lawyer, scholars have largely ignored it. This article seeks to remedy that omission, using empirical evidence as well as economic theory to help explain why in-house lawyers are taking over, and whether they are likely to continue to take over, these functions and roles of outside lawyers. The findings are surprising, suggesting that in-house lawyers may now be performing as …


To Make Or To Buy: In-House Lawyering And Value Creation, Steven L. Schwarcz Jan 2007

To Make Or To Buy: In-House Lawyering And Value Creation, Steven L. Schwarcz

Steven L Schwarcz

In recent years, companies have been shifting much of their transactional legal work from outside law firms to in-house lawyers, and some large companies now staff transactions almost exclusively in-house. Although this transformation redefines the very nature of the business lawyer, scholars have largely ignored it. This article seeks to remedy that omission, using empirical evidence as well as economic theory to help explain why in-house lawyers are taking over, and whether they are likely to continue to take over, these functions and roles of outside lawyers. The findings are surprising, suggesting that in-house lawyers may now be performing as …


To Make Or To Buy: In-House Lawyering And Value Creation, Steven L. Schwarcz Jan 2007

To Make Or To Buy: In-House Lawyering And Value Creation, Steven L. Schwarcz

Steven L Schwarcz

No abstract provided.


Insider Waiting: The New Loophole Under 10b5-1, Maureen Mcgreevy Jan 2007

Insider Waiting: The New Loophole Under 10b5-1, Maureen Mcgreevy

Maureen McGreevy

In October, 2000, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) enacted Rule 10b5-1 which provides an affirmative defense for individuals charged with insider trading. The Rule states that a person is not deemed to have traded on the basis of material non-public information if, before he or she gained knowledge of that material, non-public information, the person had entered into a trading plan under which he or she contracted to sell the securities in question. As a result of this rule, many corporate executives have established what have become to be known as 10b5-1 trading plans in order to protect themselves …


The Corporate Common Good: The Right And Obligation Of Managers To Do Good To Others, Edward Lyons Dec 2006

The Corporate Common Good: The Right And Obligation Of Managers To Do Good To Others, Edward Lyons

Edward C. Lyons

In this Article we articulate a model of managerial freedom - and even obligation - to engage in philanthropic activity differing in significant respects from that described by Germain Grisez in his influential work of Christian ethics "The Way of the Lord Jesus: Difficult Moral Questions." We argue that Grisez's conception of a corporation as essentially ordered to the economic benefit of its stakeholders unnecessarily restricts a corporate manager's freedom of action. While Grisez denies that bald profit maximization is an appropriate standard for economic activity, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that he eventually falls back into what …


Bulletproof: Mandatory Rules For Deal Protection, Brian Jm Quinn Dec 2006

Bulletproof: Mandatory Rules For Deal Protection, Brian Jm Quinn

Brian JM Quinn

No abstract provided.


The Short And Puzzling Life Of The “Implicit Minority Discount” In Delaware Appraisal Law, Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Michael L. Wachter Dec 2006

The Short And Puzzling Life Of The “Implicit Minority Discount” In Delaware Appraisal Law, Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Michael L. Wachter

Lawrence A. Hamermesh

The “implicit minority discount,” or IMD, is a fairly new concept in Delaware appraisal law. A review of the case law discussing the concept, however, reveals that it has emerged haphazardly and has not been fully tested against principles that are generally accepted in the financial community. While control share blocks are valued at a premium because of the particular rights and opportunities associated with control, these are elements of value that cannot fairly be viewed as belonging either to the corporation or its shareholders. In corporations with widely dispersed share holdings, the firm is subject to agency costs that …


The Institute Of Delaware Corporate And Business Law New Name, New Directions, Lawrence A. Hamermesh Dec 2006

The Institute Of Delaware Corporate And Business Law New Name, New Directions, Lawrence A. Hamermesh

Lawrence A. Hamermesh

No abstract provided.


An Older, Balder Critique Of ‘Toward Common Sense And Common Ground’, Lawrence A. Hamermesh Dec 2006

An Older, Balder Critique Of ‘Toward Common Sense And Common Ground’, Lawrence A. Hamermesh

Lawrence A. Hamermesh

No abstract provided.