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Politics And The Business Corporation, Robert H. Sitkoff
Politics And The Business Corporation, Robert H. Sitkoff
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009
This essay explores the policy bases for, and the political economy of, the law's long-standing regulation of corporate political speech. The essay has three parts. First, it contends that the conventional justifications for regulating corporate interventions in politics -- that corporate donations unnaturally skew the political discourse (bad politics) and that corporate political donations harm shareholders (agency costs) -- assume irrational investors and substantial capital market inefficiency. Drawing on public choice theory, the essay also explores the aim of retarding rent-seeking as an alternative justification for regulating corporate interventions in politics. Second, the essay reexamines the history of the regulation …
Trust Law, Corporate Law, And Capital Market Efficiency, Robert H. Sitkoff
Trust Law, Corporate Law, And Capital Market Efficiency, Robert H. Sitkoff
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009
In both the publicly-traded corporation and the private donative trust a crucial task is to minimize the agency costs that arise from the separation of risk-bearing and management. But where the law of corporate governance evolved in the shadow of capital-market checks on agency costs, trust governance did not. Thus, even more than that of close corporations, the law and study of private trusts offers an illuminating counterfactual -- a control, as it were - for a playful thought experiment about the importance of capital market efficiency to the law and study of public corporations. The animating idea for this …