Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Discipline
-
- Business Organizations Law (5)
- Business (3)
- Corporate Finance (3)
- Economic Policy (3)
- Economics (3)
-
- Law and Economics (3)
- Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration (3)
- Securities Law (3)
- Social and Behavioral Sciences (3)
- Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics (2)
- Sociology (2)
- Work, Economy and Organizations (2)
- American Politics (1)
- Antitrust and Trade Regulation (1)
- Banking and Finance Law (1)
- Bankruptcy Law (1)
- Business Administration, Management, and Operations (1)
- Comparative and Foreign Law (1)
- Economic Theory (1)
- Finance (1)
- Jurisprudence (1)
- Law and Politics (1)
- Law and Society (1)
- Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility (1)
- Legal Studies (1)
- Legal Theory (1)
- Legislation (1)
- Litigation (1)
- Political Science (1)
- Institution
Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Law
Taxing Prometheus: How The Corporate Interest Deduction Discourages Innovation And Risk-Taking, Michael S. Knoll
Taxing Prometheus: How The Corporate Interest Deduction Discourages Innovation And Risk-Taking, Michael S. Knoll
All Faculty Scholarship
This paper uses recent developments in the theory of optimal capital structure to demonstrate how the federal corporate income tax with an interest deduction, but without a corresponding dividend deduction, misallocates capital within the corporate sector by encouraging investment in low-risk, low-growth projects employing tangible assets over high-risk, high-growth projects employing intangible assets.
Turning Back The Tide Of Director And Officer Liability, Walter Effross
Turning Back The Tide Of Director And Officer Liability, Walter Effross
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
No abstract provided.
Patterns In The Bankruptcy Reorganization Of Large Publicly Held Companies, Lynn M. Lopucki, William C. Whitford
Patterns In The Bankruptcy Reorganization Of Large Publicly Held Companies, Lynn M. Lopucki, William C. Whitford
UF Law Faculty Publications
Several recent articles contend that Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code does not provide efficient procedures for redressing the financial distress of large firms. The authors of these articles argue that the creditors of a financially distressed firm would fare better if the corporation's problems were resolved in some other way. The argument has proceeded principally on a theoretical level, since it is virtually impossible to know for certain how firms that have been in Chapter 11 would have fared under a different procedure. We recently completed an extensive empirical study of forty-three Chapter 11 cases involving large, publicly held firms. …
Sanctifying Secrecy: The Mythology Of The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, Elizabeth G. Thornburg
Sanctifying Secrecy: The Mythology Of The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, Elizabeth G. Thornburg
Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters
This article surveys the traditional justifications for giving corporations the benefit of attorney-client privilege. It rejects both moral and utilitarian explanations and argues that, far from being beneficial or benign, the privilege actually does great harm to the truth-seeking function of litigation and imposes tremendous transaction costs on the litigants and on the judicial system as a whole.
Making America Competitive, Mark J. Loewenstein
From Legitimacy To Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, Jill E. Fisch
From Legitimacy To Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, Jill E. Fisch
All Faculty Scholarship
On October 16, 1992, after a comprehensive review of its system of proxy regulation and after two separate amendment proposals that drew more than 1700 letters of comment from the public, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission" or the "SEC") voted to reform the federal proxy rules. The reforms were "intended to facilitate shareholder communications and to enhance informed proxy voting, and to reduce the cost of compliance with the proxy rules for all persons engaged in a proxy solicitation.' The SEC explained the amendments by stating that the rules were "impeding shareholder communication and participation in the corporate …
Self-Regulation, Normative Choice, And The Structure Of Corporate Fiduciary Law, William W. Bratton
Self-Regulation, Normative Choice, And The Structure Of Corporate Fiduciary Law, William W. Bratton
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.