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Re-Envisioning The Controlling Shareholder Regime: Why Controlling Shareholders And Minority Shareholders Embrace Each Other, Sang Yop Kang
Re-Envisioning The Controlling Shareholder Regime: Why Controlling Shareholders And Minority Shareholders Embrace Each Other, Sang Yop Kang
Sang Yop Kang
According to conventional corporate governance scholarship, controlling shareholder regimes exist in jurisdictions where minority shareholders are not well protected by controlling shareholders’ expropriation. However, Professor Ronald Gilson raises a critical point against the conventional view; if laws are inefficient and do not protect investors, as the conventional view explains, why do we observe any minority shareholders at all in such “bad-law” countries? One possible reason is that in response to controlling shareholders’ expropriation, minority shareholders discount severely shares that corporations issue. Then, a related question is: if it is true, why do some controlling shareholders in bad-law countries have many …
Transplanting A Poison Pill To Controlling Shareholder Regimes: Why It Is So Difficult, Sang Yop Kang
Transplanting A Poison Pill To Controlling Shareholder Regimes: Why It Is So Difficult, Sang Yop Kang
Sang Yop Kang
Recently, the great tide of globalization has caused M&A activities to spill over into controlling shareholder regimes (economies dominated by controlling shareholders). Due to a seismic change arising from an unprecedented takeover wave, transplanting the Delaware pill has been heavily discussed in controlling shareholder regimes. This Article explores how legal and socio-economic conditions of the United States (State of Delaware) and controlling shareholder regimes are different and why transplanting the Delaware pill could create unintended results in controlling shareholder regimes. First, the legitimacy of the Delaware pill is supported by corporate governance institutions, such as a relatively functional board, a …