Law Commons^™

Wasting The Corporate Waste Doctrine: Why Waste Claims Are Obsolete In Delaware Corporate Law And Why The Waste Doctrine Is The Wrong Solution To The Problem Of Executive Compensation, Kris S. Swift

Kris S. Swift

Abstract

Kristen S. Swift

This Note makes several points, drawn from Delaware litigation history, on the futility of pleading corporate waste in Delaware. At inception, the waste doctrine was a tool for shareholder protection and empowerment; however, as calculated business risk became encouraged and later formally protected by the business judgment rule, the waste doctrine evolved to protect officers and boards and now sets a nearly impossible benchmark for misconduct that would allow shareholders to recover on a waste claim. The waste doctrine is inextricably tied to how business risk-taking is perceived by Delaware courts and shifting attitudes toward risk …

Ending Judgment Arbitrage: Jurisdictional Competition And The Enforcement Of Foreign Money Judgments In The United States, Gregory Shill

Gregory Shill

Recent multi-billion-dollar damage awards issued by foreign courts against large American companies have focused attention on the once-obscure, patchwork system of enforcing foreign-country judgments in the United States. That system’s structural problems are even more serious than its critics have charged. However, the leading proposals for reform overlook the positive potential embedded in its design.

In the United States, no treaty or federal law controls the domestication of foreign judgments; the process is instead governed by state law. Although they are often conflated in practice, the procedure consists of two formally and conceptually distinct stages: foreign judgments must first be …

Segmented Settlements Are Not The Answer: A Response To Professor Squire’S Article, How Collective Settlements Camouflage The Costs Of Shareholder Lawsuits, Christopher C. French

Christopher C. French

In his recent article, Professor Richard Squire offers a provocative theory in which he claims the underlying claimants in shareholder litigation against corporate policyholders are overcompensated due to what he describes as “cramdown” settlements, under which insurers are forced to settle due to the “duty to contribute” that arises under multi-layered directors and officers (“D&O”) insurance programs. He also offers a novel idea regarding how this problem could be fixed by what he refers to as “segmented” settlements in which each insurer and the policyholder would be allowed to settle separately and consider only its own interests in doing so. …