Law Commons^™

Two Models Of Corporate Governance: Beyond Berle And Means, Lynne L. Dallas

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This Article introduces a new model of corporate governance, which challenges, as did Berle and Means, the conclusions drawn from the traditional ownership model. Rather than focusing upon the inefficiencies of the large complex firm resulting from the separation of share ownership and control, however, this new model, which I call the power model, focuses upon the political nature of decision making in the large corporation, which exists regardless of the identity of the entrepreneur.

Corporate Auctions And Directors' Fiduciary Duties: A Third-Generation Business Judgment Rule, Steven G. Bradbury

Michigan Law Review

This Note proposes a rationale and a methodology for applying the business judgment rule when directors resist a hostile bid during the auction phase of a control contest. Part I examines the changes that occur in the responsibilities of target directors when a corporate auction is initiated. This Part describes the Unocal business judgment rule test and discusses its usefulness in the auction phase of a takeover. While the test requires modification if it is to complement effectively the auction-phase duties announced in Revlon, this Part suggests that the business judgment rule continues to be relevant and important during …

Reciprocal Altruism As A Felony: Antitrust And The Prisoner's Dilemma, John Shepard Wiley Jr.

Michigan Law Review

This essay is about the idea of cooperation in antitrust law. At the outset, ·I clarify my terminology. Biologists often refer to reciprocal altruism. "Reciprocal altruism" in the antitrust context has an odd semantic ring. There is nothing altruistic or self-sacrificing about the cooperation that antitrust rules outlaw: cartel price fixing. Firms do it strictly for the money. I prefer the term reciprocity to describe a firm's strategy to pursue behavior that will profit it only if competing firms engage in similar behavior. This usage can create confusion in the present context, however, because reciprocity is also an antitrust term …

The Promise Of State Takeover Statutes, Richard A. Booth

Michigan Law Review

The purpose of this article is, first, to describe the problems associated with two-tier tender offers and the closely related, and perhaps still more coercive, partial tender offer. Second, the article will address the natural question why such offers have not already been banned, suggesting a better view of what coercion means in the context of a tender offer. Third, the article will offer a management-oriented view of coercion, explaining the legitimate interests of managers (and other groups) in resisting takeovers, as well as how greenmail and poison pills, though subject to abuse, can be used quite properly to combat …

Adventures In Finance, Deborah A. Demott

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Finance and Industrial Performance in a Dynamic Economy: Theory, Practice, and Policy by Merritt B. Fox

Corporations And Society: Power And Responsibility, Sara Anne Engle

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Corporations and Society: Power and Responsibility edited by Warren J. Samuels and Arthur S. Miller

Labor Law's Alter Ego Doctrine: The Role Of Employer Motive In Corporate Transformations, Gary Alan Macdonald

Michigan Law Review

This Note examines the differing judicial approaches for reviewing NLRB alter ego findings, and concludes that a fundamental problem with all of the current approaches is the unwarranted consideration of motive in varying degrees. This Note proposes a modified "reasonably foreseeable benefit" standard which does not depend in any degree on the employer's motive for changing its corporate form. Part I discusses the origin and evolution of the alter ego doctrine, including its genesis in Southport Petroleum, the well-settled Crawford Door factors, and the related "successorship" doctrine. Part II analyzes the conflict among the federal courts of appeals over …

A Micro-Microeconomic Approach To Antitrust Law: Games Managers Play, Harry S. Gerla

Michigan Law Review

If we are to gain an accurate perspective on the impact of antitrust laws and policies on the behavior of firms in the real world, we must adopt a micro-microeconomic approach which focuses not on how rational, profit-maximizing firms will theoretically behave, but upon how late twentieth-century American managers and executives actually behave. This article attempts to begin that task.

Part I of this article examines the justifications for focusing on individual managers rather than profit-maximizing firms as the key actors in antitrust law. Part II looks at contemporary management mores and practices and develops some generalized "rules of the …