Law Commons^™

The Elephant In The Room: Helping Delaware Courts Develop Law To End Systemic Short-Term Bias In Corporate Decision-Making, Kenneth Mcneil, Keith Johnson

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

Short-termism in corporate decision-making is as problematic for long-term investors as relying on a three-mile radar on a supertanker. It is totally inadequate for handling the long-term risks and opportunities faced by the modern corporation. Yet recent empirical research shows that up to 85% of the S&P 1500 have no long-term planning. This is costing pension funds and other long-term investors dearly. For instance, the small minority of companies that do long-term planning and risk management had a long-term profitability that was 81% higher than their peers during the 2001–2014 period—with less stock volatility that costs investors dearly as well. …

Do Institutional Owners Monitor? Evidence From Voting On Connected Transaction Proposals In Hong Kong-Listed Companies, Félix E. Mezzanotte, Simon Fung

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

The conventional view in Hong Kong has been that institutional owners tend to be passive owners and that they do little to monitor the companies’ management. We investigated whether the presence of institutional owners in Hong Kong-listed companies was associated with greater monitoring of management through dissent voting by hand-collecting information for a sample (n= 96) of connected transaction proposals (“CT proposals”) and of their voting outcomes, as announced in the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong during the period from 2012–14. Our study shows that voting approval rates on CT proposals were lower (i.e. greater dissent voting) when institutional owners …

Dual-Class Capital Structures: A Legal, Theoretical & Empirical Buy-Side Analysis, Christopher C. Mckinnon

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

“The advantage of a dual-class share structure is that it protects entrepreneurial management from the demands of ordinary shareholders. The disadvantage of a dual-class share structure is that it protects entrepreneurial management from the demands of shareholders.” Issuing dual classes of stock has become hotly debated since two major events transpired in 2014: (1) Facebook acquired WhatsApp for $19 billion and (2) Alibaba chose to list its shares on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) instead of the Hong Kong Exchange. Because dual-class managers, like those at Facebook and Alibaba, retain a controlling voting block, their decisions are immune from …

The Corporation’S Place In Society, Gabriel Rauterberg

Michigan Law Review

The vast majority of economic activity is now organized through corporations. The public corporation is usurping the state’s role as the most important institution of wealthy capitalist societies. Across the developed world, there is increasing convergence on the shareholder-owned corporation as the primary vehicle for creating wealth. Yet nothing like this degree of convergence has occurred in answering the fundamental questions of corporate capitalism: What role do corporations serve? What is the goal of corporate law? What should corporate managers do? Discussion of these questions is as old as the institutions involved.

A Blended Approach To Reducing The Costs Of Shareholder Litigation, Valian A. Afshar

Michigan Law Review

Multiforum litigation and federal securities law class actions impose heavy costs on corporations and their shareholders without producing proportionate benefits. Both are largely the result of the agency problem between shareholders and their attorneys, driven more by the attorneys’ interests in generating fees than by the interests of their clients. In response to each of these problems, commentators have recommended a number of solutions. Chief among them are forum selection and mandatory arbitration provisions in a corporation’s charter or bylaws. This Note recommends that corporations unilaterally adopt both forum selection and mandatory arbitration bylaws to address shareholder lawsuits under state …

The Jobs Act Trojan Horse: A Gift To Startups With Something Else Inside?, Erik Gordon

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

This Comment will analyze which provisions of the Act are consistent with the purpose that sponsors would have the public believe, that emphasized by the name “JOBS Act,” and distinguish them from those provisions that serve as menacing soldiers hidden under the cover of a name that diverts attention from the Act’s true purpose.

Legally "Strong" Shareholders Of Japan, Gen Goto

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

Foreign investors often criticize Japanese corporations for not paying enough attention to the interests of their shareholders. It might surprise these critics, then, to learn that shareholders’ legal rights under the Japanese Companies Act are actually quite strong. Indeed, many of the rights that shareholders’ rights advocates often support, including shareholders’ power to alter a corporate charter without board consent, shareholders’ power to control dividend payments, majority voting for board elections, shareholders’ power to replace the board of directors, and shareholder access to a corporate ballot—all of which are strongly debated elsewhere— are already effective in Japan. Moreover, derivative suits …

Insider Trading And Other Securities Frauds In The United States: Lessons For Chile, Dante Figueroa

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

This Article is a comparative analysis of insider trading law in the United States and Chile. The study summarily reviews the historical, political, and legal foundations of insider trading regulation in both jurisdictions, identifying areas of convergence, as well as areas in which the Chilean securities market could benefit vis- ` a-vis the more advanced experience of the considerably larger American securities market. The Article also highlights the axiological closeness between both jurisdictions concerning the protection of inside corporate information and the fiduciary role of those who intervene in securities markets in their various capacities (as investors, shareholders, corporate officers, …

From Revolutionary To Palace Guard: The Role And Requirements Of Intermediaries Under Proposed Regulation Crowdfunding, Andrew D. Stephenson, Brian R. Knight, Matthew Bahleda

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

Intermediaries in securities crowdfunding face significant requirements as a result of the statutory mandates of Title III of the JOBS Act. The SEC, in its proposed rules, provided structure to these requirements. The proposed rules would create strict requirements for intermediaries regarding their relationships with investors and how they undertake crowdfunding transactions under Section 4(a)(6) of the Securities Act. The proposed rules would also create and establish the guidelines for funding portals, a new type of limited purpose securities broker. While some commentators decry the SEC for placing undue burdens and legal liabilities on intermediaries in securities crowdfunding, the SEC …

Securities Class Actions And Bankrupt Companies, James J. Park

Michigan Law Review

Securities class actions are often criticized as wasteful strike suits that target temporary fluctuations in the stock prices of otherwise healthy companies. The securities class actions brought by investors of Enron and WorldCom, companies that fell into bankruptcy in the wake of fraud, resulted in the recovery of billions of dollars in permanent shareholder losses and provide a powerful counterexample to this critique. An issuer's bankruptcy may affect how judges and parties perceive securities class actions and their merits, yet little is known about the subset of cases where the company is bankrupt. This is the first extensive empirical study …

The Facebook Ipo's Face-Off With Dual Class Stock Structure, Anna S. Han

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform Caveat

The Facebook initial public offering (“Facebook IPO”) is premised on a dual class stock structure, which the media criticizes as a circumvention of regulations designed to protect shareholders. I argue that Facebook’s use of dual class stock not only is likely to benefit its shareholders, but also follows in the footsteps of seasoned, influential companies like Google.

On The Role And Regulation Of Proxy Advisors, Paul Rose

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

In anticipation of proxy season-the springtime ritual where companies prepare and deliver proxy statements in preparation for annual shareholder meetings-U.S. public companies typically reexamine their corporate governance structures and policies. Many corporate governance structures that were acceptable ten years ago are now considered outmoded or even evidence of managerial entrenchment. For example, consider the classified board of directors. In recent years, many companies have shifted from a classified board of directors to an annually elected board. A company might adopt an annually-elected board structure for a number of reasons. A classified board can serve as an entrenchment device, for instance, …

Turning A Short-Term Fling Into A Long-Term Commitment: Board Duties In A New Era, Nadelle Grossman

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Corporate boards face significant pressure to make decisions that maximize profits in the short run. That pressure comes in part from executives who are financially rewarded for short-term profits despite the long-term risks associated with those profit-making activities. The current financial crisis, where executives at AIG and numerous other institutions ignored the long-term risks associated with their mortgage backed securities investments, arose largely because those executives were compensated for the short-term profits generated by those investments despite their longer-term risks. Pressure on boards for short-term profits also comes from activist investors who seek to make quick money off of trading …

The Case For Semi-Strong-Form Corporate Scienter In Securities Fraud Actions, Paul B. Maslo

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

The mental state of scienter - intent to defraud - is a required element of a securities fraud claim. The scienter inquiry is fairly straightforward when the defendant is an individual. It is more complex when a corporate entity is involved because a corporation can only act through its agents; it has no mind of its own. This article compares the three approaches courts have used to impute scienter to corporate defendants in the securities fraud context and concludes by recommending the approach which strikes an appropriate balance between several dueling public policy concerns.

Give Smaller Companies A Choice: Solving Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 Inefficiency, Paul P. Arnold

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This Note argues that smaller public companies should have the option to opt out of Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Optional compliance is economically preferable to the current approach of mandatory compliance. Companies that choose to comply with Section 404 will send a signal to the financial markets that their internal controls meet the high standards Section 404 demands, and investors will reward such companies if they actually value the benefit of that company's additional controls. Similarly, companies that benefit less from additional internal accounting will be able to avoid Section 404's high costs. To clarify the …

Has Corporate Law Failed? Addressing Proposals For Reform, Antony Page

Michigan Law Review

Part I of this Review discusses the modem "nexus of contracts" approach to corporations and highlights how Greenfield's views differ. Part II examines corporate goals and purposes, suggesting that Greenfield overstates the impact of the shareholder-primacy norm and does not offer a preferable alternative. Part III critiques the means to the ends--Greenfield's proposals for changing the mechanics of corporate governance. Although several of his proposals are intriguing, they seem unlikely to achieve their pro-social aims. This Review remains skeptical, in part because-even given its problems-the U.S. "director-centric governance structure has created the most successful economy the world has ever seen." …

Administrative Governance As Corporate Governance: A Partial Explanation For The Growth Of China's Stock Markets, David A. Caragliano

Michigan Journal of International Law

This Note argues that during the first decade of stock market development (roughly 1990-2000) Chinese institutions, which emphasized administrative direction and control, functioned in lieu of legal and financial institutions. Preexisting modes of administrative governance introduced incentives that mitigated information asymmetry problems inherent in initial public offerings (IPOs) and contributed to enhanced market valuation during the post-IPO phase. The author focuses on two sui generis Chinese institutions employed during this time period: the quota system for equity share issuance and the Special Treatment (ST) system for underperforming issuers. In short, the thesis is that administrative governance substituted for corporate governance.

Beyond The Business Judgment Rule: Protecting Bidder Firm Shareholders From Value-Reducing Acquisitions, Ryan Houseal

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

During the takeover transactions of the 1980s, bidder firms paid target firm shareholders average premiums of approximately 50% for their shares. Did the sizable premiums paid to target firm shareholders during the 1980s reflect post-takeover improvement in the target's performance? Or were the premiums a result of the mismanagement of the bidder firms' assets?

The answer will help determine whether additional legal mechanisms should be established to protect bidder firm shareholders from the threat of management's consummation of value reducing acquisitions. Accordingly, this Note examines various studies which attempt to identify the source of the premiums paid to target firm …

Looking A Gift Horse In The Mouth: An Analysis Of Free Internet Stock Offerings, Joel Michael Schwarz

Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review

How much should an investor pay for one share of stock in Yahoo? Or a share of stock in America Online? As publicly traded companies, one need only consult the stock charts in any local newspaper to determine the value the market has placed on these shares. Despite what many Internet sector analysts have professed to be astronomically high valuations, these publicly traded companies possess easily verifiable valuations determined by the free market forces that constitute the building blocks of our economy, and safeguarded by the oversight of federal regulators such as the Securities & Exchange Commission ("SEC"). But what …

Directorial Fiduciary Duties In A Tracking Stock Equity Structure: The Need For A Duty Of Fairness, Jeffrey J. Hass

Michigan Law Review

Part I of this article briefly describes the key distinctions between a tracking stock corporation and a conventional corporation. It then touches on the reasons why corporations have adopted tracking stock equity structures. Part II articulates the unique legal challenges presented by a tracking stock equity structure. Part III discusses the disclosure that tracking stock corporations have made with respect to these challenges. Part IV briefly summarizes the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty and explores why these duties are ill-equipped to address these challenges. Part V presents the duty of fairness and discusses the duty's elements in detail. In …

Cook And The Corporate Shareholder: A Belated Review Of William W. Cook's Publications On Corporations, Alfred F. Conard

Michigan Law Review

A Review of A Treatise on the Law of Stock and Stockholders, as Applicable to Railroad, Banking, Insurance, Manufacturing, Commercial, Business, Turnpike, Bridge, Canal, and Other Private Corporations by William W. Cook

Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, Bernard S. Black, John C. Coffee Jr.

Michigan Law Review

The two authors of this article have been on opposite sides of this debate, but both recognize that no single explanation is complete and that other factors, such as the self-interest of fund managers, the conflicts of interest faced by institutions who want to retain corporate business, cultural forces, collective action problems, and what we can call path dependence- the difficulty of changing the structure and behavior of highly evolved and specialized institutions - have causal roles in explaining shareholder passivity. The central question in research on American corporate governance is how these forces interact to produce the characteristic …

Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, Bernard S. Black

Michigan Law Review

This article argues that shareholder monitoring is possible: It's an idea that hasn't been tried, rather than an idea that has failed. I defer to a second article currently in draft the question of whether more monitoring by institutional shareholders is desirable. Will direct shareholder oversight, or indirect oversight through shareholder-nominated directors, improve corporate performance, prove counterproductive, or, perhaps, not matter much one way or the other? What are the benefits and risks in giving money managers - themselves imperfectly monitored agents - more power over corporate managers? If more shareholder voice is desirable, how much more and …

Protecting Nonshareholder Interests In The Market For Corporate Control: A Role For State Takeover Statutes, Frank J. Garcia

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Part I of this Note describes a phenomenon of modern corporate activity first identified over fifty years ago as the "separation of ownership and control." This separation gives rise to the need for a governing corporate norm; recognizing the normative aspect of this phenomenon has direct implications for the takeover debate.

Part II analyzes the problem of a target board's fiduciary duty as the modern version of the fundamental normative issue of corporate law. It argues that the norm of shareholder wealth maximization, assumed as the starting point by those most in favor of an active and minimally regulated control …

The Case For Employee Ownership In Overseas Operations Of U.S. Multinational Enterprises In Central America, William G. Hopping

Michigan Journal of International Law

Part II of this note explains the relevance of using U.S. direct investment in Central America as a starting point for encouraging employee ownership. Part III describes the essential legal framework of the ESOP in the U.S., providing a framework from which to adapt the ESOP to other countries. Part IV argues that all parties participating in this form of expanded ownership will realize significant short and long-term benefits, but points out some problems of transferring ESOPs, a U.S. legal innovation, to different cultural and business environments. Part V presents some of the legal and economic issues of adapting ESOPs, …

Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain In The Corporate Web, John C. Coffee Jr.

Michigan Law Review

Part I will seek to understand why firms trade in the stock market at a substantial discount from their asset value. It will answer that existing theories of the firm have not given adequate attention to a critical area where shareholders and managers have an inherent conflict, one that the existing structure of the firm does not resolve or mitigate. Despite the significant changes in the internal structure of the corporation over the last half century that have been described by business historians, there remains a deep internal strain between shareholders, on the one hand, and managers and employees, on …

Materiality, Law Reform, And Regulation By Prosecution, Michael Rosenzweig

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Regulation by Prosecution: The Securities & Exchange Commission Versus Corporate America by Roberta S. Karmel

Limiting The Use Of The Rico Act As A Defense To Hostile Corporate Takeovers, Mary Ann Lesniak

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This Note argues that RICO could be a legitimate defense to a hostile corporate takeover pursuant to a cash tender off er if shareholders who retain stock will be harmed by the takeover. Part I of this Note examines the general background of the RICO Act. Part II applies the Act to a hostile cash tender offer and examines each element of a civil RICO action. Part III advocates the use of RICO's injury requirement to limit this application of the Act and analyzes the potential injuries to shareholders and management during a hostile cash tender offer. This limitation upon …

The Effect Of Insider Trading Rules On The Internal Efficiency Of The Large Corporation, Robert J. Haft

Michigan Law Review

Academics have hotly debated these justifications for years, and none of the three has achieved universal acclaim. This Article suggests another perspective: Prohibiting insider trading may enhance business decision-making in large corporations. With the exception of proponents of the Business Property view, analysts have focused on how an insider trading rule affects the national securities markets and traders in those markets. The internal governance of the large corporation is a different matter, one deserving separate consideration.

The Sec And Corporate Disclosure: Regulation In Search Of A Purpose, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

A Book Notice about The SEC and Corporate Disclosure: Regulation in Search of a Purpose by Homer Kripke