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SelectedWorks

Todd Henderson

Publication Year

Articles 1 - 5 of 5

Full-Text Articles in Law

Insider Trading And Ceo Pay, Todd Henderson Jan 2011

Insider Trading And Ceo Pay, Todd Henderson

Todd Henderson

This Paper presents evidence boards of directors “bargain” with executives about the profits they expect to make from trades in firm stock. The evidence suggests executives whose trading freedom is increased using Rule 10b5-1 trading plans experienced reductions in other forms of pay to offset the potential gains from trading. There are two benefits from trading—portfolio optimization and informed trading profits—and this Paper allows us to isolate them. The data show boards pay executives in a way that reflects the profits they are expected to earn from informed trades. The legal issues about paying using illegal profits are explored. As …


Do Accounting Rules Matter? The Dangerous Allure Of Mark To Market, Todd Henderson Aug 2010

Do Accounting Rules Matter? The Dangerous Allure Of Mark To Market, Todd Henderson

Todd Henderson

This paper examines the relative strength of two imperfect accounting rules: historical cost and mark to market. The manifest inaccuracy of historical cost is well known, and, paradoxically one source of its hidden strength. Because private parties know of its evident weaknesses they look elsewhere for information. In contrast, mark to market for hard-to-value assets has many hidden weaknesses. In this paper we show how it creates asset bubbles and exacerbate their negative collateral consequences once they burst. It does the former by allowing banks to adopt generous valuations in up-markets that increase their lending capacity. It does the latter …


Insider Trading And Ceo Pay, Todd Henderson Aug 2010

Insider Trading And Ceo Pay, Todd Henderson

Todd Henderson

This Paper presents evidence boards of directors “bargain” with executives about the profits they expect to make from trades in firm stock. The evidence suggests executives whose trading freedom is increased using Rule 10b5-1 trading plans experienced reductions in other forms of pay to offset the potential gains from trading. There are two benefits from trading—portfolio optimization and informed trading profits—and this Paper allows us to isolate them. The data show boards pay executives in a way that reflects the profits they are expected to earn from informed trades. The legal issues about paying using illegal profits are explored. As …


The Nanny Corporation And The Market For Altruism, Todd Henderson Mar 2009

The Nanny Corporation And The Market For Altruism, Todd Henderson

Todd Henderson

Individuals in common pools-employees in firms, shareholders in firms, individuals in insurance plans, and citizens in a jurisdiction-want the managers of those common pools to act paternalistically toward other individuals, because this lowers the costs of being in the pool. The nanny state, which bans smoking in public places and imposes innumerable sin taxes, and the nanny corporation, which is starting to force employees to be more healthy, are simply responding to this demand. These two can thought of as competing in the "market for paternalism" to deliver paternalism to individuals that demand it.

Where nannyism is inevitable, as it …


Corporate Philanthropy And The Market For Altruism, Todd Henderson, Anup Malani Aug 2008

Corporate Philanthropy And The Market For Altruism, Todd Henderson, Anup Malani

Todd Henderson

Academics and businesspeople have long debate the merits of corporate philanthropy. It is our contention that this debate is too narrowly focused on the role of corporations. There is a robust market for philanthropic works – which we call the market for altruism – in which non-profit organizations, the government, and for-profit corporations compete to do good works. We describe this market and the role corporations play in satisfying the demand for altruism. We conclude that corporations should only engage in philanthropy when they have a comparative advantage over non-profits and the government. Moreover, the government must avoid discriminating – …