Law Commons^™

Transnational Corporate Governance Codes: Lessons From Regulating Related Party Transactions In Hong Kong And Singapore, Christopher C. H. Chen, Wai Yee Wan

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

Many jurisdictions around the world, includingAsia, have corporate governance codes largely based on the transnational codedrafted by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).The core ideas underpinning the OECD’s principles of corporate governance are boardindependence and proper management of conflicts of interest. These ideas, drawnfrom the Anglo-American model of corporate governance, are designed to protectcompanies and their shareholders. However, the question remains as to whether atransnational corporate governance code is always appropriate and effective, particularlywhen the kinds of companies listed on the stock exchange significantly differfrom the Anglo-American model. In this article, we examine Hong Kong andSingapore, two Asian …

Toward Fair And Sustainable Capitalism: A Comprehensive Proposal To Help American Workers, Restore Fair Gainsharing Between Employees And Shareholders, And Increase American Competitiveness By Reorienting Our Corporate Governance System Toward Sustainable Long-Term Growth And Encouraging Investments In America’S Future, Leo E. Strine Jr.

All Faculty Scholarship

To promote fair and sustainable capitalism and help business and labor work together to build an American economy that works for all, this paper presents a comprehensive proposal to reform the American corporate governance system by aligning the incentives of those who control large U.S. corporations with the interests of working Americans who must put their hard-earned savings in mutual funds in their 401(k) and 529 plans. The proposal would achieve this through a series of measured, coherent changes to current laws and regulations, including: requiring not just operating companies, but institutional investors, to give appropriate consideration to and make …

Singapore Company Law And The Economy: Reciprocal Influence Over 50 Years, Vincent Ooi, Cheng Han Tan

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

A strong reciprocal relationship has existed between Singapore Company Law (SCL) and the economy since Independence in 1965. Swift Parliamentary responses to economic events and successful implementation of Government policies has made it possible to clearly attribute cause and effect to statutory amendments and economic events in turn, proving the reciprocal relationship between the two. The first theme of this article seeks to explain the fundamental characteristics of SCL that have resulted in such an unusually strong reciprocal relationship: (1) Autochthonous nature of SCL; (2) Responsive nature of legislation; and (3) Government control at multiple levels of implementation. The second …

The (Re)Introduction Of Dual-Class Share Structures In Hong Kong: A Historical And Comparative Analysis, Hui Robin Huang, Wei Zhang, Siu Cheung Kelvin Lee

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

In April 2018, Hong Kong issued new listing rules to introduce the dual-class share structure, also known as weighted voting rights (WVR), under which a special class of shareholders’ voting rights are conferred disproportionately with respect to their equity interest. The WVR was used in Hong Kong in the 1980s but was banned in 1989. The debate on the WVR was rekindled by the Alibaba event in 2013. The WVR structure has benefits and costs. Thus, Hong Kong lays down relevant supporting mechanisms, including entry requirements, disclosure requirements and safeguard requirements. The WVR regime in Hong Kong appears to be …

Social Activism Through Shareholder Activism, Lisa Fairfax

All Faculty Scholarship

In 1952, the SEC altered the shareholder proposal rule to exclude proposals made “primarily for the purpose of promoting general economic, political, racial, religious, social or similar causes.” The SEC did not reference civil rights activist James Peck or otherwise acknowledge that its actions were prompted by Peck’s 1951 shareholder proposal to Greyhound for desegregating seating. Instead, the SEC indicated that its change simply reflected a codification of a position the SEC staff had taken in 1945.

Today, the shareholder proposal rule has evolved, giving way to several amendments that now enable shareholders to submit proposals on the proxy statement …

A One-Size-Fits-All Approach To Corporate Governance Codes And Compliance By Smaller Listed Firms: An Examination Of Companies Listed In Hong Kong And Singapore, Christopher C. H. Chen

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

This article examines the impact of a one-size-fits-all corporate governance code on smaller listed firms, which should have fewer resources to hire more qualified independent directors for their boards and board committees. After examining data from a sample of companies listed in Hong Kong and Singapore, we find some limited support for these resources-based arguments. While smaller firms do not necessarily have a lower proportion of board members who are independent directors, some evidence suggests that smaller firms do pay less to independent directors and that these directors have to serve on multiple board committees. Although many larger firms also …

Securities Disclosure As Soundbite: The Case Of Ceo Pay Ratios, Steven A. Bank, George S. Georgiev

Faculty Articles

This Article analyzes the history, design, and effectiveness of the highly controversial CEO pay ratio disclosure rule, which went into effect in 2018. Based on a regulatory mandate contained in the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, the rule requires public companies to disclose the ratio between CEO pay and median worker pay as part of their annual filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The seven-year rulemaking process was politically contentious and generated a level of public engagement that was virtually unprecedented in the long history of the SEC disclosure regime. The SEC sought to minimize compliance costs by providing …

The New Titans Of Wall Street: A Theoretical Framework For Passive Investors, Jill E. Fisch, Asaf Hamdani, Steven Davidoff Solomon

All Faculty Scholarship

Passive investors — ETFs and index funds — are the most important development in modern day capital markets, dictating trillions of dollars in capital flows and increasingly owning much of corporate America. Neither the business model of passive funds, nor the way that they engage with their portfolio companies, however, is well understood, and misperceptions of both have led some commentators to call for passive investors to be subject to increased regulation and even disenfranchisement. Specifically, this literature takes a narrow view both of the market in which passive investors compete to manage customer funds and of passive investors’ participation …

Corporate Governance Beyond Economics, Elizabeth Pollman

All Faculty Scholarship

In recent years, changes to state and federal law have increased pressure on corporate law to serve as an ordering mechanism for interests and values beyond economics. On the federal front, two U.S. Supreme Court cases have put existing corporate law in a new quasi-constitutional light. In the landmark decisions of Citizens United v. FEC and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., the Supreme Court has pointed to state corporate law as the mechanism for ordering political and religious activity. In addition, Congress, the SEC, and federal courts have been embroiled in battles about the scope and appropriateness of regulating …

Startup Governance, Elizabeth Pollman

All Faculty Scholarship

Although previously considered rare, over three hundred startups have reached valuations over a billion dollars. Thousands of smaller startups aim to follow in their paths. Despite the enormous social and economic impact of venture-backed startups, their internal governance receives scant scholarly attention. Longstanding theories of corporate ownership and governance do not capture the special features of startups. They can grow large with ownership shared by diverse participants, and they face issues that do not fit the dominant principal-agent paradigm of public corporations or the classic narrative of controlling shareholders in closely held corporations.

This Article offers an original, comprehensive framework …