Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Corporate governance

2011

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Articles 1 - 1 of 1

Full-Text Articles in Law

Why Not A Ceo Term Limit?, Charles K. Whitehead May 2011

Why Not A Ceo Term Limit?, Charles K. Whitehead

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

In this Essay, I ask: Why not require a mandatory CEO term limit? My purpose is not to propose a term limit, but rather to ask why CEO term limits are out-of-bounds – not addressed within the corporate governance scholarship – when they have long been advocated for directors and, more recently, public company auditors.

The traditional answer has been that CEOs are agents of the corporation, subject to control by the board, which holds primary responsibility for the firm’s business and affairs. Senior officers are largely shielded from outside interference, permitting them to execute consistent, long-term business strategies under …