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Full-Text Articles in Law
The Group Dynamics Theory Of Executive Compensation, Michael B. Dorff
The Group Dynamics Theory Of Executive Compensation, Michael B. Dorff
ExpressO
The corporate governance debate has focused recently on executive compensation. While defenders of the status quo assert that CEO compensation – and corporate governance generally -- is efficient, critics contend that boards have been captured by powerful CEOs who demand excessive pay unconditioned on their performance. Both sides argue that the evidence garnered from CEO compensation justifies their positions on legal reform of corporate governance as a whole. Defenders of the status quo argue that the system works well as is, as demonstrated by the enormous success of U.S. corporations. Critics concerned about managerial power propose reforms that will increase …
Sex, Trust, And Corporate Boards, Joan M. Heminway
Sex, Trust, And Corporate Boards, Joan M. Heminway
ExpressO
This essay collects and interprets social science research on sex and trust and uses this work to shed new light on the emerging case for gender diversity on corporate boards. Specifically, the essay describes research findings that indicate (1) that men and women trust and are trustworthy on different bases and (2) the existence of a bias against women in corporate leadership positions. Based on this research and current legal scholarship on corporate governance, the essay asserts that gender diversity on corporate boards may be desirable but difficult to attain. The essay also calls for more targeted research on the …
The Case Against Mandatory Annual Director Elections And Shareholders' Meetings, William K. Sjostrom
The Case Against Mandatory Annual Director Elections And Shareholders' Meetings, William K. Sjostrom
ExpressO
The article examines the mandatory requirement under state corporate law and stock exchange listing standards that public corporations hold annual shareholders’ meetings for the election of directors. Specifically, I question the value of requiring corporations to (1) elect directors annually, and (2) hold shareholders’ meetings annually. I critique the various justifications for these requirements and find none of them persuasive. I then explore a different approach taken by Minnesota with respect to the frequency of director elections and shareholders’ meetings and conclude that the approach is superior to the current scheme. Recognizing, however, that any less strict state approach is …
The Chameleon Effect: Beyond The Bonding Hypothesis For Cross-Listed Securities, Cally Jordan
The Chameleon Effect: Beyond The Bonding Hypothesis For Cross-Listed Securities, Cally Jordan
ExpressO
This paper is based on a presentation made at the New York Stock Exchange Conference on the Future of Global Equity Trading, March 12, 2004, Sarasota, FL.
Looking back, was it a momentary enthusiasm? The dramatic increase in cross-listed securities, particularly in the United States, was one of the remarkable phenomena of the 1990s capital markets. The bonding, or corporate governance, hypothesis was one of the more intriguing theories to surface to explain the phenomenon. Cross-listing, the hypothesis suggested, might be a bonding mechanism by which firms, incorporated in a jurisdiction with “weak protection” of minority shareholder rights or poor …
Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model To Encourage Corporate Whistleblowers, Richard E. Moberly
Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model To Encourage Corporate Whistleblowers, Richard E. Moberly
ExpressO
Recent corporate scandals demonstrate that rank-and-file employees often remain silent in the face of significant fraud. This silence is unfortunate because corporate employees have inside knowledge of misconduct that gives them an information advantage over more traditional corporate monitors, such as independent directors and government regulators. To address this problem, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act utilized a new approach that encourages employee whistleblowers to disclose information about corporate wrongdoing. This approach, which Professor Richard Moberly labels the “Structural Model,” requires that corporations provide a standardized channel for employees to report organizational misconduct to official monitors within the corporation. This Article offers an …
Comparative Corporate Governance: Irish, American, And European Responses To Corporate Scandals, Manish Gupta
Comparative Corporate Governance: Irish, American, And European Responses To Corporate Scandals, Manish Gupta
ExpressO
A comparative review of legislative reactions to corporate scandals such as Enron and WorldCom. This paper examines American, Irish, and European Union legislation meant to deal with regulating corporations.