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Articles 1 - 26 of 26
Full-Text Articles in Law
Corporate Aid To Governmental Authority: History And Analysis Of An Obscure Power In Delaware Corporate Law, David Yosifon
Corporate Aid To Governmental Authority: History And Analysis Of An Obscure Power In Delaware Corporate Law, David Yosifon
Faculty Publications
The Delaware General Corporation Law contains an obscure provision stating that all corporations have the power to “[t]ransact any lawful business which the corporation’s board of directors shall find to be in aid of governmental authority.” 8 DGCL §122(12). This oddly worded provision has never been applied, analyzed, or interpreted by any court. It has received almost no treatment by corporate law scholars. This lack of attention is surprising, given that by its own terms the provision seems to bear on fundamental corporate law themes, such as the purpose of corporations, the scope of directors’ fiduciary obligations and discretion, and …
Towards The Declassification Of S&P 500 Boards, Scott Hirst, Lucian A. Bebchuk, June Rhee
Towards The Declassification Of S&P 500 Boards, Scott Hirst, Lucian A. Bebchuk, June Rhee
Faculty Scholarship
This report provides an overview and analysis of the work that the Shareholder Rights Project (SRP) undertook on behalf of a number of institutional investors during 2012 and 2013, the SRP’s first two years of operations. During 2012 and 2013, the SRP worked on behalf of eight SRP-represented investors on board declassification proposals submitted for a vote at the 2012 and/or 2013 annual meetings of 122 S&P 500 and Fortune 500 companies, and this work has produced substantial results:
100 Negotiated Outcomes: Negotiated outcomes involving a commitment to board declassification were reached with 100 S&P 500 and Fortune 500 companies, …
Deconstructing Corporate Governance: The Mechanics Of Trusting, René Reich-Graefe
Deconstructing Corporate Governance: The Mechanics Of Trusting, René Reich-Graefe
Faculty Scholarship
The phenomenon of trust among firm participants is a much neglected academic inquiry in corporate governance research and the theory of the firm. This Article elaborates on the comparatively small sample of existing legal research on the intersection of trust and corporate governance and tries to interrupt the selective (in-)attention given to the philosophical, psychological, political, sociological, economic, and legal phenomenon that is our individual as well as collective, everyday trust (or distrust) in the functionality and explainability of the world tomorrow in accordance with our preferences of today and our experiences of the past. Trust—as a phenomenon—is a concrete …
Pre-Disclosure Accumulations By Activist Investors: Evidence And Policy, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Robert J. Jackson Jr., Wei Jiang
Pre-Disclosure Accumulations By Activist Investors: Evidence And Policy, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Robert J. Jackson Jr., Wei Jiang
Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is currently considering a rulemaking petition requesting that the Commission shorten the ten-day window, established by Section 13(d) of the Williams Act, within which investors must publicly disclose purchases of a five percent or greater stake in public companies. In this Article, we provide the first systematic empirical evidence on these disclosures and find that several of the petition's factual premises are not consistent with the evidence.
Our analysis is based on about 2,000 filings by activist hedge funds during the period of 1994-2007. We find that the data are inconsistent with the petition's …
Investment Company As Instrument: The Limitations Of The Corporate Governance Regulatory Paradigm, Anita Krug
Investment Company As Instrument: The Limitations Of The Corporate Governance Regulatory Paradigm, Anita Krug
All Faculty Scholarship
U.S. regulation of public investment companies (such as mutual funds) is based on a notion that, from a governance perspective, investment companies are simply another type of business enterprise, not substantially different from companies that produce goods or provide (noninvestment) services. In other words, investment company regulation is founded on what this Article calls a “corporate governance paradigm,” in that it provides a significant regulatory role for boards of directors, as the traditional governance mechanism in business enterprises, and is “entity centric,” focusing on intraentity relationships to the exclusion of superentity ones. This Article argues that corporate governance norms, which …
Issuing New Shares And Preemptive Rights: A Comparative Analysis, Marco Ventoruzzo
Issuing New Shares And Preemptive Rights: A Comparative Analysis, Marco Ventoruzzo
Journal Articles
The question of whether the corporate law of Europe and America are converging is still largely unanswered. One fundamental area in which the two systems diverge concerns how they regulate the issuing of new shares, in particular preemptive rights, a problem rarely addressed by comparative corporate law scholars. This essay fills that gap by examining the major comparative differences between the approaches followed on the two sides of the Atlantic, and offers some possible explanations for this divergence.
Is The Corporate Director's Duty Of Care A 'Fiduciary' Duty? Does It Matter?, Christopher M. Bruner
Is The Corporate Director's Duty Of Care A 'Fiduciary' Duty? Does It Matter?, Christopher M. Bruner
Scholarly Articles
While reference to "fiduciary duties" (plural) is routinely employed in the United States as a convenient short-hand for a corporate director's duties of care and loyalty, other common-law countries generally treat loyalty as the sole "fiduciary duty." This contrast prompts some important questions about the doctrinal structure for duty of care analysis adopted in Delaware, the principal jurisdiction of incorporation for U.S. public companies. Specifically, has the evolution of Delaware's convoluted and problematic framework for evaluating disinterested board conduct been facilitated by styling care a "fiduciary" duty? If so, then how should Delaware lawmakers and judges respond moving forward?
In …
On The Rise Of Shareholder Primacy, Signs Of Its Fall, And The Return Of Managerialism (In The Closet), Lynn A. Stout
On The Rise Of Shareholder Primacy, Signs Of Its Fall, And The Return Of Managerialism (In The Closet), Lynn A. Stout
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
Fiduciary Duties And Fiduciary Outs, Julian Velasco
Fiduciary Duties And Fiduciary Outs, Julian Velasco
Journal Articles
Fiduciary outs are virtually ubiquitous in acquisition agreements, but almost unheard of in other contexts. This is because the fiduciary out is an inherently problematic device. Although it is not intended to do so, it almost necessarily transforms an agreement into an option in the hands of one party. Nevertheless, fiduciary outs make sense in the context of acquisition agreements. This is because fiduciary outs are essentially contractual proxies for fiduciary duties. As such, they have the same purpose: to protect shareholders from abuse at the hands of directors. Fiduciary outs do this in the context of acquisition agreements by …
Carrots & Sticks: How Vcs Induce Entrepreneurial Teams To Sell Startups, Brian Broughman, Jesse Fried
Carrots & Sticks: How Vcs Induce Entrepreneurial Teams To Sell Startups, Brian Broughman, Jesse Fried
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Venture capitalists (VCs) usually exit their investments in a startup via a trade sale. But the entrepreneurial team – the startup’s founder, other executives, and common shareholders – may resist a trade sale. Such resistance is likely to be particularly intense when the sale price is low relative to VCs’ liquidation preferences. Using a hand-collected dataset of Silicon Valley firms, we investigate how VCs overcome such resistance. We find, in our sample, that VCs give bribes (carrots) to the entrepreneurial team in 45% of trade sales; in these sales, carrots total an average of 9% of deal value. The overt …
Should New Zealand Adopt Say On Pay?, Randall Thomas, Susan Watson
Should New Zealand Adopt Say On Pay?, Randall Thomas, Susan Watson
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
The Next Stage Of Csr For Canada: Transformational Corporate Governance, Hybrid Legal Structures, And The Growth Of Social Enterprise, Carol Liao
All Faculty Publications
The period when corporate social responsibility (CSR) only referred to corporate philanthropic donations has passed. Present day CSR is intimately intertwined with sustainable development, and its growth in the last several decades has been evident in Canada. The recent appearance of “hybrid” corporate legal structures on the international stage marks a growing trend toward enabling the dual pursuit of economic and social mandates for businesses. It suggests that the next significant stage in the CSR movement will be in the reformation and creation of corporate legal models that not only enable, but require, CSR concepts to be embodied within corporate …
The Long Road Back: Business Roundtable And The Future Of Sec Rulemaking, Jill E. Fisch
The Long Road Back: Business Roundtable And The Future Of Sec Rulemaking, Jill E. Fisch
All Faculty Scholarship
The Securities and Exchange Commission has suffered a number of recent setbacks in areas ranging from enforcement policy to rulemaking. The DC Circuit’s 2011 Business Roundtable decision is one of the most serious, particularly in light of the heavy rulemaking obligations imposed on the SEC by Dodd-Frank and the JOBS Act. The effectiveness of the SEC in future rulemaking and the ability of its rules to survive legal challenge are currently under scrutiny.
This article critically evaluates the Business Roundtable decision in the context of the applicable statutory and structural constraints on SEC rulemaking. Toward that end, the essay questions …
Adapting To The New Shareholder-Centric Reality, Edward B. Rock
Adapting To The New Shareholder-Centric Reality, Edward B. Rock
All Faculty Scholarship
After more than eighty years of sustained attention, the master problem of U.S. corporate law—the separation of ownership and control—has mostly been brought under control. This resolution has occurred more through changes in market and corporate practices than through changes in the law. This Article explores how corporate law and practice are adapting to the new shareholder-centric reality that has emerged.
Because solving the shareholder–manager agency cost problem aggravates shareholder–creditor agency costs, I focus on implications for creditors. After considering how debt contracts, compensation arrangements, and governance structures can work together to limit shareholder–creditor agency costs, I turn to available …
Mandating Board-Shareholder Engagement?, Lisa Fairfax
Mandating Board-Shareholder Engagement?, Lisa Fairfax
All Faculty Scholarship
This Article not only argues that corporations must be encouraged to enhance the level of communication between shareholders and the board, but also maintains that the benefits of increased engagement are significant enough that we should consider developing standards for incentivizing, if not mandating, more robust board-shareholder engagement for corporations that fail to respond to such encouragement. In the last several years, shareholders not only have gained increased authority over corporate elections and governance matters, but also have demonstrated a willingness to use that authority to challenge, and even reject, management policies and practices. Shareholders also have begun to demand …
Proposals For Corporate Governance Reform: Six Decades Of Ineptitude And Counting, Douglas M. Branson
Proposals For Corporate Governance Reform: Six Decades Of Ineptitude And Counting, Douglas M. Branson
Articles
This article is a retrospective of corporate governance reforms various academics have authored over the last 60 years or so, by the author of the first U.S. legal treatise on the subject of corporate governance (Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Governance (1993)). The first finding is as to periodicity: even casual inspection reveals that the reformer group which controls the "reform" agenda has authored a new and different reform proposal every five years, with clock-like regularity. The second finding flows from the first, namely, that not one of these proposals has made so much as a dent in the problems that …
Investment Company As Instrument: The Limitations Of The Corporate Governance Regulatory Paradigm, Anita K. Krug
Investment Company As Instrument: The Limitations Of The Corporate Governance Regulatory Paradigm, Anita K. Krug
Articles
U.S. regulation of public investment companies (such as mutual funds) is based on a notion that, from a governance perspective, investment companies are simply another type of business enterprise, not substantially different from companies that produce goods or provide (noninvestment) services. In other words, investment company regulation is founded on what this Article calls a “corporate governance paradigm,” in that it provides a significant regulatory role for boards of directors, as the traditional governance mechanism in business enterprises, and is “entity centric,” focusing on intraentity relationships to the exclusion of super-entity ones.
This Article argues that corporate governance norms, which …
Ring-Fencing, Steven L. Schwarcz
Ring-Fencing, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
“Ring-fencing” is often touted as a regulatory solution to problems in banking, finance, public utilities, and insurance. However, both the precise meaning of ring-fencing, as well as the nature of the problems that ring-fencing regulation purports to solve, are ill defined. This article examines the functions and conceptual foundations of ring-fencing. In a regulatory context, the term can best be understood as legally deconstructing a firm in order to more optimally reallocate and reduce risk. So utilized, ring-fencing can help to protect public-benefit activities performed by private-sector firms, as well as to mitigate systemic risk and the too-big-to-fail problem inherent …
The Danger Of Difference: Tensions In Directors’ View Of Corporate Board Diversity, Kimberly D. Krawiec, John M. Conley, Lissa L. Broome
The Danger Of Difference: Tensions In Directors’ View Of Corporate Board Diversity, Kimberly D. Krawiec, John M. Conley, Lissa L. Broome
Faculty Scholarship
This Article describes the results from fifty-seven interviews with corporate directors and a limited number of other persons (including institutional investors, search firm personnel, and the like) regarding their views on corporate board diversity. It highlights numerous tensions in these views. Most directors, for instance, proclaim that diverse boards are good, but very few directors can articulate their reasons for this belief. Some directors have suggested that diverse boards work better than non-diverse boards, but gave relatively few concrete examples of specific instances where a female or minority board member made a special contribution related to that director’s race or …
Shareholders And Social Welfare, William W. Bratton, Michael L. Wachter
Shareholders And Social Welfare, William W. Bratton, Michael L. Wachter
All Faculty Scholarship
This article addresses the question whether (and how) the shareholders matter for social welfare. Answers to the question have changed over time. Observers in the mid-twentieth century believed that the socio-economic characteristics of real world shareholders were highly pertinent to social welfare inquiries. But they went on to conclude that there followed no justification for catering to shareholder interest, for shareholders occupied elite social strata. The answer changed during the twentieth century’s closing decades, when observers came to accord the shareholder interest a key structural role in the enhancement of economic efficiency even as they also deemed irrelevant the characteristics …
Sue On Pay: Say On Pay’S Impact On Directors’ Fiduciary Duties, Lisa Fairfax
Sue On Pay: Say On Pay’S Impact On Directors’ Fiduciary Duties, Lisa Fairfax
All Faculty Scholarship
This Article advances a normative case for using say on pay litigation to enhance the state courts’ role in policing directors’ compensation decisions. Outrage over what many perceive to be excessive executive compensation has escalated dramatically in recent years. In 2010, such outrage prompted Congress to mandate say on pay—a nonbinding shareholder vote on executive compensation. In the wake of say on pay votes, some shareholders have brought suit against directors alleging that a negative vote indicates a breach of directors’ fiduciary duties. To date, the vast majority of courts have rejected these suits. This Article insists that such rejection …
Who Calls The Shots?: How Mutual Funds Vote On Director Elections, Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch, Marcel Kahan
Who Calls The Shots?: How Mutual Funds Vote On Director Elections, Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch, Marcel Kahan
All Faculty Scholarship
Shareholder voting has become an increasingly important focus of corporate governance, and mutual funds control a substantial percentage of shareholder voting power. The manner in which mutual funds exercise that power, however, is poorly understood. In particular, because neither mutual funds nor their advisors are beneficial owners of their portfolio holdings, there is concern that mutual fund voting may be uninformed or tainted by conflicts of interest. These concerns, if true, hamper the potential effectiveness of regulatory reforms such as proxy access and say on pay. This article analyzes mutual fund voting decisions in uncontested director elections. We find that …
A Private Ordering Solution To Blockholder Disclosure, Joshua Mitts
A Private Ordering Solution To Blockholder Disclosure, Joshua Mitts
Faculty Scholarship
The recent debate over reforming the Securities Exchange Act section 13(d) ten-day filing window demonstrates the importance of balancing the costs and benefits of delayed blockholder disclosure. While hedge fund activism may create shareholder value, short-termism is a very real problem for firms today. Rather than a rigid mandatory rule, the duration of the blockholder disclosure window should be set through a shareholder amendment to the corporate bylaws that empowers shareholders to set an optimal maximum length for each firm. To internalize the economic and moral costs to society of permitting trading on asymmetric information, the SEC should impose a …
Private Regulation Of Insider Trading In The Shadow Of Lax Public Enforcement: Evidence From Canadian Firms, Laura Nyantung Beny, Anita Anand
Private Regulation Of Insider Trading In The Shadow Of Lax Public Enforcement: Evidence From Canadian Firms, Laura Nyantung Beny, Anita Anand
Articles
Like firms in the United States, many Canadian firms voluntarily restrict trading by corporate insiders beyond the requirements of insider trading laws (i.e., super-compliance). Thus, we aim to understand the determinants of firms’ private insider trading policies (ITPs), which are quasi-contractual devices. Based on the assumption that firms that face greater costs from insider trading (or greater benefits from restricting insider trading) ought to be more inclined than other firms to adopt more stringent ITPs, we develop several testable hypotheses. We test our hypotheses using data from a sample of firms included in the Toronto Stock Exchange/Standard and Poor’s (TSX/S&P) …
Carrots And Sticks: How Vcs Induce Entrepreneurial Teams To Sell Startups, Brian J. Broughman, Jesse M. Fried
Carrots And Sticks: How Vcs Induce Entrepreneurial Teams To Sell Startups, Brian J. Broughman, Jesse M. Fried
Articles by Maurer Faculty
Venture capitalists (VCs) usually exit their investments in a startup via a trade sale. But the entrepreneurial team – the startup’s founder, other executives, and common shareholders – may resist a trade sale. Such resistance is likely to be particularly intense when the sale price is low relative to VCs’ liquidation preferences. Using a hand-collected dataset of Silicon Valley firms, we investigate how VCs overcome such resistance. We find, in our sample, that VCs give bribes (carrots) to the entrepreneurial team in 45% of trade sales; in these sales, carrots total an average of 9% of deal value. The overt …
Independent Directors And Shared Board Control In Venture Finance, Brian J. Broughman
Independent Directors And Shared Board Control In Venture Finance, Brian J. Broughman
Articles by Maurer Faculty
In most VC-backed firms neither the entrepreneurs nor the VC investors control the board. Instead control is typically shared with a mutually appointed independent director holding the tie-breaking seat. Contract theory, which treats control as an indivisible right held by one party, does not have a good explanation for this practice. Using a bargaining game similar to final offer arbitration, I show that an independent director as tie-breaker can reduce holdup by moderating each party’s ex post threat position, potentially expanding the range of firms which receive external financing. This project contributes to the literature on incomplete contracting and holdup, …