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Full-Text Articles in Law
Interlocking Directorates Among The S&P 500: Social Networks, Gender Diversity, And Corporate Governance, Eric P. Magistad
Interlocking Directorates Among The S&P 500: Social Networks, Gender Diversity, And Corporate Governance, Eric P. Magistad
School of Business Student Theses and Dissertations
This multi-article investigation examines corporate board composition and the implications for regulatory penalties. Director diversity on key board committees and board interlocks influence board behaviors as they relate to regulatory risk. Directors bring experience and inter-industry ties to a board position and subsequently transfer and receive specific knowledge, practices, and contacts with other directors (Hillman & Haynes, 2010). Despite this exchange, firms may suffer regulatory oversight penalties because different directors perceive and respond to risk differently (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1983; Flynn et al., 1994). Leveraging the tenets of the cultural theory of risk perception (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1983) and of …
The Mediating Effect Of Strategic Posture On Corporate Governance And Environmental Reporting, Abdalla Shwairef, Azlan Amran, Mohammad Iranmanesh, Noor Hazlina Ahmad
The Mediating Effect Of Strategic Posture On Corporate Governance And Environmental Reporting, Abdalla Shwairef, Azlan Amran, Mohammad Iranmanesh, Noor Hazlina Ahmad
Research outputs 2014 to 2021
The aim of this study is to explain how corporate governance affects environmental reporting through the mediating effect of strategic position. The data were collected from chief executive managers and chief financial managers of 197 large companies in Malaysia. The partial least squares technique was used to test the proposed relationships. The results show that managers’ strategic posture mediates the impact of four aspects of corporate governance, namely, board size, board independency, CSR committee presence, and institutional ownership on environmental reporting. These findings extend the literature on the relationship between corporate governance and environmental reporting by providing insight into the …
The “Value” Of A Public Benefit Corporation, Jill E. Fisch, Steven Davidoff Solomon
The “Value” Of A Public Benefit Corporation, Jill E. Fisch, Steven Davidoff Solomon
All Faculty Scholarship
We examine the “value” a PBC form provides for publicly-traded corporations. We analyze the structure of the PBC form and find that other than requiring a designated social purpose it does not differ significantly in siting control and direction with shareholders. We also examine the purpose statements in the charters of the most economically significant PBCs. We find that, independent of structural limitations on accountability, these purpose statements are, in most cases, too vague and aspirational to be legally significant, or even to serve as a reliable checks on PBC behavior. We theorize, and provide evidence, that without a legal …
How Corporate Governance Is Made: The Case Of The Golden Leash, Matthew D. Cain, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith, Steven Davidoff Solomon
How Corporate Governance Is Made: The Case Of The Golden Leash, Matthew D. Cain, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith, Steven Davidoff Solomon
Steven Davidoff Solomon
This Article presents a case study of a corporate governance innovation—the incentive compensation arrangement for activist-nominated director candidates colloquially known as the “golden leash.” Golden leash compensation arrangements are a potentially valuable tool for activist shareholders in election contests. In response to their use, several issuers adopted bylaw provisions banning incentive compensation arrangements. Investors, in turn, viewed director adoption of golden leash bylaws as problematic and successfully pressured issuers to repeal them. The study demonstrates how corporate governance provisions are developed and deployed, the sequential response of issuers and investors, and the central role played by governance intermediaries—activist investors, institutional …
Hedge Fund Activism, Poison Pills, And The Jurisprudence Of Threat, William W. Bratton
Hedge Fund Activism, Poison Pills, And The Jurisprudence Of Threat, William W. Bratton
All Faculty Scholarship
This chapter reviews the single high profile case in which twentieth century antitakeover law has come to bear on management defense against a twenty-first century activist challenge—the Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision to sustain a low-threshold poison pill deployed against an activist in Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht. The decision implicated an important policy question: whether a twentieth century doctrine keyed to hostile takeovers and control transfers appropriately can be brought to bear in a twenty-first century governance context in which the challenger eschews control transfer and instead makes aggressive use of the shareholder franchise. Resolution of the question …
How Corporate Governance Is Made: The Case Of The Golden Leash, Matthew D. Cain, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith, Steven Davidoff Solomon
How Corporate Governance Is Made: The Case Of The Golden Leash, Matthew D. Cain, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith, Steven Davidoff Solomon
All Faculty Scholarship
This Article presents a case study of a corporate governance innovation—the incentive compensation arrangement for activist-nominated director candidates colloquially known as the “golden leash.” Golden leash compensation arrangements are a potentially valuable tool for activist shareholders in election contests. In response to their use, several issuers adopted bylaw provisions banning incentive compensation arrangements. Investors, in turn, viewed director adoption of golden leash bylaws as problematic and successfully pressured issuers to repeal them.
The study demonstrates how corporate governance provisions are developed and deployed, the sequential response of issuers and investors, and the central role played by governance intermediaries—activist investors, institutional …
Stewardship In The Interests Of Systemic Stakeholders: Re-Conceptualizing The Means And Ends Of Anglo-American Corporate Governance In The Wake Of The Global Financial Crisis, Zhong Xing Tan
Journal of Business & Technology Law
No abstract provided.
Shareholder Eugenics In The Public Corporation, Edward B. Rock
Shareholder Eugenics In The Public Corporation, Edward B. Rock
All Faculty Scholarship
In a world of active, empowered shareholders, the match between shareholders and public corporations can potentially affect firm value. This article examines the extent to which publicly held corporations can shape their shareholder base. Two sorts of approaches are available: direct/recruitment strategies; and shaping or socialization strategies. Direct/recruitment strategies through which “good” shareholders are attracted to the firm include: going public; targeted placement of shares; traditional investor relations; the exploitation of clientele effects; and de-recruitment. “Shaping” or “socialization” strategies in which shareholders of a “bad” or unknown type are transformed into shareholders of the “good” type include: choice of domicile; …