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Corporate governance

Securities Law

University of San Diego

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Full-Text Articles in Law

Are Passive Index Funds Active Owners? Corporate Governance Consequences Of Passive Investing, Giovanni Strampelli Dec 2018

Are Passive Index Funds Active Owners? Corporate Governance Consequences Of Passive Investing, Giovanni Strampelli

San Diego Law Review

The exponential rise of mutual funds designed to track stock indices has been one of the drivers behind the re-concentration of ownership of listed companies in the United States. Because of the high concentration of the passive index funds industry, the three leading passive fund managers—BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street—make up an increasingly important component of the shareholder base of listed companies. In spite of this however, it remains questionable whether they are actually interested in playing an active role in the corporate governance of investee companies. In fact, although passive investors are, by definition, focused on the long term …


Overseeing Controlling Shareholders: Do Independent Directors Constrain Tunneling In Taiwan?, Yu-Hsin Lin Mar 2011

Overseeing Controlling Shareholders: Do Independent Directors Constrain Tunneling In Taiwan?, Yu-Hsin Lin

San Diego International Law Journal

This Article intends to explore the extent to which independent directors constrain tunneling by controlling shareholders in Taiwan. Taiwan serves as an appropriate jurisdiction for research since the private benefits agency problem is prevalent among Taiwanese public companies. A further twist in Taiwan?s case is that independent directors were newly introduced to Taiwan?s corporate boards, which follow dual-board system where the traditional monitoring function is served by statutory supervisors, instead of board committees, which adds to the complexity in analyzing the effectiveness of independent directors in constraining tunneling activities. Part II reviews relevant literature and lays the foundation for this …


Evolving Regulation Of Corporate Governance And The Implications For D&O Liability: The United States And Australia, Joan T.A. Gabel, Nancy R. Mansfield, Paul Von Nessen, Austin W. Hall, Andrew Jones Mar 2010

Evolving Regulation Of Corporate Governance And The Implications For D&O Liability: The United States And Australia, Joan T.A. Gabel, Nancy R. Mansfield, Paul Von Nessen, Austin W. Hall, Andrew Jones

San Diego International Law Journal

This Article compares the modern corporate regulatory environments in the United States and Australia, including an analysis of the climate for Directors & Officers (D & O) liability coverage. Comparing these regulations across two large markets with similar historical bases for assessing director and officer liability allows us to explore which reforms may be more effective as new scandals emerge.