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Full-Text Articles in Law

The Compliance Process, Veronica Root Martinez Aug 2019

The Compliance Process, Veronica Root Martinez

Veronica Root

Even as regulators and prosecutors proclaim the importance of effective compliance programs, failures persist. Organizations fail to ensure that they and their agents comply with legal and regulatory requirements, industry practices, and their own internal policies and norms. From the companies that provide our news, to the financial institutions that serve as our bankers, to the corporations that make our cars, compliance programs fail to prevent misconduct each and every day. The causes of these compliance failures are multifaceted and include general enforcement deficiencies, difficulties associated with overseeing compliance programs within complex organizations, and failures to establish a culture of …


Modern-Day Monitorships, Veronica Root Jun 2016

Modern-Day Monitorships, Veronica Root

Veronica Root

When a sexual abuse scandal rocked Penn State, when Apple engaged in anticompetitive behavior, and when servicers like Bank of America improperly foreclosed upon hundreds of thousands of homeowners, each organization entered into a Modern-Day Monitorship. Modern-Day Monitorships are utilized in an array of contexts to assist in widely varying remediation efforts. They provide outsiders a unique source of information about the efficacy of the tarnished organization’s efforts to remediate misconduct. Yet despite their use in high-profile and serious matters of organizational wrongdoing, they are not an outgrowth of careful study and deliberate planning. Instead, Modern-Day Monitorships have been employed …


Cartels, Corporate Compliance, And What Practitioners Really Think About Enforcement, D. Daniel Sokol Nov 2014

Cartels, Corporate Compliance, And What Practitioners Really Think About Enforcement, D. Daniel Sokol

D. Daniel Sokol

This article shows the limitations to the optimal deterrence-inspired cartel enforcement policy currently used by the Department of Justice Antitrust Division. This article employs both quantitative and qualitative survey evidence of cartel practitioners to shed light upon the realities of US cartel enforcement policy. The empirical evidence provided by the practitioner surveys challenges the traditional assumptions behind the success of the DOJ’s cartel program. Perhaps the most interesting finding is that firms regularly game the leniency program to punish their competitors. For various reasons, firms and the DOJ have strong incentives to settle rather than to litigate cases in which …


Beyond Incentives: Making Corporate Whistleblowing Moral In The New Era Of Dodd-Frank Act "Bounty Hunting", Matt A. Vega Nov 2012

Beyond Incentives: Making Corporate Whistleblowing Moral In The New Era Of Dodd-Frank Act "Bounty Hunting", Matt A. Vega

Matt A Vega

In this article, I examine the SEC's new whistleblower bounty program authorized by the Dodd-Frank Act. Under the program, which went into effect last year, the SEC is required to pay a bounty to whistleblowers who voluntarily provide the agency with "original information" about a potential securities law violation that leads to a successful SEC or "related" enforcement action and that results in monetary sanctions of sufficient size. When the average SEC settlement is over $18.3 million, whistleblowers can expect the average bounty to be well in the range of $2-5 million.

My contention is that this new program is …