Law Commons^™

Using Public Disclosure As The Vesting Point For Moral Rights Under The Visual Artists Rights Act, Elizabeth M. Bock

Michigan Law Review

In 2010, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit confronted the novel question of when moral rights protections vest under the Visual Artists Rights Act. In Massachusetts Museum of Contemporary Art Foundation, Inc. v. Bichel, the First Circuit determined that the protections of the Visual Artists Rights Act begin when a work is "created" under the Copyright Act. This Note argues that this decision harms moral rights conceptually and is likely to result in unpredictable and inconsistent decisions. This Note proposes instead that these statutory protections should vest when an artist determines that his work is complete and presents …

The Copyright Act Of 1976 And Prejudgment Interest, Jon M. Powers

Michigan Law Review

This Note argues that prejudgment interest should be presumptively available on damages-plus-profits awards under section 504(b) but should not be available for statutory damages under section 504(c). Part I argues that Supreme Court precedent suggests that the explicit reference to interest found in the Patent Act does not prevent courts from awarding prejudgment interest under the 1976 Copyright Act. Part II asserts that the 1976 Copyright Act's silence regarding prejudgment interest does not represent a congressional choice to exclude this remedy and that, in the face of this silence, the underlying purposes of section 504 should determine the propriety of …

Rhetoric And Reality In Copyright Law, Stewart E. Sterk

Michigan Law Review

My first objective in this article is to explore the gulf between copyright rhetoric and copyright reality. After examining copyright rhetoric, the article demonstrates how neither the need to generate creative activity nor the desire to reward deserving authors provides a plausible justification for current copyright doctrine.

Why, then, does copyright doctrine continue to expand? The concluding section suggests some answers. Interest-group politics provides an obvious answer and one well-substantiated by the history of copyright legislation. But the story does not end with interest-group politics. Instead, I suggest that the nation's elite, including its lawmakers, has a stake in believing …

Does A Copyright Coowner's Duty To Account Arise Under Federal Law?, Craig Y. Allison

Michigan Law Review

This Note discusses both the source of the accounting rule and the proper forum for applying the rule. Part I provides a general history of joint ownership and the duty to account and suggests that the number of litigants presenting joint ownership claims will probably increase. Part II discusses joint ownership case law chronologically. This Part shows that the case law is consistent with the view that the duty to account was a creation of the federal courts. Part III argues that the accounting rule is federal common law and that federal jurisdiction necessarily follows for all copyright accounting cases. …

Copyright, Computer Software, And Work Made For Hire, Matthew R. Harris

Michigan Law Review

Prior to the Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, the Circuits had disagreed over the question of whether independent contractors could qualify as "employees" under the doctrine. The Fifth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits defined "employee" narrowly, thereby excluding the majority of commissioned works from potential work for hire status. Applying a much broader definition of the term, the Second and Seventh Circuits included virtually all commissioned works as work for hire. The disagreement was not surprising, since the copyright statute does not include a definition of the term, and the legislative history fails to …

The Availability Of Jury Trials In Copyright Infringement Cases: Limiting The Scope Of The Seventh Amendment, Andrew W. Stumpff

Michigan Law Review

This Note argues that statutory copyright damages are properly regarded as equitable and hence that no right to a jury trial exists in cases brought to recover such damages. More generally, the Note maintains that the seventh amendment's distinction between equitable and legal causes of action has produced irrational consequences, and proposes that "legal" issues be defined narrowly so as to limit the scope of the seventh amendment. Part I analyzes the debate over statutory copyright damages, concluding that historical and statutory construction arguments require these damages to be construed as legal. Part II examines some of the problems that …