Law Commons^™

Copyrighting Tiktok Dances: Choreography In The Internet Age, Ali Johnson

Washington Law Review

TikTok is a video-sharing social media application that launched in 2018 and has grown wildly since its inception. Many users are drawn to the platform by “dance challenges”—short dance routines of varying complexity set to popular songs that are recreated by other users, eventually going “viral” (i.e., recreated on a massive scale by other users) on the app. Going viral can provide young dancers and choreographers an opportunity to break into the highly competitive entertainment industry. However, there is a problem: due to TikTok’s interface and community practices, the original creators of a dance (who, significantly, are often young women …

Limiting Lessons From Property: Re-Imagining The Public Domain In The Image Of The Public Trust Doctrine, Deidre Keller

Journal Publications

No abstract provided.

Copyright And Good Faith Purchasers, Shyamkrishna Balganesh

All Faculty Scholarship

Good faith purchasers for value — individuals who unknowingly and in good faith purchase property from a seller whose own actions in obtaining the property are of questionable legality — have long obtained special protection under the common law. Despite the seller’s own actions being tainted, such purchasers obtain valid title themselves and are allowed to freely alienate the property without any restriction. Modern copyright law, however, does just the opposite. Individuals who unknowingly and in good faith purchase property embodying an unauthorized copy of a protected work are altogether precluded from subsequently alienating such property, or risk running afoul …

Addressing The Incoherency Of The Preemption Provision Of The Copyright Act Of 1976, Joseph P. Bauer

Joseph P. Bauer

Section 301 of the Copyright Act of 1976 expressly preempts state law actions that are within the "general scope of copyright" and that assert claims that are "equivalent to" the rights conferred by the Act. The Act eliminated the previous system of common law copyright for unpublished works, which had prevailed under the prior 1909 Copyright Act. By federalizing copyright law, the drafters of the statute sought to achieve uniformity and to avoid the potential for state protection of infinite duration. The legislative history of § 301 stated that this preemption provision was set forth "in the clearest and most …

Copyright, Custom, And Lessons From The Common Law, Jennifer E. Rothman

All Faculty Scholarship

In this essay prepared for the University of Pennsylvania’s conference on Intellectual Property and the Common Law, I build upon my work on custom and intellectual property. I focus here on one important facet of the subject — how longstanding common law principles should inform our understanding of custom. The common law provides a number of lessons on how to appropriately limit the consideration of custom in intellectual property law and elsewhere. The essay begins by considering the traditional role of custom in the common law. Part II then examines several of the ways that courts have incorporated custom into …

Foreseeability And Copyright Incentives, Shyamkrishna Balganesh

All Faculty Scholarship

Copyright law’s principal justification today is the economic theory of creator incentives. Central to this theory is the recognition that while copyright’s exclusive rights framework provides creators with an economic incentive to create, it also entails large social costs, and that creators therefore need to be given just enough incentive to create in order to balance the system’s benefits against its costs. Yet, none of copyright’s current doctrines enable courts to circumscribe a creator’s entitlement by reference to limitations inherent in the very idea of incentives. While the common law too relies on providing actors with incentives to behave in …

Debunking Blackstonian Copyright, Shyamkrishna Balganesh

All Faculty Scholarship

This is a review of Neil Weinstock Netanel’s Copyright’s Paradox (2008).

Addressing The Incoherency Of The Preemption Provision Of The Copyright Act Of 1976, Joseph P. Bauer

Journal Articles

Section 301 of the Copyright Act of 1976 expressly preempts state law actions that are within the "general scope of copyright" and that assert claims that are "equivalent to" the rights conferred by the Act. The Act eliminated the previous system of common law copyright for unpublished works, which had prevailed under the prior 1909 Copyright Act. By federalizing copyright law, the drafters of the statute sought to achieve uniformity and to avoid the potential for state protection of infinite duration.

The legislative history of § 301 stated that this preemption provision was set forth "in the clearest and most …

Common Law Copyright, And Conversation, Frank J. Nawalanic

Cleveland State Law Review

Assume that "A" is a well known author and literary figure and that "B" is an author in his own right, but far less known than "A". "A" and "B" meet socially and engage in a stimulating conversation wherein thoughts and ideas are freely expressed and conclusions drawn. Sometime thereafter, "B" publishes excerpts from this conversation and "A" strongly desires to prevent such from being published and receiving publicity. To prevent publication of their conversation, "A" could proceed against "B" under several different causes of action. He could possibly allege breach of a fiduciary relationship, breach of implied contract, invasion …

The Common Law And Statutory Background Of The Law Of Musical Property, George D. Cary

Vanderbilt Law Review

This article comprises a brief but comprehensive presentation of the history and evolution of the law of musical copyright; it is particularly designed for the practitioner seeking a general view of musical copyright law before proceeding on to more specialized problems. After a discussion of the English and American history of musical copyright, the article examines the common law and statutory aspect of the subject, and concludes by discussing the international rules and conventions governing musical copyright.

Literary And Artistic Property -- Common-Law Copyright-- Filing Of Architectural Plans In A Public Office As Publication, Judd L. Bacon S.Ed.

Michigan Law Review

Plaintiff home designer prepared plans for a client and filed a copy in a county office as required by ordinance in order to obtain a building permit. Defendant copied and used these plans without plaintiff's consent. In an action under a state statute codifying the common-law right of designers to the exclusive ownership of their unpublished designs, the lower court held for defendant, finding plaintiff's copyright to have been destroyed by publication. On appeal, held, reversed. The filing of architectural plans in a public office in order to secure a building permit does not constitute a publication of them …

The Limits Of State Jurisdiction In Affording Common Law Protection To Clothing Designs, Leonard S. Elman

Vanderbilt Law Review

The recent case of Dior v. Milton' indicates that the "misappropriation" doctrine of the law of unfair competition will be applied to impose liability upon unlicensed users of original clothing designs. The purpose of this article is to outline briefly the statutory protection presently available for such designs, and to discuss certain problems raised by the Dior v. Milton decision.

The Constitution, in article I, section 8, provides that Congress shall have power to enact legislation "to promote the progress of science and the useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their …

Sarony V. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co., Henry W. Rogers

Articles

Commenting in the Federal Reporter on this Opinion, Professor Rogers considers at length this case bearing on definitions of copyright and artistic properties. "This was an action at law for the violation of the plaintiff's copyright of a photograph of Oscar Wilde, which the defendant had copied by the process known as chromo-lithography.... A jury was waived, and the case was argued upon questions of law only, which appear in the opinion."

"The contention of the defendant, briefly stated, is this: That there was no constitutional warrant for this act; that a photographer is not an author, and a photograph …