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The Influence Of Law And Economics Scholarship On Contract Law: Impressions Twenty-Five Years Later, Jeffrey L. Harrison
The Influence Of Law And Economics Scholarship On Contract Law: Impressions Twenty-Five Years Later, Jeffrey L. Harrison
Jeffrey L Harrison
This is an update of a work done in conjunction with a contract law conference 25 years ago. My specific assignment was to assess the impact of law and economics scholarship on contract law. I responded by conducting an empirical study of judicial citations to selected law and economics works in order to ascertain the extent to which judges seemed to be relying on the teachings of law and economics. In effect, the effort was part of a general question that concerns all law professors: Does scholarship matter? I have repeated the study with respect to the scholarship sample selected …
Teaching Contracts From A Socioeconomic Perspective, Jeffrey L. Harrison
Teaching Contracts From A Socioeconomic Perspective, Jeffrey L. Harrison
Jeffrey L Harrison
This essay begins with a brief discussion of what socioeconomics is. In this section I also address whether one must be well versed in conventional economics in order to apply a socioeconomic perspective. I then discuss the basic themes that are present throughout my contracts class that stem from my interest in socioeconomics. Underlying these themes is the more fundamental goal of devising methodologies for assessing the quality of contracts. By quality, I mean something more and perhaps more subtle than whether the parties have conformed to all the formal requirements. Instead, I encourage students to examine whether all of …
Rethinking Mistake And Nondisclosure In Contract Law, Jeffrey L. Harrison
Rethinking Mistake And Nondisclosure In Contract Law, Jeffrey L. Harrison
Jeffrey L Harrison
This Article reconsiders the analysis of the disclosure/nondisclosure issue. Part I of this Article elaborates on the basic model and some of the complexities of identifying the actual impact of nondisclosure. Part II details the social costs of the default nondisclosure rule. In Part III, a case is made that concepts like "mistake" and "defect," both "patent" and "latent," unnecessarily retard allocative efficiency by limiting what must be disclosed. In Part IV, alternatives to the default nondisclosure rule are examined in the context of several cases, some of which have been used to illustrate the virtues of the default rule.