Law Commons^™

Hypothetical Efficiency Is Not Grounds For Breach, Daniel M. Isaacs

West Virginia Law Review

The law does not approve of the efficient breach of contract; it merely provides or fails to provide remedies. Although there are situations where the law implies contract terms, there is no basis for an implied covenant of efficiency. Hypothetical contracts, purporting to incorporate a release where the cost of performance to the promisor exceeds its value to the promisee, cannot be used to bind people to results, even efficient ones, to which they did not agree. Where it is inefficient to demand performance, flexibility should come from the promisee who, having received in trust the power to limit the …

Putting The Cisg Where It Belongs: In The Uniform Commercial Code, Kina Grbic

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Beaten To "Submissions": Talent Agents Score A Victory Over Managers On Submissions Of Motion Picture Screenplays, Matthew H. Schwartz

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

No abstract provided.

Viability Of Arbitration Clauses In West Virginia Oil And Gas Leases: It Is All About The Lease!!!, Phillip T. Glyptis

West Virginia Law Review

No abstract provided.

Nonmarket Values In Family Businesses, Benjamin Means

William & Mary Law Review

Despite the economic importance of family businesses, legal scholarship has often overlooked their distinctive character. Instead, scholars focus on the chosen form of business organization— partnership, corporation, LLC—and assume that the participants are economically rational actors who seek to maximize their individual preferences. This Article contends that family businesses are extensions of family relationships and that nonmarket values affect their goals and governance choices.

Just as family law scholars have shown that contract principles can be applied to regulate intimate relationships, corporate law scholars should recognize that the intimacy of family life often substitutes for arm’s length bargaining in family …

Nearly A Century In Reserve: Organized Baseball: Collective Bargaining And The Antitrust Exemption Enter The 80'S, Nancy Jean Meissner

Pepperdine Law Review

In her comment, the author fashions a compelling argument for congressional elimination of baseball's exemption from federal antitrust laws. After noting that the exemption had been formulated in 1922 by the Supreme Court, the author explains that it has been abused by baseball club owners to create a virtual monopoly over ballplayers through the reserve system. Although the reserve system's control was somewhat diluted in 1976, with the advent of free agency and collective bargaining, club owners are currently negotiating for mandatory compensation for the loss of free agents. The resultant threat of a player's strike has served to focus …

Beyond Nondiscrimination: At&T Mobility Llc V. Concepcion And The Further Federalization Of U.S. Arbitration Law, Edward P. Boyle, David N. Cinotti

Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal

The article presents information on the court case of AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion that was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court and which questioned the preemption of state law and the Federal Arbitration Act related to the enforcement of arbitration agreement. The unconscionability doctrine, the case law related to arbitration and the contract law is discussed. The interpretation of arbitration law is also discussed.

From Lord Coke To Internet Privacy: The Past, Present, And Future Of The Law Of Electronic Contracting, Juliet M. Moringiello, William L. Reynolds

Maryland Law Review

No abstract provided.

Penalty Clauses As Remedies: Exploring Comparative Approaches To Enforceability, Jack Graves

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Vertical Boilerplate, James Gibson

Washington and Lee Law Review

Despite what we learn in law school about the “meeting of the minds,” most contracts are merely boilerplate—take-it-or-leave-it propositions. Negotiation is nonexistent; we rely on our collective market power as consumers to regulate contracts’ content. But boilerplate imposes certain information costs because it often arrives late in the transaction and is hard to understand. If those costs get too high, then the market mechanism fails. So how high are boilerplate’s information costs? A few studies have attempted to measure them, but they all use a “horizontal” approach—i.e., they sample a single stratum of boilerplate and assume that it represents the …