Law Commons^™

Contract Law's Predominant Purpose Test And The Law-Fact Distinction, Daniel P. O'Gorman

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Sign Or Die: The Threat Of Imminent Physical Harm And The Doctrine Of Duress In Contract Law, Daniel P. O'Gorman

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Police Ignorance And Mistake Of Law Under The Fourth Amendment, Eang L. Ngov

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Autonomy For Contract, Refined, Hanoch Dagan, Michael A. Heller

Faculty Scholarship

In The Choice Theory of Contracts, we advance a claim about the centrality of autonomy to contract. This Issue offers thoughtful and penetrating critiques. Here, we reply. Autonomy is the grounding principle of contract. In Choice Theory, we stressed the (1) proactive facilitation component of autonomy, in particular, the state’s obligation regarding contract types. Here, we highlight two additional, necessary implications of autonomy for contract: (2) regard for future selves and (3) relational justice. These three aspects of autonomy shape the range, limit, and floor, respectively, for the legitimate use of contract. They provide a principled and constrained path for …

The Price Of Law: The Case Of The Eurozone's Collective Action Clauses, Elena Carletti, Paolo Colla, Mitu Gulati, Steven Ongena

Faculty Scholarship

Do markets value contract protections? And does the quality of a legal system affect such valuations? To answer these questions we exploit a unique experiment whereby, after January 1, 2013, newly issued sovereign bonds of Eurozone countries under domestic law had to include Collective Action Clauses (CACs) specifying the minimum vote needed to modify payment terms. We find that CAC bonds trade at lower yields than otherwise similar no-CAC bonds; and that the quality of the legal system matters for this differential. Hence, markets appear to see CACs as providing protection against the legal risk embedded in domestic-law sovereign bonds.

Why Autonomy Must Be Contract's Ultimate Value, Hanoch Dagan, Michael A. Heller

Faculty Scholarship

In “The Choice Theory of Contracts”, we develop a liberal theory of contract law. One core task of the book was to persuade advocates of economic analysis that they must situate their enterprise within our liberal framework. Autonomy, rightly understood, is the telos of contract.

Oren Bar-Gill pushes back strongly in “Choice Theory and the Economic Analysis of Contracts”. He offers a penetrating – perhaps devastating – critique of our approach. Bar-Gill notes the substantial convergence between choice theory and a welfarist view. If he is right, then what does choice theory add?

Our task in Part I of this …

Control Of The Attorney-Client Privilege After Mergers And Other Transformational Transactions: Should Control Of The Privilege Be Alienable By Contract?, Grace M. Giesel

Faculty Scholarship

In recent years, parties to mergers and other transformational transactions have begun inserting into their deal documents provisions allocating post-transaction control of the attorney-client privilege for pretransaction communications. The controller of the privilege is the person or entity who decides whether to assert the privilege or, rather, to waive it. Commonly, representatives of the target entity in a merger or representatives of an asset seller in a transformational sale want post-transaction control of the privilege for pre-transaction communications relating to the transaction. They want control of the privilege so the surviving entity cannot access or use those communications against the …

The Middleman’S Damages Revisited, Victor P. Goldberg

Faculty Scholarship

If A promises to sell to B who, in turn, promises to sell to C and either A or C breaches should B receive the gain it expected had both transactions occurred (lost profits) or the larger market/contract differential? Recent case law and commentary argues for the lost profit remedy. The argument is that there is a conflict between awarding market damages and making the nonbreacher whole. This paper argues that there is no conflict. If B were a broker, and C breached, then A would have an action against C for market damages. If B were party to the …