Law Commons^™

Contract's Convert Meddlers, Sarah Winsberg

Notre Dame Law Review

Scholars of contract law typically examine contracts as bargains between two parties. This approach elides an additional, key function of many contracts: to shape existing relationships to the satisfaction of a third party, often one more economically powerful than either of the two bargainers. Third-party litigants, especially creditors, have historically advocated for their own interests and interpretive paradigms so strongly that they have sometimes gained priority over the actual intentions of the two bargainers.

This Article recovers the story of how a group of frequent-flier third parties—mainly creditors of small businesses—shifted the rules of contracts between partners in early America. …

The Impending Collision Of Smart Contracts And The Automatic Stay, Carter D. Wietecha

Notre Dame Law Review

This Note begins by briefly examining the nature and function of smart contracts, including how they have changed over time. Next, it evaluates the relevant language of Code provisions dealing with the automatic stay and discusses decisions treating the interaction of early generation smart contracts with the automatic stay. It concludes with a discussion of how the Supreme Court’s recent decision in City of Chicago v. Fulton has significantly changed the legal landscape for smart contracts and how the automatic stay will likely interact with smart contracts in the near future.

Forum Selection Clauses, Non-Signatories, And Personal Jurisdiction, John F. Coyle, Robin J. Effron

Notre Dame Law Review

Who is bound by a forum selection clause? At first glance, the answer to this question may seem obvious. It is black letter law that a person cannot be bound to an agreement without her consent. In recent years, however, courts have not followed this rule with respect to forum selection clauses. Instead, they routinely enforce these clauses against individuals who never signed the contract containing the clause. Courts justify this practice on the grounds that it promotes litigation efficiency by bringing all of the litigants together in the chosen forum. There are, however, problems with enforcing forum selection clauses …

"Money Can't Buy Me Love": A Contrast Between Damages In Family Law And Contract, Margaret F. Brinig

Journal Articles

As my contribution to this symposium in David's honor, I submit the law and economics section of the damages chapter of our joint enterprise, Understanding Contracts. Because of David's failing health, my own involvement with the publisher never reached contract stage. The chapter concludes with a problem that illustrates some of the intricacies of mixing family law and contract. David and I grappled for some time with the answer to the problem, coming at it from our different points of view. On one occasion, David, with a twinkle, told me there was only one place where I was "absolutely wrong." …

Promises, Trust, And Contract Law, Anthony J. Bellia

Journal Articles

The need for individuals to be able to trust that promises will be performed is central to justifying a law that renders certain promises enforceable. This Article argues that the legal enforcement of certain promises to meet this need does not necessarily diminish the personal relationships of trust in which such promises are made, as has been argued. Rather, this Article argues, the making and performance of legally enforceable promises can assist individuals in building relationships of trust, as it assists them in the pursuit of myriad goods.

Contracting With Electronic Agents, Anthony J. Bellia

Journal Articles

Established contract doctrine provides no clear answer to the question whether exchanges arranged by the interaction of electronic agents are enforceable. This Article explores whether the law should enforce exchanges arranged by the interaction of electronic agents. It examine how normative theories of contractual obligation inform the issue, with an eye toward the strengths and weaknesses of each theory. The theories that most strongly support the enforcement of exchanges arranged by electronic agents, this Article explains, are those that ground contractual obligation in protecting the ability of individuals to pursue their reasonable objectives through reliable arrangements.

Covenant And Contract, Steven Nock, Margaret F. Brinig

Journal Articles

In this article we ask, "What distinguishes a covenant from a mere contract, and what role does this distinction play for natural law?" Both of us have thought substantially about covenant over the past several years. The concept of covenant comes to us originally from religious sources, so we have paid explicit attention to what the Bible and organized religion have to say about covenant. We have also drawn from our own disciplines of law, economics, and sociology as they explain or draw from the initial concepts.

Covenant is a concept that takes us beyond contract. Indeed, the idea that …

A Maternalistic Approach To Surrogacy: Comment On Richard Epstein's Surrogacy: The Case For Full Contractual Enforcement, Margaret F. Brinig

Journal Articles

Many of the other participants in this Symposium have written extensively about surrogacy. Not only have they contributed to the debate, in some instances they have framed it. In some respects, therefore, I merely thank all of them and chime in. Unlike my fellow panelists, however, I do not think surrogacy merits an enthusiastic, positive response.

In this Comment, I propose to restate objections to specifically enforceable surrogacy contracts from a family-law perspective as well as from the philosophical or psychological roots of family law. I will then reexamine the problems of surrogacy from a contractarian, law-and-economics perspective, showing how …

Partial Performance Of Employment Contracts, Geoffrey J. Bennett

Journal Articles

Commentary on

Wiluszynski v. Tower Hamlets London Borough Council (The Times, 28.4.89)

Afterword: Contracts And Uncertainty, Walter F. Pratt

Journal Articles

This symposium reveals an unexpected irony: The very innovations designed to deal with one type of uncertainty-economic-have themselves produced another type of uncertainty-that associated with resolving disputes. This new uncertainty sounds a discordant note in the traditional refrain that contracts are legal devices for allocating risks between parties. As an afterword, this article draws together evidence from the symposium and from history to emphasize that contract is not the ideal device for allocating risks at the very time that allocation is most desired-when uncertainty is greatest. The lesson can be put in starker terms: Contract is a legal relationship and …