Law Commons^™

Access To Justice: Impact Of Twombly & Iqbal On State Court Systems, Danielle Lusardo Schantz

Akron Law Review

Approximately a decade ago, the Supreme Court of the United States unexpectedly changed the pleading standard for federal cases with the Twombly and Iqbal decisions. Plausibility pleading replaced the more liberal notice pleading standard endorsed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Since then, state courts have been faced with a choice to either mirror this change in pleading standards or maintain their commitment to notice pleading. Plausibility pleading has begun to creep into the state court system. Several states have formally changed their pleading standards, while others have declared their commitment to notice pleading. This Article considers the impact …

Confronting Silence: The Constitution, Deaf Criminal Defendants, And The Right To Interpretation During Trial, Deirdre M. Smith

Maine Law Review

For most deaf people, interactions with the hearing community in the absence of interpretation or technological assistance consist of communications that are, at most, only partly comprehensible. Criminal proceedings, with the defendant's liberty interest directly at stake, are occasions in which the need for deaf people to have a full understanding of what is said and done around them is most urgent. Ironically, the legal “right to interpretation” has not been clearly defined in either statutory or case law. Although the federal and state constitutions do not provide a separate or lesser set of rights for deaf defendants, their situation …

Use Your Words: On The "Speech" In "Freedom Of Speech", Leslie Kendrick

Michigan Law Review

Freedom of speech occupies a special place in American society. But what counts as “speech” is a contentious issue. In countless cases, courts struggle to distinguish highly protected speech from easily regulated economic activity. Skeptics view this struggle as evidence that speech is, in fact, not distinguishable from other forms of activity.

This Article refutes that view. It argues that speech is indeed distinct from other forms of activity, and that even accounts that deny this distinction actually admit it. It then argues that the features that make speech distinctive as a phenomenon also make it distinctive as a normative …

Remedies Symposium, Remedial Discretion In Constitutional Adjudication: A Codicil, John M. Greabe

Law Faculty Scholarship

This symposium paper elaborates on two questions raised by the author’s prior work, Remedial Discretion in Constitutional Adjudication. That paper disagreed with calls for a revival of non-retroactive judicial rulings to facilitate more constitutional innovation and argued that the Supreme Court’s practice of developing doctrines that withhold remedies for constitutional violations—e.g., qualified immunity, exceptions to the exclusionary rule, and harmless-error rules— is both sufficient to facilitate constitutional innovation and preferable to reviving non-retroactivity. Of necessity, the paper also developed a theory of when courts may withhold remedies for constitutional violations and when they may not: courts may withhold remedies responsive …

Qualified Immunity And Statutory Interpretation: A Response To William Baude, Hillel Y. Levin, Michael Wells

Scholarly Works

In his article, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, Professor Baude argues that the doctrine of qualified immunity under section 1983 is unlawful because the doctrine did not exist at the time section 1983 was enacted. We disagree. Section 1983 is a common law statute. Consequently, its meaning and application was not fixed at the time of original passage. In this article, we explain why.

Although we are sympathetic to Professor Baude’s implicit policy-based critique of the doctrine of qualified immunity, we believe his analysis is flawed. The better and more likely way to improve the doctrine is through the common law …

Undocumented Citizens Of The United States: The Repercussions Of Denying Birth Certificates, Anna L. Lichtenberger

St. Mary's Law Journal

Abstract forthcoming

Rights As Trumps?, Jamal Greene

Faculty Scholarship

Rights are more than mere interests, but they are not absolute. And so two competing frames have emerged for adjudicating conflicts over rights. Under the first frame, rights are absolute but for the exceptional circumstances in which they may be limited. Constitutional adjudication within this frame is primarily an interpretive exercise fixed on identifying the substance and reach of any constitutional rights at issue. Under the second frame, rights are limited but for the exceptional circumstances in which they are absolute. Adjudication within this frame is primarily an empirical exercise fixed on testing the government’s justification for its action. In …