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Full-Text Articles in Law

The Limits Of Enumeration, Richard A. Primus Dec 2014

The Limits Of Enumeration, Richard A. Primus

Articles

According to a well-known principle of constitutional interpretation here identified as the “internal-limits canon,” the powers of Congress must always be construed as authorizing less legislation than a general police power would. This Article argues that the internallimits canon is unsound. Whether the powers of Congress would in practice authorize any legislation that a police power would authorize is a matter of contingency: it depends on the relationship between the powers and the social world at a given time. There is no reason why, at a given time, the powers cannot turn out to authorize any legislation that a police …


Death, Desuetude, And Original Meaning, John F. Stinneford Nov 2014

Death, Desuetude, And Original Meaning, John F. Stinneford

UF Law Faculty Publications

One of the most common objections to originalism is that it cannot cope with cultural change. One of the most commonly invoked examples of this claimed weakness is the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, whose original meaning would (it is argued) authorize barbaric punishment practices like flogging and branding, and disproportionate punishments like the death penalty for relatively minor offenses. This Article shows that this objection to originalism is inapt, at least with respect to the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. As I have shown in prior articles, the original meaning of “cruel and unusual” is “cruel and contrary to …


Liberty, James E. Fleming, Linda C. Mcclain Oct 2014

Liberty, James E. Fleming, Linda C. Mcclain

Faculty Scholarship

"To secure the blessings of liberty," the Preamble to the US Constitution proclaims, "We the People . . . ordain and establish this Constitution." The Constitution is said to secure liberty through three principal strategies: the design of the Constitution as a whole; structural arrangements, most notably separation of powers andfederalism; and protection of rights. This chapter focuses on this third strategy of protecting liberty, in particular, through the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. We first examine the several approaches taken to the "Incorporation" of certain basic liberties "enumerated" in the Bill of Rights to apply to the state governments. We …


International Norms In Constitutional Law, Michael Wells Sep 2014

International Norms In Constitutional Law, Michael Wells

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.


The Use Of International Sources In Constitutional Opinion, Daniel Bodansky Sep 2014

The Use Of International Sources In Constitutional Opinion, Daniel Bodansky

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.


According To The Spirit And Not To The Letter: Proportionality And The Singapore Constitution, Jack Tsen-Ta Lee Sep 2014

According To The Spirit And Not To The Letter: Proportionality And The Singapore Constitution, Jack Tsen-Ta Lee

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

When interpreting the fundamental liberties in the Singapore Constitution, courts presently do not engage in a proportionality analysis – that is, a consideration of whether limitations on rights imposed by executive or legislative action bear a rational relation with the object of the action, and, if so, whether the limitations restrict rights as minimally as possible. The main reason for this appears to be the expansive manner in which exceptions to the fundamental liberties are phrased, and the courts’ deferential attitude towards the political branches of government. This paper considers how the rejection of proportionality has affected the rights to …


Restraining The Hand Of Law: A Conceptual Framework To Shrink The Size Of Law, Bryan Druzin Sep 2014

Restraining The Hand Of Law: A Conceptual Framework To Shrink The Size Of Law, Bryan Druzin

West Virginia Law Review

No abstract provided.


Plausible Absurdities And Practical Formalities: The Recess Appointments Clause In Theory And Practice, David Frisof Feb 2014

Plausible Absurdities And Practical Formalities: The Recess Appointments Clause In Theory And Practice, David Frisof

Michigan Law Review

The recent controversy surrounding President Obama’s recess appointments to the National Labor Relations Board and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau while the Senate was holding pro forma sessions illustrates the need to reach a new understanding of the Recess Appointments Clause of the Constitution. For the Recess Appointments Clause to be functional, it must fulfill two essential constitutional purposes: it must act as a fulcrum in the separation of powers, and it must ensure the continued exercise of the executive power. Achieving this functionality depends not only on the formal constructions of the Clause but also on the ways in …


Classical Liberal Constitution Or Classical Liberal Construction?, Gary S. Lawson Jan 2014

Classical Liberal Constitution Or Classical Liberal Construction?, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

In The Classical Liberal Constitution: The Uncertain Quest for Limited Government (2013), Richard Epstein says that he "incorporates but goes beyond" originalist theory by calling for adjudication "in sync with" classical liberal theory political theory, which Professor Epstein claims underlies the Constitution. Without in any way detracting from the numerous virtues of this book, I argue that this is primarily a work of constitutional construction rather than constitutional interpretation. From the standpoint of interpretation, the background rules that best supplement the constitutional text are found in eighteenth-century fiduciary law rather than in classical liberal political theory, though the latter is …


From Commonwealth To Constitutional Limitations: Thomas Cooley's Michigan, 1805-1886, Robert Allan Olender Jan 2014

From Commonwealth To Constitutional Limitations: Thomas Cooley's Michigan, 1805-1886, Robert Allan Olender

SJD Dissertations

In response to what he perceived as the challenges associated with republican governance in the later portions of the nineteenth century, Michigan’s Thomas McIntyre Cooley penned his treatise concerning constitutional limitations on legislative power. In it, Cooley offered a vision of government where courts would check government power and would raise constitutional barriers against the impact of improper influences on legislators. As a student of history, Cooley grounded his beliefs and doctrines in experience, not philosophical reflections. Believing that “the fruits of speculative genius in government are of little value,” Cooley submitted that governing structures and law “must be the …


Reading Blackstone In The Twenty-First Century And The Twenty-First Century Through Blackstone, Jessie Allen Jan 2014

Reading Blackstone In The Twenty-First Century And The Twenty-First Century Through Blackstone, Jessie Allen

Book Chapters

If the Supreme Court mythologizes Blackstone, it is equally true that Blackstone himself was engaged in something of a mythmaking project. Far from a neutral reporter, Blackstone has some stories to tell, in particular the story of the hero law. The problems associated with using the Commentaries as a transparent window on eighteenth-century American legal norms, however, do not make Blackstone’s text irrelevant today. The chapter concludes with my brief reading of the Commentaries as a critical mirror of some twenty-first-century legal and social structures. That analysis draws on a long-term project, in which I am making my way through …


On Creativity In Constitutional Interpretation, Pierre Schlag Jan 2014

On Creativity In Constitutional Interpretation, Pierre Schlag

Publications

In the present article a particular aspect of constitutional interpretation will be considered. This aspect is called "creative" and involves retrieving the meaning of an object of interpretation. It is with regard to this particular aspect or moment of interpretation that creativity is often viewed as something to be avoided, to be shunned. If the task at hand is to "retrieve" some meaning, then the idea that this meaning can be created, in whole or in part, seems quite simply antithetical to the enterprise at hand. It suffices to note that many jurists and legal thinkers believe that interpretation as …


Originalism's Promise, And Its Limits - Symposium: History And Meaning Of The Constitution, Lee J. Strang Jan 2014

Originalism's Promise, And Its Limits - Symposium: History And Meaning Of The Constitution, Lee J. Strang

Cleveland State Law Review

At the same time, I believe, originalism’s promise remains. Originalism’s promise is three-fold. First, originalism promises that it can paint constitutional interpretation in the most normatively attractive light. Not ideal results. Instead—on balance and systemically—normatively more attractive results than its competitors. Second, originalism promises that constitutional interpretation can fit the key facets of our Constitution. These key facets include, for example, the Constitution’s writtenness and its particular origins, facets that originalism better fits than alternative methods of constitutional interpretation. Third, originalism promises that constitutional interpretation can respect judges’ capacities. Judges’ pivotal role necessitates that interpretative methodologies work with their capacities, …


Book Review: Court-Packing And Legal Creation - Symposium: History And Meaning Of The Constitution, Sheldon Gelman Jan 2014

Book Review: Court-Packing And Legal Creation - Symposium: History And Meaning Of The Constitution, Sheldon Gelman

Cleveland State Law Review

Review of FDR and Chief Justice Hughes: The President, the Supreme Court, and the Epic Battle over the New Deal by James F. Simon. New York: Simon & Schuster. 2012


Liberal Originalism: The Declaration Of Independence And Constitutional Interpretation - Symposium: History And Meaning Of The Constitution, Scott D. Gerber Jan 2014

Liberal Originalism: The Declaration Of Independence And Constitutional Interpretation - Symposium: History And Meaning Of The Constitution, Scott D. Gerber

Cleveland State Law Review

In my work I have labeled the dominant iterations of originalism “conservative originalism.” It is an approach that dictates that judges may legitimately recognize only those rights specifically mentioned in the Constitution, or ascertainably implicit in its structure or history. In all other cases, conservative originalists argue, the majority is entitled to govern—to make moral choices—through the political process. “Liberal originalism,” by contrast, maintains that the Constitution should be interpreted in light of the political philosophy of the Declaration of Independence. Liberal originalism rejects both conservative originalism and the notion of a living constitution on the ground that they are …


History In Law, Mythmaking, And Constitutional Legitimacy - Symposium: History And Meaning Of The Constitution, Patrick J. Charles Jan 2014

History In Law, Mythmaking, And Constitutional Legitimacy - Symposium: History And Meaning Of The Constitution, Patrick J. Charles

Cleveland State Law Review

What truly separates an historical inquiry, however, from an originalist inquiry is the degree by which myth consumes fact. Certainly, regardless of whether one is performing an historical or originalist inquiry, the methodological process takes part in generating myth. In terms of where the respective inquiries are to be placed on the spectrum of constitutional mythmaking, however, the standard historical inquiry is far less likely to engage in the process than its originalist counterpart. This is mainly because originalism is not so much about reasoning from known historical truths, but instead about recreating a hypothetical expected legal application of how …


J. Skelly Wright And The Limits Of Liberalism, Louis Michael Seidman Jan 2014

J. Skelly Wright And The Limits Of Liberalism, Louis Michael Seidman

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This essay, written for a symposium on the life and work of United States Court of Appeals Judge J. Skelly Wright, makes four points. First, Judge Wright was an important participant in the liberal legal tradition. The tradition sought to liberate law from arid formalism and to use it as a technique for progressive reform. However, legal liberals also believed that there were limits on what judges could do–-limits rooted in both its liberalism and its legalism. Second, Wright occupied a position on the left fringe of the liberal legal tradition, and he therefore devoted much of his career to …


Constitutional Interpretation And History: New Originalism Or Eclecticism?, Stephen M. Feldman Dec 2013

Constitutional Interpretation And History: New Originalism Or Eclecticism?, Stephen M. Feldman

Stephen M. Feldman

The goal of originalism has always been purity. Originalists claim that heir methods cleanse constitutional interpretation of politics, discretion, and indeterminacy. The key to attaining purity is history. Originalist methods supposedly discern in history a fixed constitutional meaning. Many originalists now claim that the most advanced method -- the approach that reveals the purest constitutional meaning -- is reasonable-person originalism. These new originalists ask the following question: When the Constitution was adopted, how would a hypothetical reasonable person have understood the text? This Article examines historical evidence from the early decades of nationhood to achieve two goals. First, it demonstrates …


The Interpretation Of Constitutional History, Or Charles Beard Becomes A Fortuneteller (With An Emphasis On Free Expression), Stephen M. Feldman Dec 2013

The Interpretation Of Constitutional History, Or Charles Beard Becomes A Fortuneteller (With An Emphasis On Free Expression), Stephen M. Feldman

Stephen M. Feldman

In "An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States", Charles A. Beard argued that the framers advocated for and defended the Constitution because of their personal economic interest, that the pursuit of common good was not so much a motive as a veneer. The current historical consensus is that Beard's thrust is incorrect. In this essay, I largely agree with this assessment, but his economic approach can add an important element to the discussion of constitutional history. And though his economic depiction does not closely fit the framing of the Constitution, it uncannily fits the Roberts Court's current …