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Less Than Meets The Eye: Anti-Discrimination And The Development Of Section 5 Enforcement And Eleventh Amendment Abrogation Law Since City Of Boerne V. Flores, Justin Schwartz Jan 2011

Less Than Meets The Eye: Anti-Discrimination And The Development Of Section 5 Enforcement And Eleventh Amendment Abrogation Law Since City Of Boerne V. Flores, Justin Schwartz

Justin Schwartz

The conventional wisdom is that the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment since City of Boerne has raised the bar for Congress to pass anti discrimination legislation and made it far more difficult for plaintiffs to sue the states and state agencies. I show, by close analysis of the Court's case law on state sovereign immunity and Congress' Section 5 power to abrogate that immunity, that this is a misreading.

As the jurisprudence developed from Boerne, Kimel (age discrimination) and Garrett (disability discrimination in employment) to Hibbs (sex discrimination) and Lane (disability discrimination in public accommodations), the Court has …


Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz Jan 2011

Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz

Justin Schwartz

This short nontechnical article reviews the Arrow Impossibility Theorem and its implications for rational democratic decisionmaking. In the 1950s, economist Kenneth J. Arrow proved that no method for producing a unique social choice involving at least three choices and three actors could satisfy four seemingly obvious constraints that are practically constitutive of democratic decisionmaking. Any such method must violate such a constraint and risks leading to disturbingly irrational results such and Condorcet cycling. I explain the theorem in plain, nonmathematical language, and discuss the history, range, and prospects of avoiding what seems like a fundamental theoretical challenge to the possibility …


Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz Jan 2011

Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz

Justin Schwartz

This short nontechnical article reviews the Arrow Impossibility Theorem and its implications for rational democratic decisionmaking. In the 1950s, economist Kenneth J. Arrow proved that no method for producing a unique social choice involving at least three choices and three actors could satisfy four seemingly obvious constraints that are practically constitutive of democratic decisionmaking. Any such method must violate such a constraint and risks leading to disturbingly irrational results such and Condorcet cycling. I explain the theorem in plain, nonmathematical language, and discuss the history, range, and prospects of avoiding what seems like a fundamental theoretical challenge to the possibility …