Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 10 of 10

Full-Text Articles in Law

Unraveling Judicial Restraint: Guns, Abortion, And The Faux Conservatism Of J. Harvie Wilkinson, Iii, Nelson Lund, David B. Kopel Dec 2008

Unraveling Judicial Restraint: Guns, Abortion, And The Faux Conservatism Of J. Harvie Wilkinson, Iii, Nelson Lund, David B. Kopel

David B Kopel

Writing in the Virginia Law Review, a distinguished federal judge maintains that true conservatives are required to substitute principles of judicial restraint for an inquiry into the original meaning of the Constitution. Accordingly, argues J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, the Supreme Court's Second Amendment decision in District of Columbia v. Heller is an activist decision just like Roe v. Wade: "[B]oth cases found judicially enforceable substantive rights only ambiguously rooted in the Constitution's text." In this response, we challenge his critique.

Part I shows that Judge Wilkinson's analogy between Roe and Heller is untenable. The right of the people to keep …


``No One Does That Anymore": On Tushnet, Constitutions, And Others, Penelope J. Pether Jun 2008

``No One Does That Anymore": On Tushnet, Constitutions, And Others, Penelope J. Pether

Working Paper Series

In this contribution to the Quinnipiac Law Review’s annual symposium edition, this year devoted to the work of Mark Tushnet, I read his antijuridification scholarship “against the grain,” concluding both that Tushnet’s later scholarship is neo-Realist rather than critical in its orientation, and that both his early scholarship on slavery and his post-9/11 constitutional work reveal an ambivalence about the claim that we learn from history to circumscribe our excesses, which anchors his popular constitutionalist rhetoric.

The likeness of Tushnet’s scholarship to the work of the Realists lies in this: while the Realists’ search for a science that would satisfy …


Differentiating Church And State (Without Losing The Church), Patrick Mckinley Brennan May 2008

Differentiating Church And State (Without Losing The Church), Patrick Mckinley Brennan

Working Paper Series

There is an ongoing debate about whether the U.S. Constitution includes -- or should be interpreted to include -- a principle of "church autonomy." Catholic doctrine and political theology, by contrast, clearly articulated a principle of "libertas ecclesiae," liberty of the church, when during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the Church differentiated herself from the state. This article explores the meaning and origin of the doctrine of the libertas ecclesiae and the proper relationship among churches, civil society, and government. In doing so, it highlights the points at which church and state should cooperate and the points at which …


The Tropicalization Of Proportionality Balancing: The Colombian And Mexican Examples, Luisa Conesa Apr 2008

The Tropicalization Of Proportionality Balancing: The Colombian And Mexican Examples, Luisa Conesa

Cornell Law School Inter-University Graduate Student Conference Papers

In “The Tropicalization of Proportionality Balancing: the Colombian and Mexican Examples” the author analyzes how the German based proportionality balancing test was exported to Latin America, by studying the Colombian Constitutional Court and the Mexican Supreme Court. This work is guided by the following questions: what is proportionality balancing? How has it been used by the Colombian and Mexican jurisprudences and what are its influences? Do the Courts cite other jurisdictions when using the test? Have they imported a traditional European test? Or, have they “tropicalized” it?

The study of the Latin American examples leads to the conclusion that the …


Reviving The Subject Of Law, Penelope J. Pether Apr 2008

Reviving The Subject Of Law, Penelope J. Pether

Working Paper Series

This essay is an advanced draft of work that will be published in On Philosophy and American Law (Francis J. Mootz III ed. forthcoming, Cambridge U.P., 2009). This edited collection includes responses by a wide range of scholars working in legal theory to Mootz’s challenge to respond to the current state of American legal philosophy, using Karl Llewellyn’s 1934 University of Pennsylvania law review account of the emergence of legal realism as a prompt. Drawing on the author’s recent scholarship on the emergence of a distinctive and impoverished model of “common law” judging in the U.S. since the mid- c20th, …


The “Institutional Turn” In Jurisprudence: Critique And Reconstruction., Andres Palacios Lleras Jan 2008

The “Institutional Turn” In Jurisprudence: Critique And Reconstruction., Andres Palacios Lleras

Andrés Palacios Lleras

This paper engages in a inquiry into the roles that courts play within the legal system, given that judges are interdependent interpreters of legal rules that are boundedly rational and, arguably, politically biased. Contemporary authors claim that, although these two conditions play an important role in interpretation, contemporary theories in jurisprudence have not addressed them properly. Their assessments raise legal issues that are very significant; given the fact that judges are boundedly rational and tend to display political biases, how should they interpret legal rules? Is it best for them to interpret these rules in a formalist fashion, without resorting …


The Indeterminate Side Of Constitutions As Precommitment Strategies, Andres Palacios Lleras Jan 2008

The Indeterminate Side Of Constitutions As Precommitment Strategies, Andres Palacios Lleras

Andrés Palacios Lleras

This paper engages in a time-honored inquiry in American jurisprudence, an inquiry which continues to be invigorated by contemporary studies in Constitutional Law. It is an inquiry into the determinacy of the American Constitution as a legal text, taking into account that it was drafted and approved more than two hundred years ago with the purpose, arguably, to organize present and future political decision-making. Some contemporary authors claim that the discussion about the role of the Constitution is muddled, and that to acknowledge its authority does not necessarily entail a theory of constitutional interpretation. Furthermore, other authors have claimed that …


Popular Constitutionalism And Relaxing The Dead Hand: Can The People Be Trusted?, Todd E. Pettys Jan 2008

Popular Constitutionalism And Relaxing The Dead Hand: Can The People Be Trusted?, Todd E. Pettys

Todd E. Pettys

A growing number of constitutional scholars are urging the nation to rethink its commitment to judicial supremacy. Popular constitutionalists argue that the American people, not the courts, hold the ultimate authority to interpret the Constitution’s many open-ended provisions whose meanings are reasonably contestable. This Article defends popular constitutionalism on two important fronts. First, using originalism as a paradigmatic example of the ways in which courts frequently draw constitutional meaning from sources rooted deep in the past, the Article contends that defenders of judicial supremacy still have not persuasively responded to the familiar dead-hand query: Why should constitutional meanings that prevailed …


Plain Language Textualism: Some Personal Predilections Are More Equal Than Others, Stephen Durden Jan 2008

Plain Language Textualism: Some Personal Predilections Are More Equal Than Others, Stephen Durden

Stephen Durden

This Article challenges the validity of plain language textualism, an allegedly superior method of constitutional interpretation based solely on the “plain language” of the Constitution. First, this Article demonstrates that, notwithstanding the ebb and flow of support for this interpretive method, both the Supreme Court and its individual Justices often seek to “plainly” define various provisions in the Constitution. What matters most to this Article is not whether any individual “plain language” interpretation of a constitutional provision seems reasonable or even best, but rather whether the use of “plain language” is consistent with the expressed and unexpressed objectives and purposes …


Risky Business: Massachusetts V. Epa, Risk-Based Harm, And Standing In The D.C. Circuit, Amanda Leiter Jan 2008

Risky Business: Massachusetts V. Epa, Risk-Based Harm, And Standing In The D.C. Circuit, Amanda Leiter

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

No abstract provided.