Law Commons^™

Renewing Intraparty Democracy: Assessing Competition, Deliberation, And Associational Rights Of Political Parties, Jonathan J. Thessin

Jonathan J Thessin

Among the many schools of thought on the design of political institutions are two particularly fashionable ones: competitive market theories and deliberative democracy theories. Competitive democrats argue for destabilizing the two-party system by enabling third parties to compete effectively; by contrast, deliberative democrats argue for more discussion before political decisions are made. Neither theory, however, pays sufficient attention to the internal character of parties. Oftentimes, dominant parties lock up political institutions and restrict meaningful discussion not only by imposing ballot restrictions on third parties but also by restricting access to party leadership.

This article argues for a shift away from …

Renewing Intraparty Democracy: Assessing Competition, Deliberation, And Associational Rights Of Political Parties, Jonathan J. Thessin

Jonathan J Thessin

Among the many schools of thought on the design of political institutions are two particularly fashionable ones: competitive market theories and deliberative democracy theories. Competitive democrats argue for destabilizing the two-party system by enabling third parties to compete effectively; by contrast, deliberative democrats argue for more discussion before political decisions are made. Neither theory, however, pays sufficient attention to the internal character of parties. Oftentimes, dominant parties lock up political institutions and restrict meaningful discussion not only by imposing ballot restrictions on third parties but also by restricting access to party leadership.

This article argues for a shift away from …

Overcoming Lochner In The Twenty-First Century: Taking Both Rights And Popular Sovereignty Seriously As We Seek To Secure Equal Citizenship And Promote The Public Good, Thomas B. Mcaffee

Thomas B. McAffee

Professor McAffee reviews substantive due process as the textual basis for modern fundamental rights constitutional decision-making. He contends that we should avoid both the undue literalism that rejects the idea of implied rights, as well as the attempt to substitute someone's preferred moral vision for the limits, and compromises, that are implicit in -- and intended by -- the Constitution's text. He argues, moreover, that we can largely harmonize the various goals of our constitutional system, by both taking rights seriously and by understanding that securing rights does not sum up, or exhaust, the Constitution's purposes.