Law Commons^™

A Complete Property Right Amendment, John H. Ryskamp

ExpressO

The trend of the eminent domain reform and "Kelo plus" initiatives is toward a comprehensive Constitutional property right incorporating the elements of level of review, nature of government action, and extent of compensation. This article contains a draft amendment which reflects these concerns.

Zoning And Eminent Domain Under The New Minimum Scrutiny, John H. Ryskamp

ExpressO

Recently the Supreme Court has made it clearer that minimum scrutiny is a factual analysis. Whether in any government action there is a rational relation to a legitimate interest is a matter of determining whether there is a policy maintaining important facts. This has come about in the Court’s emerging emphasis on developing fact-based criteria for determining government purpose. Thus, those who want to affect zoning and eminent domain outcomes should look to what the Court sees as important facts, and whether government action is maintaining those facts with its proposed land use or eminent domain action.

Using Capture Theory And Chronology In Eminent Domain Proceedings, John H. Ryskamp

ExpressO

Capture theory--in which private purpose is substituted for government purpose--sheds light on a technique which is coming into greater use post-Kelo v. New London. That case affirmed that eminent domain use need only be rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. Capture theory focuses litigators' attention on "government purpose." That is a question of fact for the trier of fact. This article shows how to use civil discovery in order to show the Court that private purpose has been substituted for government purpose. If it has, the eminent domain use fails, because the use does not meet minimum scrutiny. This …

Discarded Deference: Judicial Independence In Informal Agency Guidance, Christopher M. Pietruszkiewicz

ExpressO

In the past few years, the Supreme Court has resurrected an intermediate deference standard from the 1940s to be applied by courts in considering informal guidance issued by administrative agencies. The decision upon which the deference standard is based is a product of a political solution and not a comprehensive evaluation of how the New Deal agencies fit within traditional role of the courts as sole interpreters of the law.

This 1940s decision has evolved such that deference to the views of administrative agencies has become a matter of judicial discretion, finding deference when the views of an agency parallel …