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The Inefficiency Of Quasi-Per Se Rules: Regulating Information Exchange In Eu And U.S. Antitrust Law, Kenneth Khoo, Jerrold Tsin Howe Soh

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

It is well understood that the exchange of information between horizontal competitors can violate competition law provisions in both the European Union (EU) and the United States, namely, article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and section 1 of the Sherman Act. However, despite ostensible similarities between EU and U.S. antitrust law concerning interfirm information exchange, substantial differences remain. In this article, we make a normative argument for the U.S. antitrust regime's approach, on the basis that the United States’ approach to information exchange is likely to be more efficient than the relevant approach under …