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Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Law
Class Actions And Private Antitrust Litigation, Albert H. Choi, Kathryn E. Sprier
Class Actions And Private Antitrust Litigation, Albert H. Choi, Kathryn E. Sprier
Law & Economics Working Papers
When firms collude and charge supra-competitive prices, consumers can bring antitrust lawsuits against the firms. When the litigation cost is low, firms accept the cost as just another cost of doing business, whereas when the cost is high, the firms lower the price to deter litigation. Class action is modeled as a mechanism that allows plaintiffs and attorneys to obtain economies of scale. We show that class actions, and the firms' incentive to block them, may or may not be socially desirable. Agency problems, settlement, fee-shifting, treble damages, public enforcement, and sustaining collusion through repeat play are also considered.
The New Qui Tam: A Model For The Enforcement Of Group Rights In A Hostile Era, Myriam E. Gilles, Gary Friedman
The New Qui Tam: A Model For The Enforcement Of Group Rights In A Hostile Era, Myriam E. Gilles, Gary Friedman
Articles
The present Administration has made clear it has no interest in enforcing statutes designed to protect workers, consumers, voters, and others. And, as we have chronicled in prior work, the ability of private litigants to enforce these laws has been undercut by developments in the case law concerning class actions—particularly class-banning arbitration clauses. As these critical enforcement methods recede, will alternative methods of prosecuting claims arise? How might they work? Are they politically and fiscally sustainable? We focus here on a promising approach just now coming into view: qui tam legislation authorizing private citizens to bring representative claims on behalf …
Halliburton Ii At Four: Has It Changed The Outcome Of Class Certification Decisions?, Noah Weingarten
Halliburton Ii At Four: Has It Changed The Outcome Of Class Certification Decisions?, Noah Weingarten
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258 (2014) (Halliburton II) appeared to give corporate defendants a new tool to defeat class certification in the context of securities fraud class action litigation: rebutting the requisite presumption of reliance by showing a lack of "price impact"-a term that Halliburton II used to describe whether the price of an allegedly affected company's stock went up or down. However, based on an empirical study of pre- versus post-Halliburton II class certification decisions, it appears that the outcomes of class certification decisions have become even …