Law Commons^™

Standing Of Intervenor-Defendants In Public Law Litigation, Matthew I. Hall

Scholarly Works

Unless the plaintiff has a personal stake in the outcome, Article III of the United States Constitution requires federal courts to dismiss a plaintiff’s claim for lack of standing. That much is clearly established by decades of precedent. Less understood, however, is the degree to which Article III also requires defendants to possess a personal stake. The significance of defendant standing often goes unnoticed in case law and scholarship, because the standing of the defendant in most lawsuits is readily apparent:any defendant against whom the plaintiff seeks a remedy has a personal interest in defending against the plaintiff’s claim.

But …

Iqbal, Twombly, And The Lessons Of The Celotex Trilogy, Hillel Y. Levin

Scholarly Works

This Essay compares the Twombly/Iqbal line of cases to the Celotex trilogy and suggests that developments since the latter offer lessons for the former. Some of the comparisons are obvious: decreased access and increased judicial discretion. However, one important similarity has not been well understood: that the driving force in both contexts has been the lower courts rather than the Supreme Court. Further, while we can expect additional access barriers to be erected in the future, our focus should be on lower courts, rather than other institutional players, as the likely source of those barriers.

Racial Discrimination In Jury Selection: Professional Misconduct, Not Legitimate Advocacy, Lonnie T. Brown, Jr.

Scholarly Works

This Article examines the paradox between the adversary and disciplinary systems' outward condemnation of discrimination in jury selection and their apparent simultaneous inward acceptance of such conduct as legitimate advocacy.

Ending Illegitimate Advocacy: Reinvigorating Rule 11 Through Enhancement Of The Ethical Duty To Report, Lonnie T. Brown, Jr.

Scholarly Works

This article seeks to draw attention to certain ethical misconduct of litigators that is routinely accepted, tolerated, or ignored by the legal profession. Though there are other examples, the author focuses on conduct prohibited by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. In particular, the author concentrates on that rule's so-called “safe harbor” provision, which he argues serves to insulate, and possibly encourage, illegitimate advocacy in the form of the assertion and maintenance of frivolous claims, defenses, or other contentions ironically, the very conduct that the rule was ostensibly intended to deter. Regardless of the frequency of this sort of misbehavior, …

Intervention In Public Law Litigation: The Environmental Paradigm, Peter A. Appel

Scholarly Works

Litigation which Chayes labeled “public law litigation” grew especially quickly in the decade immediately before Chayes wrote his article. This growth was due, in no small part, to the 1966 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. These amendments introduced a more transactional approach to litigation and made the rules concerning party structure more flexible. In particular, the amendments modified Rule 19, which governs joinder of nonparties by the parties to the suit; Rule 23, which governs class action lawsuits; and Rule 24, which governs intervention by nonparties into ongoing litigation. Using the jurisprudence that has developed concerning intervention …

Congress's Paramount Role In Setting The Scope Of Federal Jurisdiction, Michael L. Wells

Scholarly Works

Article III presents a conundrum for scholars seeking a coherent explanation of the federal courts' role in our system of government. On the one hand, the framers set up the judiciary as a separate branch with jurisdiction over federal law and other matters of federal interest. They granted federal judges life tenure and undiminishable salary in order to preserve judicial independence from executive and legislative pressure. It is evident from these provisions that the framers saw a need for a strong national judiciary. At the same time, article III explicitly leaves to Congress the decision whether to create any lower …

Unraveling Waiver By Default, C. Ronald Ellington

Scholarly Works

Does a default judgment for nonappearance cut off a defendant's right to move later under section 60 of the Civil Practice Act to set aside the judgment because of a defect in service, lack of venue, or lack of personal jurisdiction? In recent years the Georgia Court of Appeals has repeatedly answered this most perplexing question by holding that a defendant who defaults waives his objectinos to venue and lack of personal jurisdiction. Defects in service, however, are not waived, even when the defendant receives actual notice of the lawsuit. The court of appeals' appraoch is highly questionable, perhaps even …