Law Commons^™

Bureaucratic Overreach And The Role Of The Courts In Protecting Representative Democracy, Katie Cassady

Liberty University Journal of Statesmanship & Public Policy

The United States bureaucracy began as only four departments and has expanded to address nearly every issue of public life. While these bureaucratic agencies are ostensibly under congressional oversight and the supervision of the President as part of the executive branch, they consistently usurp their discretionary authority and bypass the Founding Fathers’ design of balancing legislative power in a bicameral Congress.

The Supreme Court holds an indispensable role in mitigating the overreach of executive agencies, yet the courts’ inability to hold bureaucrats accountable has diluted voters’ voices. Since the Supreme Court’s 1984 ruling in Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense …

Bureaucratic Overreach And The Role Of The Courts In Protecting Representative Democracy, Katie Cassady

Helm's School of Government Conference - American Revival: Citizenship & Virtue

Although only four departments at the United States’ founding, the American bureaucracy has expanded to address nearly every issue of public life. While these agencies are ostensibly under congressional oversight through monetary allowance and the supervision of the President as part of the executive branch, they consistently usurp their discretionary authority and bypass the Founders’ design of legislative power vested solely in a bicameral legislature.

The Supreme Court holds an indispensable role in mitigating the overreach of bureaucratic agencies. However, despite their obligation to protect the rights of the American people, the courts’ inability to hold bureaucrats accountable has diluted …

Interring The Immigration Rule Of Lenity, Patrick J. Glen

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The immigration rule of lenity has haunted immigration jurisprudence since its initial iteration in 1947. But as with any spectral entity, its existence is more ephemeral than real. The rule was meant to be a tie-breaker of sorts, a canon that where a provision of the immigration laws was ambiguous, the courts should impose the more lenient construction. It has never, however, been the dispositive basis for a holding of the Supreme Court. Rather, to the extent it has been referenced, it has been trotted out only as a rhetorical device to sanction a decision reached on other grounds. Even …

Chevron In The Circuit Courts, Kent Barnett, Christopher J. Walker

Michigan Law Review

This Article presents findings from the most comprehensive empirical study to date on how the federal courts of appeals have applied Chevrondeference— the doctrine under which courts defer to a federal agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute that it administers. Based on 1,558 agency interpretations the circuit courts reviewed from 2003 through 2013 (where they cited Chevron), we found that the circuit courts overall upheld 71% of interpretations and applied Chevrondeference 77% of the time. But there was nearly a twenty-five-percentage-point difference in agency-win rates when the circuit courts applied Chevrondeference than when they did …

High-Stakes Interpretation, Ryan D. Doerfler

All Faculty Scholarship

Courts look at text differently in high-stakes cases. Statutory language that would otherwise be ‘unambiguous’ suddenly becomes ‘less than clear.’ This, in turn, frees up courts to sidestep constitutional conflicts, avoid dramatic policy changes, and, more generally, get around undesirable outcomes. The standard account of this behavior is that courts’ failure to recognize ‘clear’ or ‘unambiguous’ meanings in such cases is motivated or disingenuous, and, at best, justified on instrumentalist grounds.

This Article challenges that account. It argues instead that, as a purely epistemic matter, it is more difficult to ‘know’ what a text means—and, hence, more difficult to regard …

Credit Discrimination Based On Gender: The Need To Expand The Rights Of A Spousal Guarantor Under The Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Allen Abraham

Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law

This Note focuses on the definition of “applicant” as defined in the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) and Regulation B. Specifically, this Note explores the expanded protections offered by the ECOA to spousal guarantors, after the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) expanded the definition of “applicant” by promulgating Regulation B. However, after a circuit split, where the Eighth Circuit, in Hawkins v. Community Bank of Raymore, held that a guarantor was not an “applicant” per the ECOA’s definition and the Sixth Circuit, in RL BB Acquisition, LLC v. Bridgemill Commons Development Group, LLC, followed Regulation B’s expansion of the definition of …

Legal Process In A Box, Or What Class Action Waivers Teach Us About Law-Making, Rhonda Wasserman

Articles

The Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion advanced an agenda found in neither the text nor the legislative history of the Federal Arbitration Act. Concepcion provoked a maelstrom of reactions not only from the press and the academy, but also from Congress, federal agencies and lower courts, as they struggled to interpret, apply, reverse, or cabin the Court’s blockbuster decision. These reactions raise a host of provocative questions about the relationships among the branches of government and between the Supreme Court and the lower courts. Among other questions, Concepcion and its aftermath force us to grapple with the …

The United States Court Of Appeals For Veterans Claims: Has It Mastered Chevron's Step Zero?, Linda Jellum

Articles

No abstract provided.

Adapting To Administrative Law's Erie Doctrine, Kathryn A. Watts

Articles

This Article looks to the federalism context and draws on the federal courts' experience adapting to the Court's landmark decision in Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins. Much like Brand X, the Court's Erie decision, which commanded federal courts to apply state law in all cases not governed by positive federal law, significantly reduced the lawmaking power of the federal courts by putting the federal courts in the position of interpreting law that they cannot definitively construe. Although Erie seemed simple enough to adhere to when state law provided a clear answer, Erie posed a serious dilemma when federal courts …

Interpreting Urugual Round Agreements Act Section 102(B)'S Safeguards For State Sovereignty: Reconciling Judicial Independence With The United States Trade Representative's Policy Expertise, Brandon Johnson

Michigan Journal of International Law

In this Note, I address the concerns of one aspect of this academic commentary-the claim that the WTO Agreement may cause a tectonic shift in domestic regulatory power, away from the states and toward the federal government and/or the WTO. I argue that while the concerns about the loss of national sovereignty are exaggerated, there is a very real threat to the sovereignty of the States. Congress was aware of this danger and included a variety of provisions designed specifically to protect state sovereignty from federal encroachment in the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), the federal legislation incorporating the WTO …