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Full-Text Articles in Law
Bankruptcy Vérité, Lynn M. Lopucki, Joseph W. Doherty
Bankruptcy Vérité, Lynn M. Lopucki, Joseph W. Doherty
Michigan Law Review
In the empirical study we report in Bankruptcy Fire Sales, we compared the recoveries from the going-concern bankruptcy sales of twenty-five large, public companies with the recoveries from the bankruptcy reorganizations of thirty large, public companies. We found that, controlling for the asset size of the company and its presale or pre-reorganization earnings ("EBITDA"), reorganization recoveries were more than double sale recovenes. We are honored that Professor James J. White has chosen to comment on our study. White is an eloquent defender of the status quo, pulls no punches, and always has something interesting to say. Bankruptcy Noir is …
Section 524(G) Without Compromise: Voting Rights And The Asbestos Bankruptcy Paradox, S. Todd Brown
Section 524(G) Without Compromise: Voting Rights And The Asbestos Bankruptcy Paradox, S. Todd Brown
Journal Articles
Section 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code was adopted to protect unknown future asbestos personal injury victims' rights and prospects for financial recovery. To serve these goals and satisfy the demands of due process, Section 524(g) provides two basic forms of virtual representation for future victims - requiring the appointment of an independent legal representative and aligning the interests of future victims with current claimants (75% of whom must approve any plan that invokes Section 524(g)). In recent years, however, the 75% super-majority vote requirement has been transformed into a veto power wielded by a small group of law firms, who …
Trends In Distressed Debt Investing: An Empirical Study Of Investors' Objectives, Michelle M. Harner
Trends In Distressed Debt Investing: An Empirical Study Of Investors' Objectives, Michelle M. Harner
Faculty Scholarship
Increased creditor control in chapter 11 cases has generated considerable debate over the past several years. Proponents of creditor control argue that, among other things, it promotes efficiency in corporate reorganizations. Critics assert that it destroys corporate value and frequently forces otherwise viable entities to liquidate. The increasing involvement of professional distressed debt investors in chapter 11 cases has intensified this debate. In this article, I present and analyze empirical data regarding the investment practices and strategies of distressed debt investors. Based on this data and actual case reports, I reach two primary conclusions. First, although relatively few in number, …
The Corporate Governance And Public Policy Implications Of Activist Distressed Debt Investing, Michelle M. Harner
The Corporate Governance And Public Policy Implications Of Activist Distressed Debt Investing, Michelle M. Harner
Faculty Scholarship
Activist institutional investors traditionally have invested in a company's equity to try to influence change at the company. Some of these investors, however, are now purchasing a company's debt for this same purpose. They may seek to change a company's management and board personnel, operational strategies, asset holdings or capital structure. The chapter 11 bankruptcy cases of Allied Holdings, Inc. and its affiliates exemplify the strategies of activist distressed debt investors. In the Allied cases, Yucaipa Companies, a distressed debt investor, purchased approximately 66% of Allied's outstanding general unsecured bond debt. Yucaipa used this debt position to exert significant influence …
Bankruptcy Noir, James J. White
Bankruptcy Noir, James J. White
Articles
In Bankruptcy Fire Sales, Professor LoPucki and Dr. Doherty do two things. First, they present provocative data about the relative payoff to be had in Chapter 11 by a full reorganization compared with the payoff from a section 363 sale without a full reorganization. Second, they give a yet more provocative explanation for their data. Taking a page from Professor LoPucki's recent book, they blame the meager return that they observe on 363 sales on the unprincipled behavior of the lawyers, managers, creditors, investment bankers, and even judges involved in the sales. Messrs. LoPucki and Doherty's data appear to …