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Bankruptcy Voting And The Designation Power, Christopher W. Frost

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is the only form of bankruptcy that requires winning the consent of the creditor body. Creditors are given the right to vote based on an underlying assumption that they will cast their votes to maximize recovery on their claims. When creditors collectively vote to further these distributional goals, then the estate in turn should realize the maximum value for its assets. "Value maximization" is one of the fundamental goals of chapter 11, and voting in bankruptcy is an important way of achieving that goal.

The problem with these assumptions is that creditors sometimes vote …

Not-So-Critical Vendors: Redefining Critical Vendor Orders, Christopher D. Hunt

Kentucky Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Mayday, Mayday!: How The Current Bankruptcy Code Fails To Protect The Pensions Of Employees, Amy Lassiter

Kentucky Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Bank Of America V. 203 North Lasalle Street Partnership: Cram Down Without Debtor Exclusivity--Good Or Bad For The Creditor?, Ann E. Nolan

Kentucky Law Journal

No abstract provided.

9th Biennial Judge Joe Lee Bankruptcy Institute, Office Of Continuing Legal Education At The University Of Kentucky College Of Law, David G. Epstein, Kenneth N. Klee, Paul H. Asofsky, Beverly M. Burden, Lawrence P. King, Charles P. Normandin, John J. Jerome, Taft A. Mckinstry, Joan Lloyd Cooper, G. Ray Warner, Gerald K. Smith

Continuing Legal Education Materials

Materials from the 9th Biennial Judge Joe Lee Bankruptcy Institute held December 1999.

The Theory, Reality, And Pragmatism Of Corporate Governance In Bankruptcy Reorganizations, Christopher W. Frost

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Governing a corporation during a Chapter 11 reorganization presents a special case of the age-old problem of the separation of ownership and control. Critics of Chapter 11 have long pointed to the insulation provided by the automatic stay to managers of the business as one of the causes of bankruptcy inefficiency. Protected from the normal contractual and market forces that restrain the behavior of managers of healthy companies, managers of firms in bankruptcy, the harshest critics charge, use delay and other strategies to enrich themselves and the shareholders at the expense of the firm's creditors.

This Article addresses the financial …

8th Biennial Midwest/Midsouth Bankruptcy Institute, Office Of Continuing Legal Education At The University Of Kentucky College Of Law, Lawrence Ponoroff, Douglass G. Boshkoff, Tracey N. Wise, Christopher W. Frost, Keith M. Lundin, Ray Reynolds Graves, David G. Epstein, Joe Lee, Robert E. Mckenzie, Conrad K. Cyr

Continuing Legal Education Materials

Materials from the 8th Biennial Midwest/Midsouth Bankruptcy Institute held December 1997.

Running The Asylum: Governance Problems In Bankruptcy Reorganizations, Christopher W. Frost

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Like much of life, the study of bankruptcy is the study of leverage. Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code may be appropriately described as providing a framework within which interested parties may negotiate solutions to the problems facing a troubled company. The allocation of leverage to the negotiating parties is critical to the ultimate outcome of the process. In any negotiation setting control over the bargaining process is a key item of leverage. This Article proposes a framework for analysis and suggests solutions to the problem of control over corporations during the pendency of a Chapter 11 reorganization …