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Articles 1 - 18 of 18
Full-Text Articles in Law
Interpreting State Statutes In Federal Court, Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl
Interpreting State Statutes In Federal Court, Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl
Notre Dame Law Review
This Article addresses a problem that potentially arises whenever a federal court encounters a state statute. When interpreting the state statute, should the federal court use the state’s methods of statutory interpretation—the state’s canons of construction, its rules about the use of legislative history, and the like—or should the court instead use federal methods of statutory interpretation? The question is interesting as a matter of theory, and it is practically significant because different jurisdictions have somewhat different interpretive approaches. In addressing itself to this problem, the Article makes two contributions. First, it shows, as a normative matter, that federal courts …
Transactional Scripts In Contract Stacks, Shaanan Cohney, David A. Hoffman
Transactional Scripts In Contract Stacks, Shaanan Cohney, David A. Hoffman
All Faculty Scholarship
Deals accomplished through software persistently residing on computer networks—sometimes called smart contracts, but better termed transactional scripts—embody a potentially revolutionary contracting innovation. Ours is the first precise account in the legal literature of how such scripts are created, and when they produce errors of legal significance.
Scripts’ most celebrated use case is for transactions operating exclusively on public, permissionless, blockchains: such exchanges eliminate the need for trusted intermediaries and seem to permit parties to commit ex ante to automated performance. But public transactional scripts are costly both to develop and execute, with significant fees imposed for data storage. Worse, bugs …
The Canon Wars, Anita S. Krishnakumar, Victoria Nourse
The Canon Wars, Anita S. Krishnakumar, Victoria Nourse
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Canons are taking their turn down the academic runway in ways that no one would have foretold just a decade ago. Affection for canons of construction has taken center stage in recent Supreme Court cases and in constitutional theory. Harvard Dean John Manning and originalists Will Baude and Stephen Sachs have all suggested that principles of “ordinary interpretation” including canons should inform constitutional interpretation. Given this newfound enthusiasm for canons, and their convergence in both constitutional and statutory law, it is not surprising that we now have two competing book-length treatments of the canons—one by Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner, …
Dueling Canons, Anita S. Krishnakumar
Dueling Canons, Anita S. Krishnakumar
Faculty Publications
This Article offers the first targeted study of the Supreme Court’s use of canons and other tools of statutory interpretation in a “dueling” manner—that is, in both the majority and dissenting opinions in the same case, to support opposing outcomes. Taking its inspiration from Karl Llewellyn’s celebrated list of canons and countercanons, this Article examines how often and in what ways the members of the Roberts Court counter each other’s references to particular interpretive tools when disagreeing about the proper reading of a statute. Many of the Article’s findings are unexpected and undermine the assumptions made by some of the …
The Sherlock Holmes Canon, Anita S. Krishnakumar
The Sherlock Holmes Canon, Anita S. Krishnakumar
Faculty Publications
Many of the Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation cases infer meaning from Congress’s failure to comment in the legislative record. Colorfully referred to as the “dog that did not bark” canon, after a Sherlock Holmes story involving a watchdog that failed to bark while a racehorse was being stolen, the interpretive presumption holds as follows: if a statutory interpretation would significantly change the existing legal landscape, Congress can be expected to comment on that change in the legislative record; thus, a lack of congressional comment regarding a significant change can be taken as evidence that Congress did not intend that interpretation. …
Toward A Less Adversarial Relationship Between Chevron And Gardner, James D. Ridgway
Toward A Less Adversarial Relationship Between Chevron And Gardner, James D. Ridgway
University of Massachusetts Law Review
Veterans benefits are a creature of statute. As such, nearly every veterans benefits issue presented to the courts for resolution involves the interpretation of a statute, regulation, or sub-regulatory authority. Although veterans law has been subject to judicial review for over twenty-five years, the courts still have yet to develop a coherent doctrine regarding when to resolve ambiguity in favor of the veteran versus when to defer to the interpretations of the Department of Veterans Affairs. This Article explores three possible approaches to developing a coherent vision of how veteran friendliness and agency deference can coexist and provide more predictability …
What 30 Years Of Chevron Teach Us About The Rest Of Statutory Interpretation , Abbe R. Gluck
What 30 Years Of Chevron Teach Us About The Rest Of Statutory Interpretation , Abbe R. Gluck
Fordham Law Review
No abstract provided.
A Free Lunch In Chicago, Curtis E.A. Karnow
A Free Lunch In Chicago, Curtis E.A. Karnow
Curtis E.A. Karnow
A discussion of the ethical issues implicated by judges’ acceptance of travel and related expenses when attending privately sponsored judicial education, including seminars offered by educational institutions.
Extraterritoriality And Its Discontents: Limiting The Reach Of U.S. Law, John H. Knox
Extraterritoriality And Its Discontents: Limiting The Reach Of U.S. Law, John H. Knox
John H Knox
How far do U.S. laws reach beyond U.S. borders? Many statutes do not specify their geographic scope, instead using general terms that have no inherent limit. In construing those laws, federal courts presume that legislation applies only within the territory of the United States. The apparent simplicity of the presumption against extraterritoriality masks difficult issues, which the Supreme Court has been unable to resolve. For example, the Court has issued contradictory decisions on whether U.S. territory includes U.S. bases in other countries, on how the presumption applies to foreign actions with domestic effects, and on what evidence is necessary to …
Refining The Democracy Canon, Christopher Elmendorf
Refining The Democracy Canon, Christopher Elmendorf
Christopher S. Elmendorf
This Essay responds to Professor Rick Hasen’s forthcoming article, The Democracy Canon. Hasen identifies an intriguing and until now largely unnoticed practice in many state courts--to wit, the construing of election statutes with a strong thumb-on-the-scales in favor of easing voters' access to the polls and of rendering ballots eligible to be counted. Hasen defends this “pro voter” canon of interpretation and commends it to the federal courts. I argue that Hasen’s Canon cannot stand on the normative foundation he has poured for it, and that the federal courts’ adoption of the Canon would probably have significant costs (for example, …
Construing Patent Claims In Light Of The Specification Versus Importing Claim Limitations From The Specification: Is There Any Difference?, Robbie R. Harmer
Construing Patent Claims In Light Of The Specification Versus Importing Claim Limitations From The Specification: Is There Any Difference?, Robbie R. Harmer
Robbie R Harmer
Patent litigation often turns on the meaning of words in patent claims. Though litigants, licensees, assignees, and examiners at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) all must interpret, or construe, patent claims at some point in the lifetime of a patent, judges have the final say as to the scope and meaning of the words in patent claims. Judges’ interpretive methodologies raise questions about the relationship between the claims and the specification. The Federal Circuit, having exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patents, has established that courts should construe patent claims “in light of” the patent specification. On the other hand, …
Canons, The Plenary Power Doctrine And Immigration Law, Brian G. Slocum
Canons, The Plenary Power Doctrine And Immigration Law, Brian G. Slocum
Brian G. Slocum
There is a fundamental dichotomy in immigration law. On one hand, courts have consistently maintained that Congress has “plenary power” over immigration and reject most constitutional challenges on that basis. On the other hand, courts frequently use canons of statutory construction in an aggressive fashion to help interpret immigration statutes in favor of aliens. Immigration scholars have almost exclusively focused on the plenary power doctrine. They have either ignored the important role that canons have played in immigration law or have viewed canons as serving only a temporary and marginally legitimate role as substitutes for the lack of constitutional rights …
Canons, The Plenary Power Doctrine And Immigration Law, Brian G. Slocum
Canons, The Plenary Power Doctrine And Immigration Law, Brian G. Slocum
ExpressO
There is a fundamental dichotomy in immigration law. On one hand, courts have consistently maintained that Congress has “plenary power” over immigration and reject most constitutional challenges on that basis. On the other hand, courts frequently use canons of statutory construction in an aggressive fashion to help interpret immigration statutes in favor of aliens. Immigration scholars have almost exclusively focused on the plenary power doctrine. They have either ignored the important role that canons have played in immigration law or have viewed canons as serving only a temporary and marginally legitimate role as substitutes for the lack of constitutional rights …
“Only A Sith Thinks Like That”: Llewellyn’S “Dueling Canons,” One To Seven, Michael Sinclair
“Only A Sith Thinks Like That”: Llewellyn’S “Dueling Canons,” One To Seven, Michael Sinclair
NYLS Law Review
No abstract provided.
“Only A Sith Thinks Like That”: Llewellyn’S “Dueling Canons,” Eight To Twelve, Michael Sinclair
“Only A Sith Thinks Like That”: Llewellyn’S “Dueling Canons,” Eight To Twelve, Michael Sinclair
NYLS Law Review
No abstract provided.
Tools, Not Rules: The Heuristic Nature Of Statutory Interpretation, Morell E. Mullins Sr.
Tools, Not Rules: The Heuristic Nature Of Statutory Interpretation, Morell E. Mullins Sr.
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The Canon Has A History, Richard A. Primus
The Canon Has A History, Richard A. Primus
Reviews
Legal Canons, edited by J. M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson, is a collection of fourteen essays on subjects related to canonicity in law and legal education. Balkin and Levinson have two principal aims. One is to expand the category of things that can be canonical: not just texts, they say, but also arguments, problems, narrative frameworks, and examples invoked in conversation or teaching. In their view, what makes something canonical is its ability to reproduce itself in the minds of successive generations.' If generation after generation of legal academics argues about the countermajoritarian difficulty, then the countermajoritarian difficulty is a …
Legal Ethics: Legal Rules And Professional Aspirations, Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr.
Legal Ethics: Legal Rules And Professional Aspirations, Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr.
Cleveland State Law Review
The bar is now generally aware that a revised set of Rules of Professional Conduct has been proposed to, and is being considered by, the American Bar Association. These proposed Model Rules, if endorsed by the ABA, will be presented for adoption in the several states. If adopted in a state, the Model Rules would replace the present Code of Professional Responsibility.