Law Commons^™

Crisis Bureaucracy: Homeland Security And The Political Design Of Legal Mandates, Mariano-Florentino Cuellar

ExpressO

Policymakers fight over bureaucratic structure because it helps shape the legal interpretations and regulatory decisions of agencies through which modern governments operate. In this article, we update positive political theories of bureaucratic structure to encompass two new issues with important implications for lawyers and political scientists: the implications of legislative responses to a crisis, and the uncertainty surrounding major bureaucratic reorganizations. The resulting perspective affords a better understanding of how agencies interpret their legal mandates and deploy their administrative discretion. We apply the theory to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. Two principal questions surrounding this creation are …

Why Judicial Review Fails: Organizations, Politics, And The Problem Of Auditing Executive Discretion, Mariano-Florentino Cuellar

ExpressO

Every day executive branch officials make thousands of decisions affecting our security and welfare. Homeland security officials screen tens of thousands of people at the border. They decide whose name gets on government “no fly lists.” Agencies freeze suspected terrorist assets, choose what companies to inspect for environmental violations, and decide whom to prosecute. This article describes how judicial review predictably and systematically fails to prevent abuse and promote organizational learning when government officials make many such choices using their discretion to target individuals or groups. It then proposes the use of quasi-judicial audits of executive discretion as a remedy. …

Dangerous Clients: A Phenomenological Solution To Bureaucratic Oppression, Edward L. Rubin

ExpressO

Modern administrative agencies are often unnecessarily oppressive in their day-to-day contact with people. This article traces such oppression to status differences between agency employees and clients, their relationship as strangers to one another, the institutional pathologies of the agency and the divergent incentives to which the agency employees are subject. The article then considers three solutions to this problem that have been discussed in the academic literature regarding government agencies: the imposition of due process requirements, the shift to client-centered management, and the use of market or quasi-market mechanisms.

After critiquing all three solutions, the article proposes a new approach, …