Law Commons^™

What's A Name Worth?: Experimental Tests Of The Value Of Attribution In Intellectual Property, Christopher J. Buccafusco, Christopher Jon Sprigman, Zachary C. Burns

All Faculty Scholarship

Despite considerable research suggesting that creators value attribution – i.e., being named as the creator of a work – U.S. intellectual property (IP) law does not provide a right to attribution to the vast majority of creators. On the other side of the Atlantic, however, many European countries give creators, at least in their copyright laws, much stronger rights to attribution. At first blush it may seem that the U.S. has gotten it wrong, and the Europeans have made a better policy choice in providing to creators a right that they value. But for reasons we will explain in this …

Beyond Economics In Pay For Performance, Tamara C. Belinfanti

Articles & Chapters

This article argues that while much of the intellectual energy has focused on the economics of executive pay, the challenge of executive compensation is as much a challenge of human behavior as it is one of economics. The raison d’etre of pay for performance (PFP) is to motivate executives to make decisions that are in the best interest of their firm and its shareholders. Attention to the relevant individual, situational, cultural, and institutional dynamics (what I term “behavioral dynamics”) that affect how executives are motivated and how they value future rewards is critical for the sustainability of PFP as a …

Access To Consumer Remedies In The Squeaky Wheel System , Amy J. Schmitz

Pepperdine Law Review

This article explores the “Squeaky Wheel System” (“SWS”) in business-to-consumer (“B2C”) contexts, referring to merchants’ reservation of purchase remedies and other contract benefits for only the relatively few “squeaky wheel” consumers who have the requisite information and resources to persistently seek assistance. The article uncovers how this system fosters contractual discrimination and hinders consumers’ awareness and access with respect to contract remedies. It also adds empirical insights from my recent e-survey, and offers suggestions for using the internet to empower consumers of all economic and status levels with efficient and accessible means for learning about their purchase rights and asserting …

Behavioral Antitrust And Monopolization, Maurice Stucke

Scholarly Works

One hot topic is whether Google has violated the antitrust laws. Another important topic is how behavioral economics can enrich antitrust policy. This Essay examines two implications of behavioral economics on antitrust monopolization law. The Essay first discusses trial-and-error learning as an entry barrier. This is timely given the current debate over the entry barriers of the search engine market.

The Essay next discusses behavioral exploitation to maintain a monopoly. The behavioral economics literature can help explain the European Commission’s tying claims against Microsoft, why the Commission’s original remedy failed, and the benefits and risks of the Commission’s remedy involving …

Behavioral Exploitation Antitrust In Consumer Subprime Mortgage Lending, Max Huffman, Daniel Heidtke

Max Huffman

We analyze whether antitrust might provide an alternative and perhaps superior approach to regulating consumer subprime mortgage lending. Behavioral exploitation antitrust targets commercial conduct of the sort that was observed in consumer subprime mortgage lending in the years leading up to 2007. The welfare effects of that conduct are easily established. Antitrust-based regulation can mitigate those welfare effects. Regulation that does exist, which operates at the level of the individual transaction, may be easily avoided, may be short-sighted, may suffer from enforcement problems that public choice theory explains, and/or may overreach by removing consumer choice. We show that antitrust enforcement …

Vertical Boilerplate, James Gibson

James Gibson

Despite what we learn in law school about the “meeting of the minds,” most contracts are merely boilerplate -- take-it-or-leave-it propositions. Negotiation is nonexistent; we rely on our collective market power as consumers to regulate contracts’ content. But boilerplate imposes certain information costs, because it often arrives late in the transaction and is hard to understand. If those costs get too high, then the market mechanism fails. So how high are boilerplate’s information costs? A few studies have attempted to measure them, but they all use a “horizontal” approach -- i.e., they sample a single stratum of boilerplate and assume …

The Implications Of Behavioral Antitrust, Maurice Stucke

Scholarly Works

Behavioral economics is now mainstream. It is also timely. The financial crisis raised important issues of market failure, weak regulation, moral hazard, and our lack of understanding about how many markets actually operate.

As behavioral economics (with its more realistic assumptions of human behavior) goes mainstream in academia and the business world, one expects lawyers and economists to bring the current economic thinking to the competition agencies. How should the competition agencies respond?

This paper examines how competition authorities can consider the implications of behavioral economics on four levels: first as a gap filler, i.e., to help explain “real world” …

Foreward: The Rise Of Behavioral Law And Economics, Maurice Stucke

Scholarly Works

No abstract provided.

Barriers To Market Discipline: A Comparative Study Of Regulatory Reforms, Vincent Di Lorenzo

Vincent Di Lorenzo

Barriers to Market Discipline: A Comparative Study of Mortgage Market Reforms This article explores regulatory reforms in the U.S. and U.K. in response to the recent mortgage market crisis. These reform efforts serve as case studies for evaluation of necessary reforms being considered in many nations. Two issues are examined. First, the article explores the extent to which regulatory bodies have recognized behavioral barriers to market discipline on the part of both consumers and industry actors. The academic literature has long identified such barriers, but recognition by government regulators has lagged. Second the article examines the varied response in the …

Happiness, Efficiency, And The Promise Of Decisional Equity: From Outcome To Process, Jeffrey L. Harrison

Pepperdine Law Review

Those who resist the teachings of law and economics are rightfully concerned that economic efficiency is largely based on the predictions of relatively acquisitive people about what will make them feel or be better off. Due to a variety of factors, these predictions often turn out to be wrong. The explosion in happiness research would appear to have the potential to close the link between choices and actual outcomes and, consequently, make the concept of efficiency more meaningful. This Article explores this promising advance. It concludes that direct focus on one concept or another of happiness or "better-off-ness" does not …

Contrasting The Art Of Economic Science With Pseudo-Economic Nonsense: The Distinction Between Reasonable Assumptions And Ridiculous Assumptions, Mark Klock

Pepperdine Law Review

In this paper I explain that law professors who claim to have proven that the stock market cannot be efficient have based their case on economic models contain hidden assumptions which are nonsense. Specifically, the assumption that investors have no wealth constraint and can borrow unlimited amounts of capital is nonsense. I further explain that the frequently touted claim that many investors are irrational is not relevant to the debate about market efficiency because when real world characteristics of financial markets are imposed - markets clear, budget constraints are satisfied, and investors face credit limits - markets will be efficient …

The Dog That Didn't Bark: Private Investment Funds And Relational Contracts In The Wake Of The Great Recession, Robert C. Illig

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

In the aftermath of the subprime mortgage crisis, the contract rights of numerous hedge funds and venture capital funds were breached. These contracts were complex and sophisticated and had been negotiated at great time and expense. Yet despite all of the assumptions of neo-classical contracts theory, nothing happened. Practically none of these injured parties sued to enforce their rights. Professor Illig uses this dearth of litigation to conduct a form of natural experiment as to the value of contract law. Discrete market participants contracted before the crash and then pursued their rights in court afterwards, while relational market participants contracted …

The Theory Of Minds Within The Theory Of Games, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Mark Turner, Nicholas Weller

Faculty Scholarship

Classical rationality as accepted by game theory assumes that a human chooser in a given moment has consistent preferences and beliefs and that actions result consistently from those preferences and beliefs, and moreover that these preferences, beliefs, and actions remain the same across equal choice moments. Since, as is widely found in prior experiments, subjects do not follow the predictions of classical rationality, behavioral game theorists have assumed consistent deviations from classical rationality by assigning to subjects certain dispositions— risk preference, cognitive abilities, social norms, etc. All of these theories are fundamentally cognitive theories, making claims about how individual human …

Access To Consumer Remedies In The Squeaky Wheel System, Amy J. Schmitz

Faculty Publications

This article explores the “Squeaky Wheel System” (“SWS”) in business-to-consumer (“B2C”) contexts, referring to merchants’ reservation of purchase remedies and other contract benefits for only the relatively few “squeaky wheel” consumers who have the requisite information and resources to persistently seek assistance. The article uncovers how this system fosters contractual discrimination and hinders consumers’ awareness and access with respect to contract remedies. It also adds empirical insights from my recent e-survey, and offers suggestions for using the internet to empower consumers of all economic and status levels with efficient and accessible means for learning about their purchase rights and asserting …