Law Commons^™

How Gender And Other Identity Factors Influence Attitudes Toward Will Making: Lessons From Australia, Bridget J. Crawford, Tina Cockburn, Kelly Purser, Ho Fai Chan, Stephen Whyte, Uwe Dulleck

ACTEC Law Journal

This essay aims to stimulate interest in further empirical study of attitudes toward will making by reporting the results of a 2022 survey conducted in Australia of the general population (n=1202) and legal professionals (n=112). We asked participants for their views about the ideal age at which to begin the will-making process and the relative contributions of the client and attorney to any resulting will. There was a discernible gender-based difference in views on both questions. Women preferred to initiate those conversations approximately six years earlier than men did and, especially at earlier life stages, preferred less professional input into …

Corporate Law For Good People, Yuval Feldman, Adi Libson, Gideon Parchomovsky

Northwestern University Law Review

This Article offers a novel analysis of the field of corporate governance by viewing it through the lens of behavioral ethics. It calls for both shifting the focus of corporate governance to a new set of loci of potential corporate wrongdoing and adding new tools to the corporate governance arsenal. Behavioral ethics scholarship emphasizes that the large share of wrongdoing is generated by “good people” whose intention is to act ethically. Their wrongdoing stems from “bounded ethicality”—various cognitive and motivational limitations in their ethical decision-making processes—that leads to biased decisions that seem legitimate. Bounded ethicality has important implications for a …

Nudges For Health Policy: Effectiveness And Limitations, Victoria A. Shaffer

Missouri Law Review

One tool that our government can use to combat our healthcare challenges is the use of health policy in the form of programs, regulations, and agencies that are aimed at improving the overall health and welfare of Americans. Of the various approaches to shaping health policy, this paper will focus on the use of “nudges,” a behavioral strategy for shaping human behavior from the framework, Libertarian Paternalism. In this Article, a nudge is defined as any aspect of choice architecture or any method of structuring the choice environment that influences behavior in a predictable way, with the restriction that this …

Behavioral Economics Goes To Court: The Fundamental Flaws In The Behavioral Law & Economics Arguments Against No-Surcharge Laws, Todd J. Zywicki, Geoffrey A. Manne, Kristian Stout

Missouri Law Review

During the past decade, academics – predominantly scholars of behavioral law and economics – have increasingly turned to the claimed insights of behavioral economics in order to craft novel policy proposals in many fields, most significantly consumer credit regulation. Over the same period, these ideas have also gained traction with policymakers, resulting in a variety of legislative efforts, such as the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. Most recently, the efforts of behavioral law and economics scholars have been directed toward challenging a number of state laws that regulate retailers’ use of surcharge fees for consumer credit card payments. …

Mandatory Process, Matthew J.B. Lawrence

Indiana Law Journal

This Article suggests that people tend to undervalue their procedural rights—their proverbial “day in court”—until they are actually involved in a dispute. The Article argues that the inherent, outcome-independent value of participating in a dispute resolution process comes largely from its power to soothe a person’s grievance— their perception of unfairness and accompanying negative emotional reaction—win or lose. But a tendency to assume unchanging emotional states, known in behavioral economics as projection bias, can prevent people from anticipating that they might become aggrieved and from appreciating the grievance-soothing power of process. When this happens, people will waive their procedural rights …

Behavioral Public Choice And The Law, Gary M. Lucas Jr., Slavisa Tasic

West Virginia Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Moral Hazard Of Contract Drafting, Eric A. Zacks

Florida State University Law Review

This Article identifies and examines the principal-agent problem as it arises in the context of contract preparation. The economic agency relationship, as it may be understood to exist for contract drafting, provides a superior framework for understanding and reforming the inability of the non-drafting party (the principal) to control the drafting party (the agent). As an economic agent, the drafting party faces a moral hazard when preparing the contract because of the differing interests of the parties as well as the information and control asymmetries that exists. For example, the use of standard form contracts in consumer transactions is an …

Broker-Dealers And Investment Advisers: A Behaviorial-Economics Analysis Of Competing Suggestions For Reform, Polina Demina

Michigan Law Review

For the average investor trying to save for retirement or a child’s college fund, the world of investing has become increasingly complex. These retail investors must turn more frequently to financial intermediaries, such as broker-dealers and investment advisers, to get sound investment advice. Such intermediaries perform different duties for their clients, however. The investment adviser owes his client a fiduciary duty of care and therefore must provide financial advice that is in the client’s best interests, while the broker-dealer must merely provide advice that is suitable to the client’s interests—a lower standard than the fiduciary duty of care. And yet …

“Nudging” Better Lawyer Behavior: Using Default Rules And Incentives To Change Behavior In Law Firms, Nancy B. Rapoport

St. Mary's Journal on Legal Malpractice & Ethics

In the changing landscape of law practice—where law firm profits are threatened by such changes as increased pressure from clients to economize and the concomitant opportunities for clients to shop around for the most efficient lawyers—are there ways to change how things are done in law firms so that firms can provide more efficient and ethical service? This article suggests that an understanding of cognitive biases and basic behavioral economics will help law firms tweak their incentives and default rules to promote the improved delivery of legal services.

Public-Private Contracting And The Reciprocity Norm, Wendy Netter Epstein

American University Law Review

No abstract provided.

Are People Probabilistically Challenged?, Alex Stein

Michigan Law Review

Daniel Kahneman's recent book, Thinking, Fast and Slow, is a must-read for any scholar or policymaker interested in behavioral economics. Behavioral economics is a young, but already well-established, discipline that pervasively affects law and legal theory. Kahneman, a 2002 Nobel Laureate, is the discipline's founding father. His pioneering work with Amos Tversky and others challenges the core economic concept of expected utility, which serves to determine the value of people's prospects. Under mainstream economic theory, the value of a person's prospect equals the prospect's utility upon materialization (U) multiplied by the probability of the prospect materializing (P). When the prospect …

Access To Consumer Remedies In The Squeaky Wheel System , Amy J. Schmitz

Pepperdine Law Review

This article explores the “Squeaky Wheel System” (“SWS”) in business-to-consumer (“B2C”) contexts, referring to merchants’ reservation of purchase remedies and other contract benefits for only the relatively few “squeaky wheel” consumers who have the requisite information and resources to persistently seek assistance. The article uncovers how this system fosters contractual discrimination and hinders consumers’ awareness and access with respect to contract remedies. It also adds empirical insights from my recent e-survey, and offers suggestions for using the internet to empower consumers of all economic and status levels with efficient and accessible means for learning about their purchase rights and asserting …

Happiness, Efficiency, And The Promise Of Decisional Equity: From Outcome To Process, Jeffrey L. Harrison

Pepperdine Law Review

Those who resist the teachings of law and economics are rightfully concerned that economic efficiency is largely based on the predictions of relatively acquisitive people about what will make them feel or be better off. Due to a variety of factors, these predictions often turn out to be wrong. The explosion in happiness research would appear to have the potential to close the link between choices and actual outcomes and, consequently, make the concept of efficiency more meaningful. This Article explores this promising advance. It concludes that direct focus on one concept or another of happiness or "better-off-ness" does not …

Contrasting The Art Of Economic Science With Pseudo-Economic Nonsense: The Distinction Between Reasonable Assumptions And Ridiculous Assumptions, Mark Klock

Pepperdine Law Review

In this paper I explain that law professors who claim to have proven that the stock market cannot be efficient have based their case on economic models contain hidden assumptions which are nonsense. Specifically, the assumption that investors have no wealth constraint and can borrow unlimited amounts of capital is nonsense. I further explain that the frequently touted claim that many investors are irrational is not relevant to the debate about market efficiency because when real world characteristics of financial markets are imposed - markets clear, budget constraints are satisfied, and investors face credit limits - markets will be efficient …

The Dog That Didn't Bark: Private Investment Funds And Relational Contracts In The Wake Of The Great Recession, Robert C. Illig

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

In the aftermath of the subprime mortgage crisis, the contract rights of numerous hedge funds and venture capital funds were breached. These contracts were complex and sophisticated and had been negotiated at great time and expense. Yet despite all of the assumptions of neo-classical contracts theory, nothing happened. Practically none of these injured parties sued to enforce their rights. Professor Illig uses this dearth of litigation to conduct a form of natural experiment as to the value of contract law. Discrete market participants contracted before the crash and then pursued their rights in court afterwards, while relational market participants contracted …

Law For The Common Man: An Individual-Level Theory Of Values, Expanded Rationality, And The Law , Amir N. Licht

Law and Contemporary Problems

This article makes an admittedly bold attempt at outlining an analytical framework for addressing this question. Instead of looking at the legal implications of bounded rationality -- an exercise highly worthy in its own right -- this article advances a theory of expanded rationality. This theory retains the element of rationality in that people respond to incentives in an attempt to attain utility, and it does not question the observation that decision-making is often bounded due to various factors.

The Unintended Consequences Of Local Rules, Justin Sevier

Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy

No abstract provided.

Nudge, Choice Architecture, And Libertarian Paternalism, Pierre Schlag

Michigan Law Review

By all external appearances, Nudge is a single book-two covers, a single spine, one title. But put these deceptive appearances aside, read the thing, and you will actually find two books-Book One and Book Two. Book One begins with the behavioral economist's view that sometimes individuals are not the best judges of their own welfare. Indeed, given the propensity of human beings for cognitive errors (e.g., the availability bias) and the complexity of decisions that need to be made (e.g., choosing prescription plans), individuals often make mistakes. Enter here the idea of the nudge-the deliberate effort to channel people into …

Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Breach? A Psychological Experiment, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan

Michigan Law Review

This Article offers experimental evidence that parties are more willing to exploit efficient-breach opportunities when the contract in question includes a liquidated-damages clause. Economists claim that the theory of efficient breach allows us to predict when parties will choose to breach a contract if the legal remedy for breach is expectation damages. However, the economic assumption of rational wealth-maximizing actors fails to capture important, shared, nonmonetary values and incentives that shape behavior in predictable ways. When interpersonal obligations are informal or underspecified, people act in accordance with shared community norms, like the moral norm of keeping promises. However, when sanctions …

Uncertainty Revisited: Legal Prediction And Legal Postdiction, Ehud Guttel, Alon Harel

Michigan Law Review

Legal scholarship, following rational-choice theory, has traditionally treated uncertainty as a single category. A large body of experimental studies, however, has established that individuals treat guesses concerning the future differently than guesses concerning the past. Even where objective probabilities and payoffs are identical, individuals are much more willing to predict a future event (and are more confident in the accuracy of their predictions) than they are willing to postdict a past event (and are also less confident in the accuracy of their postdiction). For example, individuals are more willing to bet on the results of a future die toss than …

Emote Control: The Substitution Of Symbol For Substance In Foreign Policy And International Law, Jules Lobel, George Loewenstein

Chicago-Kent Law Review

Historical perspectives, as well as recent work in psychology, converge on the conclusion that human behavior is the product of two or more qualitatively different neural processes that operate according to different principles and often clash with one another. We describe a specific "dual process" perspective that distinguishes between "deliberative" and "emote" control of behavior. We use this framework to shed light on a wide range of legal issues involving foreign policy, terrorism, and international law that are difficult to make sense of in terms of the traditional rational choice perspective. We argue that in these areas, the powerful influence …

The Fable Of Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market Discipline, And Legal Policy, Avishalom Tor

Michigan Law Review

Legal scholars have recently advanced a behavioral approach to the law and economics school of thought in an attempt to improve its external validity and predictive power. The hallmark of this new approach is the replacement of the perfectly rational actor with a "boundedly rational" decisionmaker who, apart from being affected by emotion and motivation, has only limited cognitive resources. To function effectively in a complex :world, boundedly rational individuals must rely on cognitive heuristics - simplifying mental shortcuts - that inevitably lead people to make some systematic decision errors; as a result, their behavior necessarily deviates from that predicted …

The Legal Implications Of Psychology: Human Behavior, Behavioral Economics, And The Law Symposium: The Legal Implications Of Psychology Human Behavior, Behavioral Economics, And The Law, Stephen D. Hurd

Vanderbilt Law Review

Nearly all interesting legal issues require accurate predictions about human behavior to be resolved satisfactorily. Judges, policy- makers, and academics invoke mental models of individual and social behavior whenever they estimate the desirability of alternative rules, policies, or procedures. Contemporary legal scholarship has come to recognize that if these predictions are naive and intuitive, without any strong empirical grounding, they are susceptible to error and ideological bias. Something more rigorous is thus expected when normative claims are advanced, and the place of the social sciences has expanded in legal discourse to satisfy this expectation.'

Three branches of the social sciences-economics, …