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Full-Text Articles in Law

Basel Iii G: Shadow Banking And Project Finance, Christian M. Mcnamara, Andrew Metrick Jan 2020

Basel Iii G: Shadow Banking And Project Finance, Christian M. Mcnamara, Andrew Metrick

The Journal of Financial Crises

The Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), a liquidity standard introduced by Basel III, seeks to promote a better match between the liquidity of a bank’s assets and the manner in which the bank funds those assets. The NSFR requires banks to maintain a minimum amount of funding deemed “stable” by the Basel framework based on the liquidity of the banks’ assets and activities over a one-year timeframe. One of the areas seen as most affected by this development may be bank participation in project finance for infrastructure development. Since the global demand for infrastructure development remains robust, the shadow ...


Basel Iii F: Callable Commercial Paper, Christian M. Mcnamara, Rosalind Bennett, Andrew Metrick Jan 2020

Basel Iii F: Callable Commercial Paper, Christian M. Mcnamara, Rosalind Bennett, Andrew Metrick

The Journal of Financial Crises

One of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s responses to the global financial crisis of 2007-09 was to introduce the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR), a short-term measure that evaluates whether a bank has enough liquidity to meet expected cash outflows during a 30-day stress scenario. One area in which this incentive has already resulted in changed practices is in the market for commercial paper. Banks often provide backup liquidity facilities to the issuers of commercial paper that the issuers can draw upon to repay a maturing issue of commercial paper if they are unable to sell a new issue ...


Basel Iii E: Synthetic Financing By Prime Brokers, Christian M. Mcnamara, Andrew Metrick Jan 2020

Basel Iii E: Synthetic Financing By Prime Brokers, Christian M. Mcnamara, Andrew Metrick

The Journal of Financial Crises

Hedge funds rely on “prime brokerage” units within banks to provide leverage. With the enhanced capital requirements and new liquidity standards introduced by Basel III driving up the cost to banks of engaging in such financing, prime brokers have begun to offer an alternative means of providing hedge fund clients with leveraged exposure to securities. Known as synthetic financing, this alternative requires the prime broker to enter into derivatives contracts with the clients. Under the Basel III framework, the ability of banks to hedge and net such derivative positions results in capital and liquidity costs for synthetic financing that are ...


Basel Iii D: Swiss Finish To Basel Iii, Christian M. Mcnamara, Natalia Tente, Andrew Metrick Jan 2020

Basel Iii D: Swiss Finish To Basel Iii, Christian M. Mcnamara, Natalia Tente, Andrew Metrick

The Journal of Financial Crises

After the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) introduced the Basel III framework in 2010, individual countries confronted the question of how best to implement the framework given their unique circumstances. Switzerland, with a banking industry that is both heavily concentrated and very large relative to the size of its overall economy, faced a special challenge. It ultimately adopted what is sometimes referred to as the “Swiss Finish” to Basel III—enhanced requirements applicable to Switzerland’s “too-big-to-fail” banks Credit Suisse and UBS that go beyond the base requirements established by the BCBS. Yet the prominent role played by relatively ...


Basel Iii B: Basel Iii Overview, Christian M. Mcnamara, Michael Wedow, Andrew Metrick Jan 2020

Basel Iii B: Basel Iii Overview, Christian M. Mcnamara, Michael Wedow, Andrew Metrick

The Journal of Financial Crises

In the wake of the financial crisis of 2007-09, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) faced the critical task of diagnosing what went wrong and then updating regulatory standards aimed at preventing it from occurring again. In seeking to strengthen the microprudential regulation associated with the earlier Basel Accords while also adding a macroprudential overlay, Basel III consists of proposals in three main areas intended to address 1) capital reform, 2) liquidity standards, and 3) systemic risk and interconnectedness. This case considers the causes of the 2007-09 financial crisis and what they suggest about weaknesses in the Basel regime ...


Basel Iii A: Regulatory History, Christian M. Mcnamara, Thomas Piontek, Andrew Metrick Jan 2020

Basel Iii A: Regulatory History, Christian M. Mcnamara, Thomas Piontek, Andrew Metrick

The Journal of Financial Crises

From the earliest efforts to mandate the amount of capital banks must maintain, regulators have grappled with how best to accomplish this task. Until the 1980s, regulation had been based largely on discretion and judgment. In the wake of two bank failures, the central bank governors of the G10 countries established the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and in 1988, the BCBS introduced a capital measurement system, Basel I. The system represented a triumph of the fixed numerical approach, however, critics worried that it was too blunt an instrument. In 1999, the BCBS issued Basel II, a proposal to ...


The Dark Side Of Implementing Basel Capital Requirements: Theory, Evidence, And Policy, Aurelio Gurrea-Martinez, Nydia Remolina Mar 2019

The Dark Side Of Implementing Basel Capital Requirements: Theory, Evidence, And Policy, Aurelio Gurrea-Martinez, Nydia Remolina

Research Collection School Of Law

Most fnancial systems around the world have imposed new capital requirements for banks in the past years. This policy seems to be justifed on two powerful economic grounds. First, better capitalized banks promote fnancial stability by reducing banks' incentives to take risks and increasing banks' buffers against losses. Second, lack of compliance with a set of rules established by the Basel Committee may harm confdence on a country's fnancial system. While acknowledging these potential benefts, this paper makes the ofen overlooked point that the full implementation of Basel capital requirements may be socially undesirable for poorer countries seeking to ...


Basel Iii And The Future Of Project Finance Funding, Tianze Ma Oct 2016

Basel Iii And The Future Of Project Finance Funding, Tianze Ma

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

This paper seeks to analyze the new requirements in the Basel III banking regulatory framework and explore their impact on commercial banks’ project finance portfolio. The paper begins with a general introduction of the Basel Accords, followed by an analysis of the changes in the Basel III requirements and their potential impact on project finance, in particular the effects of the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and the net stable funding ratio (NSFR). The paper ends with a discussion of alternative sources of project finance funding that emerged as a result of the new regulatory regime.


Domestic Bank Regulation In A Global Environment - A Comparative Dialogue, Robert C. Hockett Dec 2014

Domestic Bank Regulation In A Global Environment - A Comparative Dialogue, Robert C. Hockett

Robert C. Hockett

No abstract provided.


Domestic Bank Regulation In A Global Environment - A Comparative Dialogue, Robert C. Hockett Mar 2013

Domestic Bank Regulation In A Global Environment - A Comparative Dialogue, Robert C. Hockett

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


The Basel Iii Liquidity Coverage Ratio And Financial Stability, Andrew W. Hartlage Dec 2012

The Basel Iii Liquidity Coverage Ratio And Financial Stability, Andrew W. Hartlage

Michigan Law Review

Banks and other financial institutions may increase the amount of credit available in the financial system by borrowing for short terms and lending for long terms. Though this "maturity transformation" is a useful and productive function of banks, it gives rise to the possibility that even prudently managed banks could fail due to a lack of liquid assets. The financial crisis of 2007-2008 revealed the extent to which the U.S. financial system is exposed to the risk of a system-wide failure from insufficient liquidity. Financial regulators from economies around the world have responded to the crisis by proposing new ...


The Political Economy Of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends To Be Frustrated And Systemic Risk Perpetuated, John C. Coffee Jr. Jan 2012

The Political Economy Of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends To Be Frustrated And Systemic Risk Perpetuated, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

A good crisis should never go to waste. In the world of financial regulation, experience has shown – since at least the time of the South Sea Bubble three hundred years ago – that only after a catastrophic market collapse can legislators and regulators overcome the resistance of the financial community and adopt comprehensive "re-form" legislation. U.S. financial history both confirms and conforms to this generalization. The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were the product of the 1929 stock-market crash and the Great Depression, with their enactment following the inauguration of President Franklin Roosevelt in ...


The Political Economy Of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends To Be Frustrated And Systemic Risk Perpetuated, John C. Coffee Jr. Jan 2012

The Political Economy Of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends To Be Frustrated And Systemic Risk Perpetuated, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

Several commentators have argued that financial “reform” legislation enacted after a market crash is invariably flawed, results in “quack corporate governance” and “bubble laws,” and should be discouraged. This criticism has been specifically directed at both the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Dodd-Frank Act. This article presents a rival perspective. Investors, it argues, are naturally dispersed and poorly organized and so constitute a classic “latent group” (in Mancur Olson’s terminology). Such latent groups tend to be dominated by smaller, but more cohesive and better funded special interest groups in the competition to shape legislation and influence regulatory policy. This domination ...


Dodd-Frank And Basel Iii’S Skin In The Game Divergence And Why It Is Good For The International Banking System, Eric M. Thompson Mar 2011

Dodd-Frank And Basel Iii’S Skin In The Game Divergence And Why It Is Good For The International Banking System, Eric M. Thompson

Eric M Thompson

The recent financial collapse has illuminated many problems with the global financial system. One of these problems was that the financial system developed in a way that allowed banks to profit by simply making more loans instead of quality loans. After the financial collapse, regulators scrambled to enact new legislation to better manage the financial system and avoid the problems that caused the collapse. One way in which regulators attempted to improve the system was to remove the ability of banks to generate limitless loans in which the banks had no stake. Two such pieces of regulation, the Dodd-Frank Wall ...


Financial Market Regulation After The Crisis: The Case For Hedge Fund Regulation Via Basel Iii, Wulf A. Kaal Ph.D. Aug 2010

Financial Market Regulation After The Crisis: The Case For Hedge Fund Regulation Via Basel Iii, Wulf A. Kaal Ph.D.

Wulf A. Kaal Ph.D.

Hedge funds have been blamed for their part in the financial market crisis of 2008-09. The exact role and the scope of hedge funds’ involvement in the financial crisis is unclear. Regulators increasingly scrutinize the hedge fund industry worldwide. Regulation of hedge funds could help minimize moral hazard, social externalities and systemic risk generated by the hedge fund industry. The paper evaluates recent regulatory changes including the US Dodd-Frank Act, the European Union Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers and other pertinent regulation. Using the methodological tool of New Institutional Economics, the paper provides an impact analysis of regulatory changes ...