Law Commons^™

The Orderly Liquidation Authority: Fanatical Or Familiar? Idealistic Or Unrealistic?, Stephanie P. Massman

Stephanie P Massman

The systemic financial crisis of 2008 spurred the failure of numerous financial and non-financial entities. Regulators addressed each of these failures on an ad hoc ex-post basis, granting multiple bailouts in various forms. The refusal to extend these bailouts to one firm, Lehman Brothers, however, caused further panic and contagion throughout the already unstable market as one of the largest financial institutions of the U.S. underwent an extremely lengthy and value-destructive Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Criticism surrounding not only the bailouts, but also the decision to allow Lehman to fail under the Bankruptcy Code, led to the inclusion of the Orderly …

The Intersection Of Tax And Bankruptcy: The Mccoy Rule, John Ferguson

John Ferguson

No abstract provided.

Against Regulatory Displacement: An Institutional Analysis Of Financial Crises, Jonathan C. Lipson

Jonathan C. Lipson

This paper uses “institutional analysis”—the study of the relative capacities of markets, courts, and regulators—to make three claims about financial crises.

First, financial crises are increasingly a problem of “regulatory displacement.” Through the ad hoc rescues of 2008 and the Dodd-Frank reforms of 2010, regulators displace market and judicial processes that ordinarily prevent financial distress from becoming financial crises. Because regulators are vulnerable to capture by large financial services firms, however, they cannot address the pathologies that create crises: market concentration and complexity. Indeed, regulators may inadvertently aggravate these conditions through resolution tactics that consolidate firms, and the volume and …