Law Commons^™

Where Have All The Lenders Gone?: "Loan To Own Transactions" In The Current Credit Market, Stephanie A. Nadler

Stephanie A Nadler

Credit is not readily available in current markets. While distressed firms are in dire need of capital contributions, traditional lenders are not willing to make risky loans. Distressed firms have turned to hedge funds as lenders for much-needed capital. Thus, hedge funds engage in “loan to own” transactions, a lending technique that has recently drawn much criticism. In a loan to own transaction, the hedge fund makes a loan to a distressed company, while also taking an equity stake in the company. Pursuant to such activity, the hedge fund will generally gain a seat on the board of directors or …

The Financial Crisis Of 2009 - Have Reorganization Proceedings In Emerging Markets Gone Bankrupt? Israel As A Case Study, David Hahn

David Hahn

The financial crisis of 2009 affected markets all over the world, presenting an unprecedented challenge for international regulators. In emerging markets, firms began raising significant amounts of debt through corporate bonds only in recent years. When such markets crashed, and firms could no longer pay bondholders, regulators were forced to adopt innovative policies to cope with the problem. This paper explores the possible regulatory responses to the crisis, by focusing on the actions taken by regulators in Israel. The paper outlines the various mechanisms that have been employed and offered to combat the crisis and highlights their shortcomings. It then …

Virtual Territoriality, Edward J. Janger

Edward J. Janger

Abstract Virtual Territoriality Edward J. Janger David M. Barse Professor Brooklyn Law School Current efforts to unify the laws of secured credit and bankruptcy are predicated on the belief that regularizing the law of debtor’s rights and creditor’s remedies will cause global business to flourish, and benefit both developed and less-developed countries. Certain and predictable remedies for creditors will facilitate lending and development, and coordination among courts will create opportunities to protect the going concern value of troubled businesses. The benefits that accompany such legal harmonization may, however, come at a price. Centralizing control of a bankruptcy case may create …

Simultaneous Distress Of Residential Developers And Their Secured Lenders: An Analysis Of Bankruptcy & Bank Regulation, Sarah P. Woo

Sarah P Woo

With falling home prices and home foreclosures currently acknowledged as a severe problem in the U.S., more attention needs to be paid to the contributing phenomenon of residential developers undergoing liquidation, which has left behind a trail of partially-completed or abandoned properties. In order to understand this phenomenon, we analyzed 222 residential developers that filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions between November 2007 and December 2008. We find that only a very small proportion of these developers, as compared to previous similar large studies, confirmed a reorganization plan. Most cases ended in liquidations. In the sample, 72.5% of the cases showed …

Like-Kind Exchanges And Qualified Intermediaries, Brad Borden, Paul L.B. Mckenney, David Shechtman

Bradley T. Borden

The economic downturn has depressed the real estate market, a significant component of the section 1031 industry. In its wake, the industry witnessed three major qualified intermediary failures. QI failures deprive exchangers of exchange proceeds and also create potential tax and legal liabilities for exchangers. This article analyzes those potential liablities and also discusses the cause of QI failures and actions that exchangers and QIs may consider to help safeguard exchange proceeds.

Perverse Incentives: Risk Taking And Reform, Aaron J. Unterman

Aaron J. Unterman

The common theme that ties the financial crisis (and this article) together is one of misguided incentives that pervaded the finance industry and perverted the actions of individuals and institutions resulting in a global crisis with severely deleterious social effects. In the world of finance, the greatest way to achieve a dramatic increase in wealth is to take large risks, of course, this is also the easiest way to lose it. A great deal of the so-called financial innovation that we experienced preceding the crisis was devoted to finding ways to take on as much risk as possible. The rise …

Secret Liens And The Financial Crisis Of 2008, Michael N. Simkovic

Michael N Simkovic

This article explains the roots of financial crises in one of the oldest and most fundamental problems of commercial law: hidden leverage. Common law courts wrestled with this problem for centuries and developed a time-tested solution: the doctrine of secret liens. If the debtor becomes insolvent, the doctrine of secret liens punishes secret lien holders by subordinating their claims to those of other creditors. In other words, by overriding privately negotiated payment priorities, the doctrine of secret liens creates incentives for transparency. This article argues that legal changes over the last 80 years eroded the doctrine of secret liens, and …

So He Huffed And He Puffed........But Will The Home(Stead) Fall Down?: The Applicability Of Section 522(P)(1) Of The U.S. Bankruptcy Code To Varying Interest Accumulation Of The Debtor In Homestead Property, Gloria J. Liddell, Pearson Liddell

Pearson Liddell Jr.

No abstract provided.

The Shadow Bankruptcy System, Jonathan C. Lipson

Jonathan C. Lipson

This article exposes and explores a puzzle at the heart of the current economic crisis: The surprising under-use, and increasing misuse, of Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, the principal legal system for salvaging troubled businesses.

The answer offered here: The rise of the shadow bankruptcy system. “Shadow bankruptcy” describes the severely under-regulated non-bank financial institutions (e.g., hedge funds, private equity funds and investment banks) that increasingly dominate and manipulate Chapter 11 reorganizations.

Like the “shadow banking” system for which it is named, shadow bankruptcy thrives on and promotes opacity and undisclosed, possibly perverse, incentives. Shadow bankruptcy players …