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Articles 31 - 60 of 164

Full-Text Articles in Law

Regulating The Moneychangers, Jerry W. Markham Jan 2016

Regulating The Moneychangers, Jerry W. Markham

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


Treating The New European Disease Of Consumer Debt In A Post-Communist State: The Groundbreaking New Russian Personal Insolvency Law, Jason J. Kilborn Jan 2016

Treating The New European Disease Of Consumer Debt In A Post-Communist State: The Groundbreaking New Russian Personal Insolvency Law, Jason J. Kilborn

Brooklyn Journal of International Law

This article examines the tumultuous transition from restrictive Communism to the debt-fueled consumer economy of modern Russia. In particular, it surveys Russia’s legal response to severe debt distress, situating it in the context of nearly one thousand years of historical development. Effective 1 October 2015, Russia finally joined most of its European neighbors in adopting a personal bankruptcy law, with characteristics that reflect both evolving international best practices and a series of lessons not learned. This article offers the first detailed exposition in English of the two steps forward represented by this new law, as well as an evaluation of …


Inside Safe Assets, Anna Gelpern, Erik F. Gerding Jan 2016

Inside Safe Assets, Anna Gelpern, Erik F. Gerding

Publications

“Safe assets” is a catch-all term to describe financial contracts that market participants treat as if they were risk-free. These may include government debt, bank deposits, and asset-backed securities, among others. The International Monetary Fund estimated potential safe assets at more than $114 trillion worldwide in 2011, more than seven times the U.S. economic output that year.

To treat any contract as if it were risk-free seems delusional after apparently super-safe public and private debt markets collapsed overnight. Nonetheless, safe asset supply and demand have been invoked to explain shadow banking, financial crises, and prolonged economic stagnation. The economic literature …


Sovereign Debt: Now What?, Anna Gelpern Jan 2016

Sovereign Debt: Now What?, Anna Gelpern

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The sovereign debt restructuring regime looks like it is coming apart. Changing patterns of capital flows, old creditors’ weakening commitment to past practices, and other stakeholders’ inability to take over, or coalesce behind a viable alternative, have challenged the regime from the moment it took shape in the mid-1990s. By 2016, its survival cannot be taken for granted. Crises in Argentina, Greece, and Ukraine since 2010 exposed the regime’s perennial failures and new shortcomings. Until an alternative emerges, there may be messier, more protracted restructurings, more demands on public resources, and more pressure on national courts to intervene in disputes …


Beyond Options, Edward R. Morrison, Anthony J. Casey Jan 2016

Beyond Options, Edward R. Morrison, Anthony J. Casey

Faculty Scholarship

Scholars and policymakers now debate reforms that would prevent a bankruptcy filing from being a moment that forces valuation of the firm, crystallization of claims against it, and elimination of junior stakeholders’ interest in future appreciation in firm value. These reforms have many names, ranging from Relative Priority to Redemption Option Value. Much of the debate centers on the extent to which reform would protect the non-bankruptcy options of junior stakeholders, or harm the non-bankruptcy options of senior lenders. We argue that this focus on options misplaced. Protecting options is neither necessary nor sufficient for advancing the goal of a …


Felonious, Erroneous, It’S All Odious: A Story Of Debt Gone Wrong, Virginia M. Brown Nov 2015

Felonious, Erroneous, It’S All Odious: A Story Of Debt Gone Wrong, Virginia M. Brown

Fordham Law Review

Iraq is paying off debt from Saddam Hussein’s rule. South Africa is paying off debt obligations incurred under apartheid rule. Argentina is renegotiating debts that can be traced back to a de facto military-civilian regime that was ousted in 1976. There are numerous examples in which sovereigns are paying off debts that previous governing regimes incurred while oppressing their citizens. Should sovereigns be obligated to pay these debts? Were the debts really incurred by the sovereign or were they incurred by the governing regime in question? What if the lender knew in advance what the proceeds would be used for? …


Section 542(C) Of The Bankruptcy Reform Act Of 1978 And Section 4-303 Of The Ucc: A Less Than Perfect Fit?, John P. Finan Jul 2015

Section 542(C) Of The Bankruptcy Reform Act Of 1978 And Section 4-303 Of The Ucc: A Less Than Perfect Fit?, John P. Finan

Akron Law Review

The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) 4-303 addresses two areas where the UCC and the Bankruptcy Code intersect. The first relates to the vulnerability of drawee banks that honor checks after their customer has taken bankruptcy (has filed a voluntary petition or is the defendant in an involuntary case); the second relates to the timing of transfers made by check under 547 of the Bankruptcy Code (the preference section). In both areas there is a less than perfect fit between the Bankruptcy Code and UCC 4-303. The first area poses problems for practitioners whose clients have received notice of bankruptcy in …


Not So Secure: Should Social Security Benefits Be Considered In The Good Faith Analysis Under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(A)(3)?, Casey J. Davis Jun 2015

Not So Secure: Should Social Security Benefits Be Considered In The Good Faith Analysis Under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(A)(3)?, Casey J. Davis

Akron Law Review

Part II of this Comment provides background information about Chapter 13 bankruptcy. This section is important because it provides a foundation for the remainder of this Comment. Part III of this Comment explores the source of this split and how the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”) has affected this issue. Within Part III, this Comment will discuss why Congress enacted BAPCPA, the largest overhaul of bankruptcy law since its origin, and why BAPCPA did not affect the good faith requirement under § 1325(a)(3) even though BAPCPA drastically altered bankruptcy law. In addition, this section also …


Bankruptcy Law As A Liquidity Provider, Kenneth Ayotte, David Skeel Jun 2015

Bankruptcy Law As A Liquidity Provider, Kenneth Ayotte, David Skeel

Kenneth Ayotte

Since the outset of the recent financial crisis, liquidity problems have been cited as the cause behind the bankruptcies and near bankruptcies of numerous firms, ranging from Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers in 2008 to Kodak more recently. This paper expands the prevailing normative theory of corporate bankruptcy — the Creditors’ Bargain theory — to include a role for bankruptcy as a provider of liquidity. The Creditors’ Bargain theory argues that bankruptcy law should be limited to solving problems caused by multiple, uncoordinated creditors, but focuses almost exclusively on the problem of creditor runs. We argue that two well-known problems …


Making Sense Of Successor Liability, Marie T. Reilly Jun 2015

Making Sense Of Successor Liability, Marie T. Reilly

Marie T. Reilly

A firm that buys assets from another firm ordinarily does not acquire liability to the seller's creditors simply by buying its assets. This ordinary rule is subject to important exceptions. The buyer's consent triggers an exception. If a buyer agrees to assume the seller's liability to third parties, it is for that reason liable. This article considers a more controversial exception - successor liability. When a court decides that an asset acquirer should be treated as a "successor" to the transferor, it is liable for the transferor's debts as though it were the transferor.


The New Synthesis Of Bank Regulation And Bankruptcy In The Dodd-Frank Era, David A. Skeel Jr. May 2015

The New Synthesis Of Bank Regulation And Bankruptcy In The Dodd-Frank Era, David A. Skeel Jr.

All Faculty Scholarship

Since the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, U.S. bank regulation and bankruptcy have become far more closely intertwined. In this Article, I ask whether the new synthesis of bank regulation and bankruptcy is coherent, and whether it is likely to prove effective.

I begin by exploring some of the basic differences between bank resolution, which is a highly administrative process in the U.S., and bankruptcy, which relies more on courts and the parties themselves. I then focus on a series of remarkable new innovations designed to facilitate the rapid recapitalization of systemically important financial institutions: convertible contingent capital …


The Failed Reform: Congressional Crackdown On Repeat Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Filers, Sara Sternberg Greene Jan 2015

The Failed Reform: Congressional Crackdown On Repeat Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Filers, Sara Sternberg Greene

Faculty Scholarship

After decades of lobbying to “get tough” on bankruptcy repeat filers, Congress passed the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA). The Bankruptcy Code now requires that the automatic stay, which prevents creditors from pursuing the property of bankruptcy debtors, expires after thirty days for petitioners who file for bankruptcy within one year of a previously failed petition. Debtors can file a motion to extend the stay, but there is a presumption of a bad faith filing, only overcome if a debtor can show there has been a “substantial change in his or her financial or personal …


Derivatives And Collateral: Balancing Remedies And Systemic Risk, Steven L. Schwarcz Jan 2015

Derivatives And Collateral: Balancing Remedies And Systemic Risk, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

U.S. bankruptcy law grants special rights and immunities to creditors in derivatives transactions, including virtually unlimited enforcement rights. This Article examines whether exempting those transactions from bankruptcy’s automatic stay, including the stay of foreclosure actions against collateral, is necessary or appropriate in order to minimize systemic risk.


4th And 205: How A Rush Of Global Comments Blocked The Sec’S First Attempted Punt Of Attorney-Client Privilege Under Sarbanes-Oxley, John Paul Lucci Dec 2014

4th And 205: How A Rush Of Global Comments Blocked The Sec’S First Attempted Punt Of Attorney-Client Privilege Under Sarbanes-Oxley, John Paul Lucci

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.


Survey 2014: Bankruptcy + Student Loan Debt Crisis, Brenda Beauchamp, Jason R. Cooper Oct 2014

Survey 2014: Bankruptcy + Student Loan Debt Crisis, Brenda Beauchamp, Jason R. Cooper

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.


Secured Credit And Insolvency Law In Argentina And The U.S.: Gaining Insight From A Comparative Perspective, Guillermo A. Moglia Claps, Julian B. Mcdonnell Oct 2014

Secured Credit And Insolvency Law In Argentina And The U.S.: Gaining Insight From A Comparative Perspective, Guillermo A. Moglia Claps, Julian B. Mcdonnell

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.


The Orderly Liquidation Authority: Fanatical Or Familiar? Idealistic Or Unrealistic?, Stephanie P. Massman Sep 2014

The Orderly Liquidation Authority: Fanatical Or Familiar? Idealistic Or Unrealistic?, Stephanie P. Massman

Stephanie P Massman

The systemic financial crisis of 2008 spurred the failure of numerous financial and non-financial entities. Regulators addressed each of these failures on an ad hoc ex-post basis, granting multiple bailouts in various forms. The refusal to extend these bailouts to one firm, Lehman Brothers, however, caused further panic and contagion throughout the already unstable market as one of the largest financial institutions of the U.S. underwent an extremely lengthy and value-destructive Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Criticism surrounding not only the bailouts, but also the decision to allow Lehman to fail under the Bankruptcy Code, led to the inclusion of the Orderly …


Reframing International Financial Regulation After The Global Financial Crisis: Rational States And Interdependence, Not Regulatory Networks And Soft Law, Matthew C. Turk Sep 2014

Reframing International Financial Regulation After The Global Financial Crisis: Rational States And Interdependence, Not Regulatory Networks And Soft Law, Matthew C. Turk

Michigan Journal of International Law

The British bank Northern Rock failed on September 14, 2007; U.S. investment bank Bear Stearns collapsed on March 17, 2008 and was subject to a government-engineered takeover by J.P. Morgan Chase; and, on the night of September 15, 2008, U.S. investment bank Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy and sent global financial markets into disarray the following Monday morning. These financial institutions shared several features in common prior to their downfall, but perhaps the most curious is that they were each considered fully compliant with the second generation framework for the Basel Accords on Capital Adequacy (Basel II), an international agreement …


Against Regulatory Displacement: An Institutional Analysis Of Financial Crises, Jonathan C. Lipson Aug 2014

Against Regulatory Displacement: An Institutional Analysis Of Financial Crises, Jonathan C. Lipson

Jonathan C. Lipson

This paper uses “institutional analysis”—the study of the relative capacities of markets, courts, and regulators—to make three claims about financial crises.

First, financial crises are increasingly a problem of “regulatory displacement.” Through the ad hoc rescues of 2008 and the Dodd-Frank reforms of 2010, regulators displace market and judicial processes that ordinarily prevent financial distress from becoming financial crises. Because regulators are vulnerable to capture by large financial services firms, however, they cannot address the pathologies that create crises: market concentration and complexity. Indeed, regulators may inadvertently aggravate these conditions through resolution tactics that consolidate firms, and the volume and …


Reward The Stalking Horse Or Preserve The Estate: Determining The Appropriate Standard Of Review For Awarding Break-Up Fees In § 363 Sales, Zachary Frimet Aug 2014

Reward The Stalking Horse Or Preserve The Estate: Determining The Appropriate Standard Of Review For Awarding Break-Up Fees In § 363 Sales, Zachary Frimet

Zachary Frimet

Following the surge of bankruptcies in the wake of the Great Recession, a growing and somewhat controversial trend has emerged whereby companies seeking to purchase a debtor’s assets in bankruptcy frequently make use of Section 363 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (“§ 363”). In general, § 363 sales are accomplished via public auction. This aspect of § 363 exposes initial bidders, known in bankruptcy as “stalking horses bidders”, to the risk that they will commit time and resources in pursuit of the acquisition and yet fail to succeed as the prevailing bidder. To hedge against this risk, stalking horse …


Debt-Buyer Lawsuits And Inaccurate Data, Peter A. Holland Apr 2014

Debt-Buyer Lawsuits And Inaccurate Data, Peter A. Holland

Faculty Scholarship

Pursuant to secret purchase and sale agreements (also known as forward flow agreements), the accounts that banks sell to debt buyers are often sold “as is,” with explicit and emphatic disclaimers that the debts may not be owed, the amounts claimed may not be accurate, and documentation may be missing. Despite their full knowledge that the accuracy and completeness of the data has been specifically disclaimed by the bank, when they sue consumers, debt buyers tell courts that the information obtained from the bank is inherently reliable and accurate. In order to avoid a fraud on the courts, the contents …


Debt-Buyer Lawsuits And Inaccurate Data, Peter A. Holland Mar 2014

Debt-Buyer Lawsuits And Inaccurate Data, Peter A. Holland

Peter A. Holland

Pursuant to secret purchase and sale agreements (also known as forward flow agreements), the accounts that banks sell to debt buyers are often sold “as is,” with explicit and emphatic disclaimers that the debts may not be owed, the amounts claimed may not be accurate, and documentation may be missing. Despite their full knowledge that the accuracy and completeness of the data has been specifically disclaimed by the bank, when they sue consumers, debt buyers tell courts that the information obtained from the bank is inherently reliable and accurate. In order to avoid a fraud on the courts, the contents …


Single Point Of Entry And The Bankruptcy Alternative, David A. Skeel Jr. Feb 2014

Single Point Of Entry And The Bankruptcy Alternative, David A. Skeel Jr.

All Faculty Scholarship

This Essay, which will appear in Across the Great Divide: New Perspectives on the Financial Crisis, a Brookings Institution and Hoover Institution book, begins with a brief overview of concerns raised by the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy about the adequacy of our existing architecture for resolving the financial distress of systemically important financial institutions. The principal takeaway of the first section is that Title II as enacted left most of these issues unanswered. By contrast, the FDIC’s new single point of entry strategy, which is introduced in the second section, can be seen as addressing nearly all of them. The …


A People’S History Of Collective Action Clauses, Mark C. Weidemaier, Mitu Gulati Jan 2014

A People’S History Of Collective Action Clauses, Mark C. Weidemaier, Mitu Gulati

Faculty Scholarship

For two decades, collective action clauses (CACs) have been part of the official-sector response to sovereign debt crisis, justified by claims that these clauses can help prevent bailouts and shift the burden of restructuring onto the private sector. Reform efforts in the 1990s and 2000s focused on CACs. So do efforts in the Eurozone today. CACs have even been suggested as the cure for the US municipal bond market. But bonds without CACs are still issued in major markets, so reformers feel obliged to explain why they know better. Over time, a narrative has emerged to justify pro-CAC reforms. It …


Securitization Of Aberrant Contract Receivables, Thomas E. Plank Jan 2014

Securitization Of Aberrant Contract Receivables, Thomas E. Plank

Chicago-Kent Law Review

Originators of traditional receivables, such as automobile loans, use securitization and structured finance debt transactions to obtain financing at lower net costs than traditional secured financing. The typical securitization or structured finance debt transaction combines (i) a sale of receivables to a separate, bankruptcy remote, special purpose legal entity (an “SPE”) and (ii) a loan to the SPE secured by the receivables. This combination produces lower net financing costs because the SPE’s lender can obtain repayment of its loan from the receivables while avoiding the costs that the Bankruptcy Code imposes on direct secured lenders to originators that could become …


The Bankruptcy Code’S Safe Harbors For Settlement Payments And Securities Contracts: When Is Safe Too Safe?, Charles W. Mooney Jr. Jan 2014

The Bankruptcy Code’S Safe Harbors For Settlement Payments And Securities Contracts: When Is Safe Too Safe?, Charles W. Mooney Jr.

All Faculty Scholarship

This Article addresses insolvency law-related issues in connection with certain financial-markets contracts, such as securities contracts, commodity contracts, forward contracts, repurchase agreements (repos), swaps and other derivatives, and master netting agreements. The Bankruptcy Code provides special treatment—safe harbors—for these contracts (collectively, qualified financial contracts or QFCs). This special treatment is considerably more favorable for nondebtor parties to QFCs than the rules applicable to nondebtor parties to other contracts with a debtor. Yet even some strong critics of the safe harbors concede that some special treatment may be warranted. This Article offers a critique of the safe harbor for settlement payments, …


Clearinghouses As Liquidity Partitioning, Richard Squire Jan 2014

Clearinghouses As Liquidity Partitioning, Richard Squire

Faculty Scholarship

To reduce the risk of another financial crisis, the Dodd-Frank Act requires that trading in certain derivatives be backed by clearinghouses. Critics mount two main objections: a clearinghouse shifts risk instead of reducing it; and a clearinghouse could fail, requiring a bailout. This Article’s observation that clearinghouses engage in liquidity partitioning answers both. Liquidity partitioning means that when one of its member firms becomes bankrupt, a clearinghouse keeps a portion of the firm’s most liquid assets, and a matching portion of its short-term debt, out of the bankruptcy estate. The clearinghouse then applies the first toward immediate repayment of the …


Rollover Risk: Ideating A U.S. Debt Default, Steven L. Schwarcz Jan 2014

Rollover Risk: Ideating A U.S. Debt Default, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

This article examines how a U.S. debt default might occur, how it could be avoided, its potential consequences if not avoided, and how those consequences could be mitigated. To that end, the article differentiates defaults caused by insolvency from defaults caused by illiquidity. The latter, which are potentiated by rollover risk (the risk that the government will be temporarily unable to borrow sufficient funds to repay its maturing debt), are not only plausible but have occurred in the past. Moreover, the ongoing controversy over the federal debt ceiling and the rise of the shadow-banking system make these types of defaults …


The Bankruptcy-Law Safe Harbor For Derivatives: A Path-Dependence Analysis, Steven L. Schwarcz, Ori Sharon Jan 2014

The Bankruptcy-Law Safe Harbor For Derivatives: A Path-Dependence Analysis, Steven L. Schwarcz, Ori Sharon

Faculty Scholarship

U.S. bankruptcy law grants special rights and immunities to creditors in derivatives transactions, including virtually unlimited enforcement rights. This article argues that these rights and immunities result from a form of path dependence, a sequence of industry-lobbied legislative steps, each incremental and in turn serving as apparent justification for the next step, without a rigorous and systematic vetting of the consequences. Because the resulting “safe harbor” has not been fully vetted, its significance and utility should not be taken for granted; and thus regulators, legislators, and other policymakers—whether in the United States or abroad—should not automatically assume, based on its …


Derivatives And Collateral: Balancing Remedies And Systemic Risk, Steven L. Schwarcz Jan 2014

Derivatives And Collateral: Balancing Remedies And Systemic Risk, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.