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Banking and Finance

Todd Henderson

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Full-Text Articles in Law

¬Reverse Regulatory Arbitrage: An Auction Approach To Regulatory Assignments, Todd Henderson, Fred Tung Aug 2012

¬Reverse Regulatory Arbitrage: An Auction Approach To Regulatory Assignments, Todd Henderson, Fred Tung

Todd Henderson

In the years before the Financial Crisis, banks got to pick their regulators, engaging in a form of regulatory arbitrage that we now know was a race to the bottom. We propose to turn the tables on the banks by allowing regulators, specifically, bank examiners, to choose the banks they regulate. We call this “reverse regulatory arbitrage,” and we think it can help improve regulatory outcomes. Building on our prior work that proposes to pay bank examiners for performance—by giving them financial incentives to avoid bank failures—we argue that bank supervisory assignments should be set through an auction among examiners. …


Pay For Regulator Performance, Todd Henderson, Frederick Tung Sep 2011

Pay For Regulator Performance, Todd Henderson, Frederick Tung

Todd Henderson

Few doubt that executive compensation arrangements encouraged the excessive risk taking by banks that led to the recent Financial Crisis. Accordingly, academics and lawmakers have called for the reform of banker pay practices. In this Article, we argue that regulator pay is to blame as well, and that fixing it may be easier and more effective than reforming banker pay. Regulatory failures during the Financial Crisis resulted at least in part from a lack of sufficient incentives for examiners to act aggressively to prevent excessive risk. Bank regulators are rarely paid for performance, and in atypical cases involving performance bonus …


Pay For Regulator Performance, Todd Henderson, Fred Tung Aug 2011

Pay For Regulator Performance, Todd Henderson, Fred Tung

Todd Henderson

Few doubt that executive compensation arrangements encouraged the excessive risk taking by banks that led to the recent Financial Crisis. Accordingly, academics and lawmakers have called for the reform of banker pay practices. In this Article, we argue that regulator pay is to blame as well, and that fixing it may be easier and more effective than reforming banker pay. Regulatory failures during the Financial Crisis resulted at least in part from a lack of sufficient incentives for examiners to act aggressively to prevent excessive risk. Bank regulators are rarely paid for performance, and in atypical cases involving performance bonus …


Do Accounting Rules Matter? The Dangerous Allure Of Mark To Market, Todd Henderson, Richard Epstein Sep 2010

Do Accounting Rules Matter? The Dangerous Allure Of Mark To Market, Todd Henderson, Richard Epstein

Todd Henderson

This paper examines the relative strength of two imperfect accounting rules: historical cost and mark to market. The manifest inaccuracy of historical cost is well known, and, paradoxically one source of its hidden strength. Because private parties know of its evident weaknesses they look elsewhere for information. In contrast, mark to market for hard-to-value assets has many hidden weaknesses. In this paper we show how it creates asset bubbles and exacerbate their negative collateral consequences once they burst. It does the former by allowing banks to adopt generous valuations in up-markets that increase their lending capacity. It does the latter …


Do Accounting Rules Matter? The Dangerous Allure Of Mark To Market, Todd Henderson, Richard Epstein Sep 2010

Do Accounting Rules Matter? The Dangerous Allure Of Mark To Market, Todd Henderson, Richard Epstein

Todd Henderson

This paper examines the relative strength of two imperfect accounting rules: historical cost and mark to market. The manifest inaccuracy of historical cost is well known, and, paradoxically one source of its hidden strength. Because private parties know of its evident weaknesses they look elsewhere for information. In contrast, mark to market for hard-to-value assets has many hidden weaknesses. In this paper we show how it creates asset bubbles and exacerbate their negative collateral consequences once they burst. It does the former by allowing banks to adopt generous valuations in up-markets that increase their lending capacity. It does the latter …


Do Accounting Rules Matter? The Dangerous Allure Of Mark To Market, Todd Henderson Aug 2010

Do Accounting Rules Matter? The Dangerous Allure Of Mark To Market, Todd Henderson

Todd Henderson

This paper examines the relative strength of two imperfect accounting rules: historical cost and mark to market. The manifest inaccuracy of historical cost is well known, and, paradoxically one source of its hidden strength. Because private parties know of its evident weaknesses they look elsewhere for information. In contrast, mark to market for hard-to-value assets has many hidden weaknesses. In this paper we show how it creates asset bubbles and exacerbate their negative collateral consequences once they burst. It does the former by allowing banks to adopt generous valuations in up-markets that increase their lending capacity. It does the latter …


Do Accounting Rules Matter? The Dangerous Allure Of Mark To Market, Todd Henderson Aug 2010

Do Accounting Rules Matter? The Dangerous Allure Of Mark To Market, Todd Henderson

Todd Henderson

This paper examines the relative strength of two imperfect accounting rules: historical cost and mark to market. The manifest inaccuracy of historical cost is well known, and, paradoxically one source of its hidden strength. Because private parties know of its evident weaknesses they look elsewhere for information. In contrast, mark to market for hard-to-value assets has many hidden weaknesses. In this paper we show how it creates asset bubbles and exacerbate their negative collateral consequences once they burst. It does the former by allowing banks to adopt generous valuations in up-markets that increase their lending capacity. It does the latter …