Law Commons^™

Omnibus Trade And Competitiveness Act Of 1988: Putting The Brakes On Foreign Investment, Christopher J. Foreman

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

The Shrews That Tame Wall Street?, Mehrsa Baradaran

Popular Media

Although plenty of men are whistleblowers and financial reformers, too, the ones making the most noise are women. Women are significantly underrepresented in Wall Street firms as well as in Congress and the regulatory agencies.

Theories And Practices Of Islamic Finance And Exchange Laws: Poverty Of Interest, Ahmed E. Souaiaia

Ahmed E SOUAIAIA

Transforming China's Traditional Banking Systems Under The New National Banking Laws, Andrew X. Qian

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

Against Regulatory Displacement: An Institutional Analysis Of Financial Crises, Jonathan C. Lipson

Jonathan C. Lipson

This paper uses “institutional analysis”—the study of the relative capacities of markets, courts, and regulators—to make three claims about financial crises.

First, financial crises are increasingly a problem of “regulatory displacement.” Through the ad hoc rescues of 2008 and the Dodd-Frank reforms of 2010, regulators displace market and judicial processes that ordinarily prevent financial distress from becoming financial crises. Because regulators are vulnerable to capture by large financial services firms, however, they cannot address the pathologies that create crises: market concentration and complexity. Indeed, regulators may inadvertently aggravate these conditions through resolution tactics that consolidate firms, and the volume and …

Dodd-Frank’S Risk Retention Requirement: The Incentive Problem, Amy L. Mcintire

Amy L. McIntire

On July 21, 2010, President Barack Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act into law (Dodd-Frank). Promulgated by Congress to promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, the bill represented an almost complete overhaul of the entire financial regulation system. Specifically, a provision in the bill mandated that securitizers “retain not less than five percent of the credit risk for any asset,” and this requirement became known as the “risk retention requirement.” Legislators hoped that, by forcing securitizers to hold onto a percentage of the risk …

Libor: Everything You Ever Wanted To Know But Were Afraid To Ask, Michael R. Koblenz, Kenneth M. Labbate, Carrie C. Turner

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

The goal of this article is to present the reader with a general overview of the LIBOR: its genesis and development, how and why London bankers manipulated the LIBOR, the liability of implicated parties, criminal penalties, the impact of criminal penalties on director and officer insurance carriers, and what the future holds for the LIBOR.

Drastic Times Call For Drastic Risk Measures: Why Value-At-Risk Is (Still) A Flawed Preventative Of Financial Crises And What Regulators Can Do About It, Andrew L. Mcelroy

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

Bank regulators recently proposed the most fundamental reforms to U.S. banking law in decades, yet the value-at-risk statistic--replete with known deficiencies--remains the basis of the capital adequacy requirement. Consequently, there exists an unresolved tension in the law: the purpose of the banking rules is to require riskier financial institutions to hold additional capital, yet the value-at-risk statistic used to make this assessment induces a perverse incentive to hold the riskiest securities. Overlaid on this framework is the wide latitude afforded to banks in designing their value-at-risk models. This Article explores foreseeable issues with the regulatory reliance on value-at-risk. Moreover, it …

A Preliminary Look At State Structures For Regulating Financial Services, Elizabeth F. Brown

Elizabeth F Brown

Within the past thirty-five years approximately fifty nations have consolidated their financial regulatory agencies into either a single integrated agency or into two semi-integrated agencies. The United States has resisted this trend, due in part to a concern that the costs of such significant consolidation would exceed its benefits. The existing studies that compare the costs of the consolidated regulators around the world with the United States regime have often been discounted because they have been unable to control for differences in culture and regulatory intensity between those other countries and the United States. This article attempts to address this …

The Icc's Exit Problem, Rebecca Hamilton

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

The International Criminal Court (ICC) was never meant to supplant the domestic prosecution of international crimes. And yet the Court is now entering its second decade of operations in four African nations, with no plan for exit in sight. This Article identifies the looming need for the ICC to consider when and how to exit situations in which it is currently active. In addition to the normative concern that a failure to start planning for exit undercuts the Court’s placement within a system of complementarity, the need to consider exit is also driven by a financial imperative. The Court’s caseload …

The Impossible, Highly Desired Islamic Bank, Haider Ala Hamoudi

Articles

The purpose of this Article is to explore, and explain the stubborn persistence of, a central paradox that is endemic to the retail Islamic bank as it operates in the United States. The paradox is that retail Islamic banking in the United States is impossible, and yet it remains highly desired. It is impossible because the principles that are supposed to underlie the practice of Islamic finance deal with the trading of assets and the equitable sharing of risks, profits and losses among bank, depositor and portfolio investment. It is true that much of this can be, and is, circumvented …