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Bank regulation

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Full-Text Articles in Law

Regulatory Managerialism Inaction: A Case Study Of Bank Regulation And Climate Change, Hilary J. Allen Feb 2023

Regulatory Managerialism Inaction: A Case Study Of Bank Regulation And Climate Change, Hilary J. Allen

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

In November of 2029, Hurricane Penelope struck New York City as a category two storm. Work had started on a wall to protect Manhattan from rising sea levels and storm surges, but the work was incomplete, and significant damage to Manhattan real estate was sustained. While almost all that real estate was insured, insurance companies were compromised by the sheer magnitude of the losses. Even with significant federal subsidies, they were unable to meet their full commitments on insurance policies. Some commercial real estate firms, who had never really recovered from the shift to remote working during the Covid pandemic, …


Why Financial Regulation Keeps Falling Short, Dan Awrey, Kathryn Judge Jan 2020

Why Financial Regulation Keeps Falling Short, Dan Awrey, Kathryn Judge

Faculty Scholarship

This article argues that there is a fundamental mismatch between the nature of finance and current approaches to financial regulation. Today’s financial system is a dynamic and complex ecosystem. For these and other reasons, policy makers and market actors regularly have only a fraction of the information that may be pertinent to decisions they are making. The processes governing financial regulation, however, implicitly assume a high degree of knowability, stability, and predictability. Through two case studies and other examples, this article examines how this mismatch undermines financial stability and other policy aims. This examination further reveals that the procedural rules …


The Banking/Commercial Separation Doctrine In Comparative Perspective, Cristie Ford Apr 2019

The Banking/Commercial Separation Doctrine In Comparative Perspective, Cristie Ford

All Faculty Publications

This report, prepared for the Department of Finance, Government of Canada, summarizes research undertaken across five jurisdictions – Australia, Japan, Singapore, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US, federal level only) – with respect to a particular kind of boundary on the business of banking: the separation of banking business from commercial business. “Commercial” here means the provision of non-financial goods and services. This separation exists under what in the United States has long been referred to as the “banking/commercial separation doctrine”. The report considers the historical justifications for the doctrine in the context of the modern “business …


Safety First: The Deceptive Allure Of Full Reserve Banking, Morgan Ricks Jan 2016

Safety First: The Deceptive Allure Of Full Reserve Banking, Morgan Ricks

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

In Safe Banking, Professor Adam Levitin joins a venerable tradition in the money and banking literature. That tradition, called full reserve banking, has claimed a number of illustrious supporters over the years, including Professors Irving Fisher, Henry Simons, and Milton Friedman. The basic idea of full re­serve banking is seductive in its simplicity: "banks" should own nothing but physical cash. Because a full reserve bank has no in­vestments, it can suffer no investment losses. A run on such a bank would be harmless, because the bank would never fail to meet redemptions (barring any loss or theft of cash). The …


The New Synthesis Of Bank Regulation And Bankruptcy In The Dodd-Frank Era, David A. Skeel Jr. May 2015

The New Synthesis Of Bank Regulation And Bankruptcy In The Dodd-Frank Era, David A. Skeel Jr.

All Faculty Scholarship

Since the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, U.S. bank regulation and bankruptcy have become far more closely intertwined. In this Article, I ask whether the new synthesis of bank regulation and bankruptcy is coherent, and whether it is likely to prove effective.

I begin by exploring some of the basic differences between bank resolution, which is a highly administrative process in the U.S., and bankruptcy, which relies more on courts and the parties themselves. I then focus on a series of remarkable new innovations designed to facilitate the rapid recapitalization of systemically important financial institutions: convertible contingent capital …


The Volcker Rule And Evolving Financial Markets, Charles K. Whitehead Feb 2015

The Volcker Rule And Evolving Financial Markets, Charles K. Whitehead

Charles K Whitehead

The Volcker Rule prohibits proprietary trading by banking entities - in effect, reintroducing to the financial markets a substantial portion of the Glass-Steagall Act’s static divide between banks and securities firms. This Article argues that the Glass-Steagall model is a fixture of the past - a financial Maginot Line within an evolving financial system. To be effective, new financial regulation must reflect new relationships in the marketplace. For the Volcker Rule, those relationships include a growing reliance by banks on new market participants to conduct traditional banking functions. Proprietary trading has moved to less-regulated businesses, in many cases, to hedge …


Bank Regulation And Securitization: How The Law Improved Transmission Lines Between Real Estate And Banking Crises, Erik F. Gerding Jan 2015

Bank Regulation And Securitization: How The Law Improved Transmission Lines Between Real Estate And Banking Crises, Erik F. Gerding

Publications

This essay examines how securitization served as a new coupling rod joining cycles in real estate and banking markets and created a new pathway for financial contagion in the “subprime” financial crisis. Legal changes promoted the growth of securitization and improved this crisis transmission line. The essay examines the history of legislative and regulatory changes that facilitated bank participation in the markets for mortgage-backed securities. The essay then explains how securitization failed to mitigate the credit, liquidity, and interest rate risk associated with real estate when losses in residential markets became correlated nationwide. It then discusses how regulation contributed to …


Private And Public Ordering In Safe Asset Markets, Anna Gelpern, Erik F. Gerding Jan 2015

Private And Public Ordering In Safe Asset Markets, Anna Gelpern, Erik F. Gerding

Publications

An influential literature in economics explores the phenomenon of “safe assets” – when participants across financial markets act “as if” certain debt is risk free – as well as its role in the global financial crisis and its implications for post-crisis reform.

We highlight the role of private ordering in constructing safe assets. Private ordering, including contractual devices and transaction structures, contributes to the creation of these debt contracts, to their collective treatment in financial markets as low risk investments, and to the making of deep and liquid markets in them. These contracts and transaction structures also provide a template …


Drastic Times Call For Drastic Risk Measures: Why Value-At-Risk Is (Still) A Flawed Preventative Of Financial Crises And What Regulators Can Do About It, Andrew L. Mcelroy Jan 2014

Drastic Times Call For Drastic Risk Measures: Why Value-At-Risk Is (Still) A Flawed Preventative Of Financial Crises And What Regulators Can Do About It, Andrew L. Mcelroy

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

Bank regulators recently proposed the most fundamental reforms to U.S. banking law in decades, yet the value-at-risk statistic--replete with known deficiencies--remains the basis of the capital adequacy requirement. Consequently, there exists an unresolved tension in the law: the purpose of the banking rules is to require riskier financial institutions to hold additional capital, yet the value-at-risk statistic used to make this assessment induces a perverse incentive to hold the riskiest securities. Overlaid on this framework is the wide latitude afforded to banks in designing their value-at-risk models. This Article explores foreseeable issues with the regulatory reliance on value-at-risk. Moreover, it …


Dismantling Large Bank Holding Companies For Their Own Good And For The Good Of The Country, Tamar Frankel Mar 2013

Dismantling Large Bank Holding Companies For Their Own Good And For The Good Of The Country, Tamar Frankel

Faculty Scholarship

This paper suggests that bank holding companies are in fact “financial malls.” I demonstrates the problems that they pose for the financial system, not only by size but by inefficient and inappropriate concentration. The article suggests restructuring of bank holding companies by introducing more market discipline to the various “shops” in the mall as well as concentrating services for the purpose of efficiency. The Article concludes with suggestion that rather than imposing a restructure by law it may perhaps be possible to entice managements that look to the long-term future to follow a restructure voluntarily.


Epic Fail: An Institutional Analysis Of Financial Distress, Jonathan C. Lipson Aug 2012

Epic Fail: An Institutional Analysis Of Financial Distress, Jonathan C. Lipson

Jonathan C. Lipson

This paper presents an institutional analysis of financial distress. “Institutional analysis” compares the effectiveness of large-scale processes, such as markets, courts, and governments, at solving social problems. Although financial distress is one of our most acute problems, there has been virtually no effort to analyze it from an institutional perspective. This paper begins to fill that gap.

Institutional analysis shows that, contrary to conventional wisdom, financial distress is not a problem that courts, such as bankruptcy courts, usually solve by themselves. Instead, it is increasingly a problem that political organs (whether elected or regulatory) both create and purport to resolve. …


Governing Interdependent Financial Systems: Lessons From The Vienna Initiative, Katharina Pistor Jan 2012

Governing Interdependent Financial Systems: Lessons From The Vienna Initiative, Katharina Pistor

Faculty Scholarship

Financial markets have become globally interdependent, yet their governance has remained national at the core. This friction encumbers crisis management and distorts incentives for crisis prevention. The Vienna Initiative, formed to manage the fallout from the global crisis in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), offers an alternative coordinated, multi-stakeholder governance framework. A critical prerequisite for such a regime is a coordinating agent, or ‘anchor tenant’, that is deeply vested in the stability of transnational financial systems, but does not directly compete with market actors or regulators. Lessons for more effective governance of financial interdependence are discussed.


The Volcker Rule And Evolving Financial Markets, Charles K. Whitehead Apr 2011

The Volcker Rule And Evolving Financial Markets, Charles K. Whitehead

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The Volcker Rule prohibits proprietary trading by banking entities - in effect, reintroducing to the financial markets a substantial portion of the Glass-Steagall Act’s static divide between banks and securities firms. This Article argues that the Glass-Steagall model is a fixture of the past - a financial Maginot Line within an evolving financial system. To be effective, new financial regulation must reflect new relationships in the marketplace. For the Volcker Rule, those relationships include a growing reliance by banks on new market participants to conduct traditional banking functions.

Proprietary trading has moved to less-regulated businesses, in many cases, to hedge …


Dodd-Frank For Bankruptcy Lawyers, Douglas G. Baird, Edward R. Morrison Jan 2011

Dodd-Frank For Bankruptcy Lawyers, Douglas G. Baird, Edward R. Morrison

Faculty Scholarship

The Dodd-Frank financial reform legislation creates an “Orderly Liquidation Authority” (OLA) that shares many features in common with the Bankruptcy Code. This is easy to overlook because the legislation uses a language and employs a decision-maker (both borrowed from bank regulation) that will seem foreign to bankruptcy lawyers. Our task in this essay is to identify the core congruities between OLA and the Code. In doing so, we highlight important differences and assess both their constitutionality and policy objectives. We conclude with a few thoughts on the likelihood that OLA will contribute to market stability.


Is The Public Utility Holding Company Act A Model For Breaking Up The Banks That Are Too-Big-To-Fail?, Roberta S. Karmel Sep 2010

Is The Public Utility Holding Company Act A Model For Breaking Up The Banks That Are Too-Big-To-Fail?, Roberta S. Karmel

Roberta S. Karmel

ABSTRACT FOR “IS THE PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING COMPANY ACT A MODEL FOR BREAKING UP THE BANKS THAT ARE TO-BIG-TO-FAIL?”

BY ROBERTA S. KARMEL

During the financial crisis of 2007-08 and the debates on regulatory reform that followed, there was general agreement that the “too-big-to-fail” principle creates unacceptable moral hazard. Policy makers divided, however, on the solutions to this problem. Some argued that the banking behemoths in the United States should be broken up. Others argued that dismantling the big banks would be bad policy because these banks would not be able to compete with universal banks in the global capital …


Bail-Ins Versus Bail-Outs: Using Contingent Capital To Mitigate Systemic Risk, John C. Coffee Jr. Jan 2010

Bail-Ins Versus Bail-Outs: Using Contingent Capital To Mitigate Systemic Risk, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

Because the quickest, simplest way for a financial institution to increase its profitability is to increase its leverage, an enduring tension will exist between regulators and systemically significant financial institutions over the issues of risk and leverage. Many have suggested that the 2008 financial crisis was caused because financial institutions were induced to increase leverage because of flawed systems of executive compensation. Still, there is growing evidence that shareholders acquiesced in these compensation formulas to cause managers to accept higher risk and leverage. Shareholder pressure then is a factor that could induce the failure of a systemically significant financial institution. …


Simultaneous Distress Of Residential Developers And Their Secured Lenders: An Analysis Of Bankruptcy & Bank Regulation, Sarah P. Woo Aug 2009

Simultaneous Distress Of Residential Developers And Their Secured Lenders: An Analysis Of Bankruptcy & Bank Regulation, Sarah P. Woo

Sarah P Woo

With falling home prices and home foreclosures currently acknowledged as a severe problem in the U.S., more attention needs to be paid to the contributing phenomenon of residential developers undergoing liquidation, which has left behind a trail of partially-completed or abandoned properties. In order to understand this phenomenon, we analyzed 222 residential developers that filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions between November 2007 and December 2008. We find that only a very small proportion of these developers, as compared to previous similar large studies, confirmed a reorganization plan. Most cases ended in liquidations. In the sample, 72.5% of the cases showed …


A Requiem For Sam's Bank, Ronald J. Mann Jan 2008

A Requiem For Sam's Bank, Ronald J. Mann

Faculty Scholarship

This paper situates Wal-Mart's failed application to form a banking subsidiary in the context of payments policy. Generally, I argue that permitting Wal-Mart to have a bank would have a salutary effect on the relatively uncompetitive market for payment networks. The dominant position of Visa and MasterCard, in which payments are priced above cost to subsidize credit, inevitably will give way to a world in which payment services are priced at cost, or even below cost as a loss-leader to attract customers to other goods and services. Entry into this market by Wal-Mart would be likely to spur more robust …


Wal-Mart Bank In Mexico: Money To The Masses And The Home-Host Hole, Anna Gelpern May 2007

Wal-Mart Bank In Mexico: Money To The Masses And The Home-Host Hole, Anna Gelpern

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

In November 2006 Wal-Mart's Mexican subsidiary received approval to open a bank. The application faced little opposition in Mexico, unlike the company's failed effort to start a bank in the United States. This was partly because in Mexico, Wal-Mart's entry was generally regarded as increasing competition in a historically concentrated banking sector. With over three-quarters of all Mexicans unbanked, the authorities also looked to Wal-Mart to reach the underserved. Along with the promise, Wal-Mart's entry presents a transnational regulatory dilemma with implications beyond Wal-Mart and Mexico. Because it is Wal-Mart's only banking venture, the new institution will have its Mexican …


Just Until Payday, Ronald J. Mann, Jim Hawkins Jan 2007

Just Until Payday, Ronald J. Mann, Jim Hawkins

Faculty Scholarship

The growth of payday lending markets during the last fifteen years has been the focus of substantial regulatory attention both in the United States and abroad, producing a dizzying array of initiatives by federal and state policymakers. Those initiatives have had conflicting purposes – some have sought to remove barriers to entry while others have sought to impose limits on the business. As is often the case in banking markets, the resulting patchwork of federal and state laws poses a problem when one state is able to dictate the practices of a national industry. For most of this industry's life, …


Basel Ii And The Need For Bank Distress Resolution Procedures, Clas Wihlborg Jan 2005

Basel Ii And The Need For Bank Distress Resolution Procedures, Clas Wihlborg

Business Faculty Articles and Research

It is argued that without increased market discipline Basel II is not likely to resolve the regulatory problem caused by explicit and implicit guarantees of depositors and other creditors of banks. One way to enhance market discipline is to implement proposals for mandatory subordinated debt. For these proposals to achieve their objective, the non-insurance of holders of subordinated debt must be credible. Increased credibility of non-insurance of one or several groups of creditors could be enhanced if distress resolution procedures for banks were pre-specified, and if they made possible bank failures without serious disruption of the financial system. The existence …


Enforcing The Community Reinvestment Act: An Advocate's Guide To Making The Cra Work For Communities, Richard D. Marsico Jan 2001

Enforcing The Community Reinvestment Act: An Advocate's Guide To Making The Cra Work For Communities, Richard D. Marsico

Articles & Chapters

This guide to the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) is designed to provide community advocates with the basic information and skills they need to challenge bank redlining and promote economic development in their neighborhoods. The Guide includes four sections: the legal structure of the CRA; important information about banks and how to get it; analyzing a bank's CRA records, and participating in the CRA enforcement process.


Double, Double Toil And Trouble: Bank Regulatory Policy At Mid-Decade, Michael P. Malloy Jan 1995

Double, Double Toil And Trouble: Bank Regulatory Policy At Mid-Decade, Michael P. Malloy

Fordham Law Review

No abstract provided.


What Is Wrong With The American Banking System And What To Do About It, Arthur John Keeffe, Mary S. Head Jan 1977

What Is Wrong With The American Banking System And What To Do About It, Arthur John Keeffe, Mary S. Head

Maryland Law Review

No abstract provided.


The Federal Bank Commission Act: A Proposal To Consolidate The Federal Banking Agencies, Laurie Leader Jan 1976

The Federal Bank Commission Act: A Proposal To Consolidate The Federal Banking Agencies, Laurie Leader

Cleveland State Law Review

As background to an examination of the Federal Bank Commission Act, this Note will explore the two most important causes of the deficiencies in the present commercial banking system. The first cause is the existence of a "dual banking" system, under which banks may choose between state or federal charters. The resulting division of regulatory authority encourages banks to "shop" for the most favorable regulation. The second major cause of deficiencies in the banking system is the three-tiered organization of federal regulation. The Act consolidates the three federal agencies into a single regulatory Commission. Emphasis also will be placed on …