Law Commons^™

Behavioral Antitrust, Amanda P. Reeves, Maurice E. Stucke

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Antitrust Law - Affirmative Acts And Antitrust - The Need For A Consistent Tolling Standard In Cases Of Fraudulent Concealment, Amber Davis-Tanner

University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review

No abstract provided.

Harmful Freedom Of Choice: Lessons From The Cellphone Market , Adi Ayal

Law and Contemporary Problems

This article focuses on the relationship between provider and customer, specifically on the complexity of available contracts in the cellphone market and the ways this complexity might be harmful to consumers. This article aims to elucidate the issues, fleshing them out both as a general phenomenon and as a specific implementation in the cellphone context. The aim is not to provide ultimate solutions, but to show the directions these solutions might take and the difficulties involved.

The Firm As Cartel Manager, Herbert Hovenkamp, Christopher R. Leslie

Vanderbilt Law Review

Antitrust law is the primary legal obstacle to price fixing, which is condemned by Section One of the Sherman Act. Section One condemns only concerted action between separate entities, not unilateral conduct by a single entity. Firms that engage in price fixing may try to reduce the risk of antitrust liability by structuring their actions to appear to be those of a unified single entity that is beyond the reach of Section One.

In this Article, Professors Hovenkamp and Leslie examine how price-fixing cartels govern themselves and maximize their profits by cooperating and colluding, instead of competing. They then use …

Lessons For Competition Law From The Economic Crisis: The Prospect For Antitrust Responses To The “Too-Big-To-Fail” Phenomenon, Jesse W. W. Markham, Jr.

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

This article examines whether, and the extent to which, antitrust law could contribute to a broader regulatory effort to control the too-big-to-fail problem. The article begins by exploring the nature of the problem. Against this backdrop, it considers antitrust policy and rules to evaluate whether antitrust might play a meaningful role. The article concludes that antitrust law, if vigorously enforced with an emphasis on avoiding too-big-to-fail problems, can be a useful public policy tool to address the problem. However, it can come nowhere near solving it or preventing recurrences of recent systemic failures.

Why Copperweld Was Actually Kind Of Dumb: Sound, Fury And The Once And Still Missing Antitrust Theory Of The Firm, Chris Sagers

Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal

No abstract provided.

American Needle And The Application Of The Sherman Act To Professional Sports Leagues, Gregory J. Werden

Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal

No abstract provided.

A Re-Examination Of The Convergence Of Antitrust Law And Professional Sports Leagues, Christine A. Miller

Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Is There Life After Death For Sports League Immunity - American Needle And Beyond, Meir Feder

Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Novel Neutrality Claims Against Internet Platforms: A Reasonable Framework For Initial Scrutiny , Jeffrey Jarosch

Cleveland State Law Review

This Article examines a recent trend in which the Federal Trade Commission and other enforcement agencies investigate Internet platforms for behavior that is insufficiently “neutral” towards users or third parties that interact with the platform. For example, Google faces a formal FTC investigation based on allegations that it has tinkered with search results rather than presenting users with a “neutral” result. Twitter faces a formal investigation after the social media service restricted the ways in which third party developers could interact with Twitter through its application programming interface (“API”). These investigations represent a new attempt to shift the network neutrality …

Multiemployer Bargaining And Monopoly: Labor-Management Collusion And A Partial Solution, Anthony B. Sanders

West Virginia Law Review

Multiemployer collective bargaining relationships between un- ions and employer associations easily devolve into legalized cartels. Once unions establish themselves as the bargaining representative for employers' employees, the employers have much to gain from banding together as an association, raising their prices and eliminating non-union competition, with unions happily serving as enforcement agents in the scheme. In return, unions receive a share of the increased oligopolistic profits in the form of higher wages and benefits. A threat to such a cartel is an employer who wants to bargain with the union but does not want to accept the terms the associ- …